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 CHAPTER 1: Rural Identity in American Political Behavior 
 
 Urban-rural polarization in the United States is not new, but it seems to be 
increasingly prominent in American politics in the past several decades, particularly since 
the end of the 2000s. Why do rural areas tend to be more right-wing, particularly in the 
contemporary U.S.? Some have argued that this difference stems from geographic 
sorting; i.e., that the demographic groups that tend toward supporting the Republican 
Party also tend to live in rural areas (older, whiter, non-college educated, more religious, 
etc.), while those groups who tend to support Democrats tend to move to or live in 
metropolitan areas (younger, non-white, college educated, etc.) (Bishop 2008). Once 
people geographically sort, then the echo chamber effect of homophily comes into play 
(Gimpel et al. 2020). Some scholars, however, have argued that this is not a 
comprehensive explanation, saying that other factors beyond sorting have driven the 
urban-rural divide. These factors most typically include elements such as different local 
economic characteristics (Rodden 2020; Scala et al. 2015) and different cultural or 
psychological differences related to place (Cramer 2012; 2016; Munis 2020; Lyons and 
Utych 2021; Parker et al. 2017).   
 However, some scholars have found that geographic sorting does not even 
account for the majority of the urban-rural difference in voting (Martin and Webster 
2018). Further, geographic sorting and homophily are limited explanations because they 
do not account for why certain people live in certain places in the first place, while also 
assuming the political psychology behind political attitudes across the urban-rural divide 
is the same. I, among others, argue that this is not the case. For example, existing studies 
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on rural public opinion and political behavior in American politics particularly highlight 
anti-elitist and anti-big government tendencies, rather than being strictly right-leaning. 
Cramer (2016) finds rural identifiers to be particularly inclined toward “outsider” 
Republican Tea Party candidates such as Scott Walker, as well as distrust of public 
officials. Historically, the People’s Party in the United States was very strongly rooted in 
agricultural concerns during the Gilded Age, as rising food prices pitted rural, Southern, 
and agricultural producer interests against metropolitan consumer interests that led to 
moralistic distinctions between rural and urban areas (Macleod 2009; Trachtenberg 
2007). Similarly, anti-intellectualism (a component of anti-elitism and populist 
sentiment) was found to be strong in parts of rural America before and during the middle 
of the 20th Century (Hofstadter 1963). Although the anti-elitism has shifted from 
resentment of politicians, the rich, and intellectuals/experts to just politicians and 
intellectuals/experts, it seems that populist tendencies in particular run strong in the rural 
United States. 
Therefore, while geographic sorting and economic differences undoubtably 
contribute, psychological and cultural differences between urban and rural America are 
an important but not well understood or researched factor when considering the political 
differences in this division. This project therefore delves further into rural identity – a 
psychological attachment to rurality or small-town life that encompasses a particular set 
of values and worldview – and its role in American politics. Rural identifiers tend to 
psychologically attach themselves to where they live, as they perceive their surroundings 
as an indicator of a broader cultural and values-based difference between rural and non-
rural America (Cramer 2012; 2016; Lyons and Utych 2020; Parker et al. 2018).  
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My first major contribution is in clarifying what rural identity is not. Unlike 
previous scholarship on rural identity in political science, I argue that rural identity in the 
contemporary United States is not determined by its affiliation with the white working 
class or economic concerns, nor is it primarily based on anti-urban resentment per se. 
Rural identity is not tied to working-class concerns or working-class identity, as is 
commonly thought (Cramer 2012), because Social Identity Theory (SIT) predicts that 
intergroup dynamics rest mostly on symbolic and/or non-material concerns relating to 
group respect and norms (Huddy 2003). As I show in a later chapter, I indeed find that 
rural social identity is not affiliated with working class indicators (if anything, it is more 
affiliated with the rural middle to upper class,) nor is it strongly tied to personal economic 
concerns. Thus, it is not primarily based in individual class or economic interests but 
symbolic and status-based concerns. That said, group threat is likely triggered by local 
economic decline, but this dynamic does not depend on individual level decline or 
personal economic characteristics or threats. At one point, rural identity and 
consciousness in the U.S. were indeed rooted in individual and group class and economic 
concerns – most certainly during the Gilded Age – but has since become more symbolic. 
I also said above that rural identity is not defined by anti-urban resentment – again 
going against conventional wisdom – which leads me to talk about what rural identity is. 
I argue that such resentment extends more to specific urban-affiliated groups but not to 
all urban residents. Rural social identifiers – particularly white rural social identifiers – 
occupy a middle status group within the group status hierarchy, rather than a low status 
one as suggested by previous literature. According to SIT, such a position encourages 
distinction – and resentment – against the higher status group or groups while also 
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creating distance from lower status groups via negative comparisons to maintain higher 
group status. This has resulted in most rural social identifiers being amenable to right-
wing populism, whether it be construed as a thin ideology (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013) 
or not because it naturally conforms to this middling position. Rural identifiers can feel 
positive ingroup pride by perceiving themselves as the morally good people being 
forgotten or looked down upon by elites – typically affiliated with urban areas and the 
coasts – who, under right-wing populism, favor lower status groups perceived as 
undeserving and cutting ahead in line (for instance, immigrants) (Hochschild 2016).  
Rural identity – especially for those on the right - thus has (at least) two urban-
affiliated out-groups: 1) experts and intellectuals, and, 2) immigrants or other lower-
status groups; the lower-status out-groups are something not fully covered in existing 
literature, such as work by Cramer (2012; 2016). This explains why rural areas tend to be 
particularly unhospitable to immigrants (Fennelly and Federico 2008), even before the 
Tea Party and the Trump presidency, as well as being more prone to anti-intellectualism 
and suspicion of scientific and medical expertise and recommendations (Callaghan et al. 
2021; Hofstadter 1963), which has important consequences not just for understanding 
public opinion and political behavior, but also for public health and science 
communication.  
Undergirding this broader argument of what rural identity is and is not regarding 
political outcomes, my study contributes to the nascent literature of rural identity in 
contemporary American politics by asserting three things. 
First, addressing the rural identity out-group as metro areas or urban areas does 
not adequately capture the complex dynamic of rural areas and the nature of their 
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relationship and concerns vis a vis other groups in society. Urban areas are a geographic 
signifier of certain groups occupying those spaces, such as experts, professionals, and 
intellectuals, as well as lower status groups such as immigrants and the (racialized) urban 
poor. Further, metro areas contain other groups that may be seen neutrally or even 
positively by rural residents. 
Second, this study further delineates what it means to have a rural identity; what 
is the content and nature of it, particularly throughout the United States. I, unlike other 
scholars, argue that rurality itself constitutes a group, while others have interpreted 
ethnographic work on rural identity by scholars such as Cramer (2012; 2016) to be 
referring simply to place-based attachment or resentment (Farhart and Sheagley n.d.; 
Munis 2020). In contrast, I argue that there is a particular characteristic of low population 
density that encourages feelings of being passed over or looked down upon by those 
closer to loci of power; such feelings have long historical legacies in the U.S. (Hofstadter 
1963) and potentially elsewhere.  
Third, this study also adds to the debate surrounding how to best measure the 
urban-rural continuum when considering political outcomes. Recent work by Nemerever 
and Rogers (2020) suggests that a way to do so in political science is oftentimes to 
measure subjective identification along the urban-rural continuum, as objective measures 
(such as Census or USDA designations) do not adequately capture where people feel they 
belong, and the feeling ultimately determines other attitudes and behaviors rather than the 
objective categorization. Measuring the strength of group identification allows us to 
better isolate underlying norms, values, and dynamics driving the perceived differences 
between urban and rural America. 
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Therefore, a better understanding of rural identity can provide a major 
contribution to literature on the urban-rural political divide – and to political behavior and 
public opinion - in the social sciences (and beyond) because it clarifies the subjective 
beliefs and the underlying perceived differences in values and worldview associated with 
population density. Although in this project I only examine the contemporary United 
States, I suspect that my work here could explain why rural areas tend to have more 
populist predilections not just in recent years in the U.S., but also in other Western 
developed countries historically and today (though this, of course, is a direction for future 
research). I present evidence for the above assertions by drawing from a series of original 
surveys and survey experiments conducted between 2016 and 2020, as well as other 
survey datasets such as the Cooperative Congressional Election Studies and the American 
National Election Studies 2019 pilot. In addition, I also use county-level demographics 
and economic data compiled from various sources. This methodological approach is a 
departure from much of the previous work on rural identity in the social sciences; I do so 
because my primary aim is hypothesis testing based on scholars such as Cramer (2012; 
2016) at the national level. Further, given that my theoretical approach relies on ideas 
from social psychology, I also employ methods used by this field (such as survey 
experiments) to verify findings. 
 I proceed with my argument as follows. In Chapter 2, I first review the 
characteristics and explanations of the urban-rural divide in existing literature, and then 
consider in particular the expected role of rural identity in American public opinion and 
political behavior, including what gaps exist in our understanding of the topic. I also 
discuss the theoretical underpinnings of identity – particularly social identity – as well as 
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populism to build my argument. Then, I lay out a plan of action for empirical analysis. 
Next, in Chapter 3, using original survey data I detail my primary measure of rural social 
identity, based on Huddy et al. (2015)’s partisan identity strength scale. I use this 
measure to examine affect toward urban and rural areas, who rural identifiers are, what 
their partisan and ideological (symbolic and operational) tendencies are, and their 
attitudes toward immigration, anti-political elitism, and anti-intellectualism – three 
dimensions which are strongly tied to populism. Here I find that rural identity tends to be 
rooted more in positive in-group affect rather than negative affect or resentment toward 
urban areas, contrary to previous work (Cramer 2016). Rural identity strength does not 
differ between rural respondent race or ethnicity. Further, rural identifiers are more likely 
to identify as conservative and support Trump, though operationally they are not more 
conservative on economic or social issues. As expected, rural identity is strongly 
affiliated with more restrictive immigration attitudes and anti-intellectualism. These 
tendencies hold for non-white rural identifiers as well as white rural identifiers. 
In Chapter 4, using original survey data and a county-level dataset, I examine the 
role of class and education – an oftentimes associated characteristic of both rural identity 
and populist tendencies – to examine how much economic interests play a role. SIT 
suggests that material interests should play less of a role compared to symbolic and 
status-based interests (Huddy 2003). I find that rural identifiers are not more likely to be 
working class, lower in education level, or poorer. In fact, when there is a significant 
relationship between rural identification and class variables, it is the middle to upper class 
individuals who tend to be rural identifiers. However, the rural identifiers in local areas 
that recently suffered economic decline have a much stronger tendency to support Trump 
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– a right wing populist president whose support is predicted by rural identity – compared 
to stronger rural identifiers in locales that have been doing well since the Great 
Recession. Given the findings from this chapter, I conclude that rural identity is indeed a 
symbolic or status-based phenomenon that does take into account local or group-based 
threats (rather than individual material threats), as would be expected by SIT. This runs 
counter to many scholars’ and popular commentators’ assumption that the white working 
class being nearly interchangeable with rural areas when it comes to explaining political 
outcomes and the concerns of rural America (Cramer 2012; Fukuyama 2018). This 
chapter’s findings also account for the role of other noted factors of the urban-rural divide 
being less prominent in explaining vote choice, such as manufacturing and agricultural 
dependence (Rodden 2020; Scala et al. 2015). 
In Chapter 5, I look at rural identity and respect toward rural areas in relation to 
immigration and affect toward immigrants – particularly undocumented immigrants – via 
cross-lagged models and an original survey experiment. I find that increases in rural 
social identity for whites correspond to less pro-immigration policy attitudes later on, but 
not vice versa; this finding does not hold for non-white respondents. In addition, being 
experimentally exposed to sympathetic language about the perceived disrespect of rural 
areas in broader culture increases positive affect toward undocumented immigrants 
compared to the control group for rural respondents and white rural respondents; it is 
unclear what occurs with non-white rural respondents due to a small sample size. Further, 
there is no significant difference between the control group’s attitudes toward 
undocumented immigrants when exposing rural participants to either the economic 
inequality between rural-urban areas or to potential concerns over demographic increases 
9 
 
in non-white populations in rural areas (mostly due to immigrants and immigrant 
populations).  
Next, in Chapter 6 I look at the role of anti-intellectualism, or distrust of experts 
and intellectuals, in rural identity. Anti-intellectualism is strongly related to populist 
sentiment and is a known predictor of a host of attitudes and behaviors that go against 
scientific and medical consensus (Merkley 2020; Motta 2018; Oliver and Rahn 2016). 
Using survey data and experimental evidence, I find that rural identity is strongly 
associated with both anti-intellectualism and health/science misinformation adoption. 
Further, in an experiment, I also find that activating rural identity for rural respondents 
increases anti-intellectualism. Finally, Chapter 7 ties together the findings in the previous 
chapters, reiterates the argument, discusses this study’s implications and limitations, and 
provides avenues for future research and exploration. 
With this project, my hope is to further advance our understanding of not just 
rural public opinion and political psychology, but political behavior more broadly. It aims 
to move beyond stereotypical accounts of what it means to be rural; popular culture and 
even parts of academia paint residents of the countryside as either idyllic and pure, or 
backwards, working-class white supremacists. Instead, I try to answer questions of why 
rural areas tend to think and act different politically using an approach grounded in 
group-based psychology. Rural identifiers and what they believe in are not wholly good 
or bad, and as in any study of group-based behavior, I acknowledge that not all trends and 
relationships I present here are true of all individuals within that group. However, politics 
– especially in the contemporary United States – are dominated by tribalism and 
intergroup competition for respect, status, and dignity (Fukuyama 2018), and for this 
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reason some essentializing and simplification are needed to understand broader group-
based trends and large-scale concerns. Throughout this work, I strive to strike a balance 
between highlighting how the political attitudes of many rural residents are 
misunderstood and misrepresented, while also remaining clear-eyed and unapologetic 
about the potentially problematic or worrisome tendencies that could help jeopardize the 
functioning of our society as well as the health of American democracy – and the health 




CHAPTER 2: The Urban-Rural Divide and Rural Identification as “the People” 
 
“People in small towns, much more than in cities, share a destiny.” 
- Richard Russo 
 
 Why do rural areas tend to be more right-wing, particularly in the contemporary 
U.S.? In the following chapter, I begin to answer this question and accomplish several 
things. First, I provide further context on what the urban-rural divide is and existing 
explanations for what drives it. I then focus on the role of rural identity and cultural 
differences between rural and urban America, while also discussing the gaps within 
existing studies on rural identity. Second, I turn to a review of Social Identity Theory 
(SIT), which can help fill some of these gaps by illuminating expectations of group 
hierarchies and how the groups will act and think based on their relative status. Third, I 
review definitions of populism and how populism provides an appealing ideological 
framework that adequately encompasses both concerns that are specific to rurality and 
that speak to its middle group status in society. 
 Next, I synthesize these different strands of literature to explain my overarching 
argument and the expectations for the subsequent chapters:  that rural identity is 
concerned with symbolic and not material matters and positions its out-groups as 
elites/experts and immigrants or other low-status outsiders, both of which are urban-
adjacent. These tendencies help explain why rural areas in the United States are less 
supportive of more open immigration policies, are more supportive of “outsider” or 
populist candidates, and why rural areas are more closed off to attitudes informed from 
scientific and health expert consensus. Further, rural areas are generally associated with 
conservatism but not fully – for instance, stronger rural identifiers are not more or less 
likely to be Republicans than weaker rural identifiers (see Chapter 3; Munis 2020) – as 
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right-wing populism has not neatly fit onto the Republican platform in the past few 
decades (Oliver and Rahn 2016).  
 Finally, I close the chapter by briefly outlining the data sources of this project, as 
many of the same data sources appear in different chapters to provide evidence for 
different facets of the overall argument. My argument largely rests on survey and survey 
experiment data conducted via Lucid or YouGov between 2018 and 2020, though I also 
incorporate a county-level data set I created from various sources, including the Census, 
the United States Department of Agriculture, and other similar sources. 
 
How Do Rural Areas Differ, and Why? 
 
The Urban-Rural Political Divide 
Probably the most talked-about difference between rural and non-rural areas1 in 
the United States, politically speaking, has been in terms of recent presidential vote 
choice and partisanship. After the 2016 presidential election, many public figures and 
scholars discussed the presence of a urban-rural voting divide, with 62% of rural areas 
supporting Donald Trump and urban areas overwhelmingly voting for Hillary Clinton 
(Morin 2016). Maps of the United States showing county or district presidential vote 
share by party revealed blue metro islands in a sea of red. The urban-rural divide in 
voting and partisanship in the United States has therefore become linked with Donald 
Trump in many of these post-election accounts, leading some to conclude that theories 
explaining the rise of Donald Trump also explain the seemingly new urban-rural divide in 
American politics.  
                                                          
1 Please see the chapter appendix for an in-depth discussion of how rural and urban are measured in the 
context of the present study. 
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Figure 2.1: Registered voters in the U.S. by urban, suburban, and rural designated 
counties. 
 
However, contrary to this narrative, urban-rural polarization did not suddenly 
appear in 2016 (Figure 2.1 above). According to Pew Research, for example, voter 
registration by county has polarized along the urban-rural continuum especially since the 
late 2000s. If one looks at the right-hand side of this figure, the Republican/Lean 
Republican trend line for rural counties jumped toward Republican support in the late 
2000s, while for urban counties, Republican support has slowly but steadily been 
decreasing. Similarly, some scholars noted a urban-rural divide in the 2000 and 2004 
presidential elections where there previously had been none (Gimpel and Karnes 2006; 
McKee 2007). Rodden (2019, pg. 6) finds a nearly 50-percentage point difference in 
county-level presidential candidate vote share between the most and least population 
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dense counties in the mid to late 2010s. In 1960, this was a 15-percentage point 
difference. Other scholars have noted recent urban-rural differences in partisanship and 
various ideological attitudes; across the board, non-metropolitan areas tended to be more 
Republican and more conservative on issue stances, than metropolitan areas in 2012 and 
in 2016 (Scala and Johnson 2017). This study also notes that immigration and racial 
attitudes appear to be the most divisive issues across the urban-rural continuum. In 
summary, although the 2016 presidential election provides a more visual and poignant 
illustration, the urban-rural divide - in partisanship, vote choice, and ideology - has been 
widening for at least a decade. That said, swing states tend to have less of a stark divide 
between urban and rural districts (McKee 2008). 
Even though there has been a gap in the urban-rural divide for quite some time, 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show a particular partisan widening in rural areas (as well as in 
smaller or more distant suburbs and in small cities in outstate areas) since 2008/2009. 





Figure 2.2: Congressional and Presidential Vote by Rurality over time. 
Note: Taken from https://www.dailyyonder.com/contrary-hear-rural-urban-gap-didnt-grow-2018-
election/2019/03/14/ . Original caption from website: “The chart shows the percent of the two-party vote 
Republicans and Democrats received in congressional (red and blue lines) and presidential elections (red 
and blue bars) from 2006 to 2018. Each chart represents a different category of county on the spectrum 
from urban to rural. Democrats gained in every county type in 2018, and the gap between the most urban 
and most rural voters remained about the same as 2016. (Daily Yonder graphic. Data source: Dave Leip’s 
Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections).” 
 
Large-Scale Explanations for the Urban-Rural Divide: Geographic Sorting and 
Homophily 
 
 Although it appears that the urban-rural divide has been in place in the United 
States for quite some time, and that metro areas have consistently supported Democratic 
presidential and Congressional candidates at stable rates for a couple decades (for the 
most part), rural areas experienced a notable shift in the right-ward direction since the 
late 2000s especially. This right-ward shift has occurred not just regarding vote choice, 
but also in partisan affiliation and ideology. 
Why might this be the case? One very prominent explanation has been geographic 
sorting. The Republican base matches several demographic characteristics, including 
being white, male, lower in education level, and part of the perceived working class. This 
has sparked literature and speculation along a number of demographic features and their 
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corresponding group identification, such as white identity (Jardina 2019) or the fall of the 
white working class (Gest 2016), as well as the partisan and racial “us versus them” that 
Trump has helped foster (Abramowitz 2018; Frey 2018; Newman et al. 2018; Sides et al. 
2017). These demographics have not only tended to increasingly predict Republican 
support; they are also more common in rural America – though white identity is only 
modestly correlated with rural residence.   
So, according to this line of thinking, the urban-rural divide results from 
geographic sorting, with right-wing sympathizers increasingly moving to (or remaining 
in) rural areas, and left-wing supporters concentrating in urban areas (Bishop 2009; 
Bishop and Cushing 2008; McKee 2008; Motyl et al. 2014; Tam et al. 2013). Younger 
and more educated individuals are increasingly finding jobs in cities, and whites are 
moving out of city centers (Kaufman 2019; Rodden 2019). This leaves the average rural 
area disproportionately older, whiter, more religious, less educated, more working class, 
and so on, all of which correlate with Republican support regardless of where one lives. 
In other words, according to the geographic sorting hypothesis, there is no real difference 
between a Republican in an urban area and a Republican in a rural area; they have similar 
positions and goals, they support similar candidates, they behave in similar ways, and 
they expect similar things from the government. According to this explanation, 
individuals who live in rural areas that do not fit the typical profile of a Republican would 
move if given the chance.  
That said, there is a fairly common-sense reason why the geographic sorting 
argument is an insufficient explanation to explain the urban-rural divide. If geographic 
sorting were the only explanation, then we would expect the urban-rural divide to slowly 
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widen over time, barring any sudden exodus of people from the countryside. However, 
there seems to have been a particular jump in the past decade or so in particular. Looking 
again at Figure 2.1, for instance, there is a sudden widening of Republican versus 
Democratic party registration for rural counties in the late 2000s. Further, this 
explanation does not consider factors that may be driving demographic sorting in the first 
place, nor does it consider that there may be differences between those of the same party 
along the urban-rural continuum. 
The sorting argument has been challenged empirically by different researchers 
(Abrams and Fiorina 2012; Darmofal and Strickler 2016; Gimpel et al. 2020; Mummolo 
and Nall 2017). These researchers challenge the geographic sorting argument either 
because there is little to no evidence for it, or because it is unclear what factors people 
would be sorting along. A study by Lewis and Baldassare (2010) finds that Republicans 
prefer rural areas while Democrats prefer urban areas, though this is only a measure of 
preference and not actual moving behavior. People who do move tend to move to similar 
communities (rural to rural, suburb to suburb, etc.) and giving positive ratings to urban or 
rural individuals was found to not impact geographic sorting behavior among self-
identified Democrats or Republicans (Mummolo and Nall 2017; Noe and Barber 1993). 
Some scholars that promote the sorting argument for the urban-rural divide do admit to 
there being some contextual, or place-based, effects (Kaufman 2019; Rodden 2019), 
particularly via social influence and the re-shaping of one’s interpersonal networks 
(Gimpel et al. 2020). Martin and Webster (2018) find that there is a contextual effect on 
vote choice beyond residential sorting, though the study does not explore the nature of 
this contextual effect.  
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Furthermore, much of what might drive people to want to move to a different area 
in the first place is the result of psychological or contextual effects - an incongruence 
between one’s identity and values and the ambient cues and values in the current 
environment (Motyl 2016; Motyl et al. 2014). For example, someone who lives in a city 
but also enjoys hunting and a slower pace of life may not feel a belonging with their 
urban surroundings, and instead feel an affinity with rural areas that eventually drives 
them to move to a small town. Or, an LGBTQ individual in a rural area may feel at odds 
with the surrounding culture on account of their sexual identity, and therefore move to a 
more tolerant urban area (Lick et al. 2012; Smart and Klein 2013). Research in 
psychology finds that people pick up on environmental cues that predict inhabitants’ cues 
on whether an individual’s social group identity would be accepted in the environment 
(Cheryan et al. 2009; Gosling et al. 2002; Purdie-Vaughns et al. 2008). Experiencing an 
incongruence between moral values of the community and the individual not only makes 
people feel uncomfortable; they are also more likely to move to a community with a 
better fit (Haidt and Graham 2007; Motyl et al. 2011; Schimel et al. 2007).  
Therefore, a contextually-driven place-based identity such as rural identity or 
community-level changes, both of which I discuss in more detail in the next section, may 
interact with geographic sorting, rather than geographic sorting and place-based factors 
being competing explanations. Once a person finds a community that is more congruent, 
their own tendencies may then become exacerbated, for example. Some scholars have 
found that neighbors and friends in the area influence one another’s attitudes, as another 
example, and social network homogeneity versus heterogeneity of attitudes would likely 
change the nature of attitude influence (Cho and Gimpel 2012; Gimpel et al. 2008; 2020; 
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McKee and Teigan 2009). In any case, the geographic sorting argument is a partial but 
not sufficient explanation for the urban-rural political divide, or for the political 
tendencies of rural areas. 
Large-Scale Explanations for the Urban-Rural Divide: Economic Issues 
Some scholars have found and delved into what the above-mentioned contextual 
effects might be. The first of these relates to large-scale economic changes that have 
affected rural areas. Many rural areas in the United States have faced ongoing, medium- 
and long-term economic problems; as a result, these areas have experienced long-term 
economic decline and a more recent lack of recovery from the Great Recession. Local 
economies can exert an influence on the community and the individuals within that 
community in a major sense. Many scholars and popular writers have pointed to the 
partial shift of the white working class from supporting Democrats to backing 
Republicans in recent years (Gest 2016; Lamont and Park 2017). In the 2016 presidential 
elections, high white working-class areas – including some rural areas - tended to vote for 
Trump, and were also more prone to substance abuse, deaths of despair, and an overall 
drop in well-being; much of this is attributed to lower intergenerational rates of social and 
economic mobility as well as relative economic deprivation (Chetty et al. 2014; Monnat 
and Brown 2016; Rothwell and Diego-Rosell 2016; Wasfy et al. 2017). This is especially 
true of less educated and working-class whites in the South and the Midwest, compared 
to other regions (Smith and Hanley 2019). Many working-class whites work in 
manufacturing – a sector that has been on the decline in the United States - and the local 
economies of rural areas have been disproportionately more reliant on manufacturing 
compared those of suburban or urban areas (Rodden 2019; Westcott and Contact 2010).  
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Two other industries common to rural areas – agriculture and mining – have also 
taken hits due to long term factors in the national and global economy. Agriculture in 
particular has shifted from small-scale farming to industrial farming in the past half 
century, making it more industrialized in nature and subject to similar trends as 
manufacturing. Further compounding this issue, the local economies of many rural areas, 
particularly those reliant on agriculture and mining, fluctuate according to commodity 
prices. Commodity prices do not always rise with an otherwise growing economy, and in 
many instances are countercyclical to broader national economic growth. For example, 
many commodity prices dropped in the mid-2010s - including crop prices (Figure 2.3) 
and metal prices - while the rest of the U.S. economy experienced ongoing growth. These 
things, along with outmigration of educated workers, have led to poor recovery in rural 
areas since the start of the Great Recession in terms of county job, wage, and GDP 
growth (Figures 2.4 and 2.5) (Farrigan 2019). Economically distressed zip codes - which 
are disproportionately rural - are further locked into a catch-22 because raising the 
education level of residents helps relieve economic decline, but the cost of getting post-




Figure 2.3: Select U.S. crop prices over time, USDA statistics. 
 










Figure 2.5: Annual growth rate for large metro, small metro, and non-metro counties, 
2001-2017. 
 
In line with these economic trends, Scala and colleagues find that rural areas with 
different types of economies tend to vote more or less Republican in recent presidential 
elections. For example, poorer and/or farming-dependent communities voted more 
conservative, while amenity- or recreation-based rural economies voted more liberal in 
2012 and 2016 (Scala and Johnson 2017; Scala et al. 2015). Similarly, Muro et al. (2019) 
find that, over the past decade, local economies of Republican-leaning districts are 
declining in terms of income and G.D.P., while Democratic-leaning districts are 
improving. This has been echoed in interviews with rural residents. For example, in 
Wisconsin, one interviewee mentioned how the industrialization of dairy farming 
depleted the town of its community, creating bitterness and a chasm between rural and 
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urban areas (Kaufman 2018). It has long been known that recent economic trends 
determine vote choice, particularly for swing voters (Achen and Bartels 2016; Lenz 
2012); though the overall economy had been doing better in the 2010s, this recovery was 
uneven and rural areas may have been voting according to more local economic 
conditions than national ones. 
As mentioned above briefly, population loss has much to do with this trend. 
Geographic sorting - the movement of young, educated people to cities - is responsible in 
part for the urban-rural split, but it also becomes highly problematic for the local 
economies and social structure of rural areas. Figure 2.6 below shows the net population 
loss over time according to metro versus non-metro areas.  
 













A lack of working-age adults damages the economy due to a dearth in higher-
paying jobs makes it difficult for certain fixtures of daily life to continue - such as 
medical care, legal services, adequate education, local governance, etc. Furthermore, less 
of this population group means less children are born in rural areas, further worsening the 
population loss. Although pockets of immigration have helped reverse this trend in 
certain rural areas, overall, there has been a net loss in population. 
In a variety of direct and indirect ways, economic and population-based decline, 
along  
with the collapse of local organizations or other groups that form chances for social 
support, have driven an uptick in social, economic, and public health issues in the rural 
United States. Such larger forces undoubtably impact people living in affected areas and 
relate to political outcomes recently. However, this does not fully explain how 
individuals link what is going on with political outcomes. In the next section, I outline the 
theoretical background of how rural areas might experience these changes at the 
individual psychological level by introducing Social Identity Theory (SIT), then applying 
this theory to rural identity. 
 
Expectations from Social Identity Theory 
 
The field of social psychology has long studied the role of group dynamics and 
group conflict, especially using Social Identity Theory (SIT). According to SIT, humans 
have a psychologically based and automatic tendency to form groups. We can form 
groups under the most minimal of circumstances or differences (Duckitt 2003; Tajfel and 
Turner 1979; Tajfel 1974). This happens because individual self-esteem increases when 
25 
 
we identify with a group; if the group is positively distinct, then group members’ self-
image is enhanced (Abrams and Hogg 1988). This personal identification with a group is 
known as a social identity, or a psychological and internalized sense of group attachment 
(Conover 1984; Huddy 2003; Lau 1989; Miller et al. 1981).  
We then tend to view others in our group – the in-group – positively, while those 
not in our group – the out-group – tend to be viewed less favorably. Even minimal 
arbitrary assignment of individuals to groups creates in-group favoritism (Schildkraut 
2014; Tajfel 1981; Wong 2010). People tend to favor members of the in-group and imbue 
positive characteristics onto them. When a higher-status group begins doing this, status 
hierarchies between groups form (Roth and Rios 2020). Members of the outgroup are 
sometimes - but not necessarily – viewed with suspicion and or are seen negatively. 
Although out-group dislike does not always occur (Brewer 1999), such dislike tends to 
occur under certain circumstances, such as in-group threat or intergroup competition 
(Blalock 1967; Grieve and Hogg 1999). Certain people are more likely to see the world in 
an “us versus them” way, especially when elites make certain groups salient and 
antagonistic (Kinder and Kam 2009). For instance, those high in Social Dominance 
Orientation (Sidanius and Pratto 1999), those high in Need for Cognitive Closure (Luttig 
2018), or those who are more sensitive to threat (Jardina 2019) are more likely to see the 
world in terms of group-based dynamics and status hierarchies of these groups. 
Despite the common binary “us versus them” conclusions stemming from SIT – 
which often do occur in practice - there can actually be multiple groups placed within a 
social hierarchy rather than simply two competing high-status and low-status groups. The 
intermediate-status groups vary in their intergroup dynamics depending on hierarchical 
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conditions, according to social psychology research. For these middling groups, 
downward social comparisons maintain positive in-group identification through 
distinction, while also holding some bias against higher-status groups, particularly in 
times of heightened in-group threat. In times of lessened group threat, these intermediate 
groups become more resentful of higher-status groups and less negative toward the 
lower-status group (Caricati and Monacelli 2010; 2012). Previous research on SIT says 
that individuals within groups tend to be more hostile toward out-groups when group 
positions within the social hierarchy are unclear and unstable, and/or when resources are 
scarce (Hornsey 2008); this appears to especially be the case for intermediate-status 
groups. 
These tendencies are illustrated well in political science and sociological research 
on racial attitudes among those groups in the middle of the racial group status hierarchy. 
Intermediate-status racial groups, such as Hispanics, rate higher-status groups positively 
and lower-status groups negatively (McClain et al. 2006). Hispanics express negative 
attitudes toward Black Americans, but particularly so if they were not born in the U.S. 
(Mindiola et al. 2003); much like the social psychology research on intermediate status 
groups above, those who are more unsure or unstable in their positionality tend to be 
more hostile to the lower-status group. Similarly, Chinese immigrants sought to distance 
themselves from Black Americans in certain parts of the American South after being 
socially lumped together by the higher-status racial group (whites) (Quan 1982); here, the 
Chinese sought to maintain intermediate status by avoiding marriage to whites and by 
definitely not marrying Blacks, thus creating group distinction with more distinction from 
the lower status group (Loewen 1971, 79).  
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In addition, group identity can lead to group consciousness, the latter being seen 
as a politicized version of the former. McClain et al. (2009) define group identification 
as, “…an individual’s awareness of belonging to a certain group and having a 
psychological attachment to that group based on a perception of shared beliefs, feelings, 
interests, and ideas with other group members.” (pg. 747). Therefore, group identity 
moves beyond group membership into a psychological attachment with one’s group. 
Group identification is a distinct concept from group consciousness, in that it occurs 
when a social group has become politicized according to a set of ideological beliefs about 
the group’s social standing, and according to the belief that collective action can improve 
the group’s status and achieve the group’s goals (McClain et al. 2009; Miller et al. 1981; 
Conover 1988). Miller et al. (1981) stipulate that group consciousness is achieved if there 
is in-group identification, if there is polarized affect (towards in-group versus out-group), 
if the in-group is in a lower position than the out-group(s), and if the group’s social status 
is attributed either with individual failings or with a biased system. Group consciousness 
tends to occur in disadvantaged or minority groups, such as racial minorities in the 
United States (Brown 1931; Miller et al. 1981; Jardina 2019). Various measures exist to 
generally capture group consciousness, though linked fate is often one of these, at least 
for racial group consciousness (Chong and Rogers 2005; Lee 2007; McClain et al. 2009). 
Despite the importance of group consciousness in explaining certain phenomena, social 
group identity can still determine political outcomes and attitudes without identification 
turning into group consciousness (Jardina 2019).  
Identities matter to politics because they shape people’s attitudes and actions 
(Schildkraut 2014), though to be politically relevant, they must be both salient to the 
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individual and linked to the political climate (Posner 2004; Schildkraut 2014). The media 
in general facilitate the linking of identities to politics, but partisan news media in 
particular has exacerbated this trend, particularly among the politically involved (Lelkes 
et al. 2017; Prior 2013; 2007). Since biased partisan media is available around the clock, 
its consumers are continually aware of partisanship and other politically-relevant social 
identities (Iyengar and Westwood 2015).  
Partisanship has been a key social identity in politics over the last few decades 
because people are increasingly sorting their other identities, including race, religion, 
education, and so on, into the larger identity of partisanship. This is what Mason (2018) 
calls a mega-identity. Multiple identities that play for the same team, i.e., several 
prominent demographic characteristics of individuals, are well-sorted into one party or 
the other. For example, being white, male, lower in education level, more religious, and 
older are all affiliated with increased support for the Republican Party. This, along with a 
lack of a cross-cutting identity, exacerbates partisan polarization and affective 
polarization so that conflicts become irreconcilable. This tribalistic tendency of 
individuals is especially true of strong partisans, particularly for those who are more 
politically engaged (Bartels 2008; Iyengar and Westwood 2014; Lavine et al. 2012).  
Rural and Place-Based Identity 
Previous Literature on Rural and Place-Based Cultural Differences and Identity 
One category of social identities are place-based. Place-based identity is when a 
person’s sense of self is in part defined by their environment, and the environment takes 
on deeply symbolic or associational meaning (Dixon and Durrheim 2000; Low and 
Altman 1992). Cuba and Hummon (1993) define a place identity as an interpretation of 
the self that uses meaning from the environment to situate or symbolize identity; in other 
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words, places provide a framework to construct an identity. Identities, including those 
that are place-based, can also motivate political and social engagement (Fowler and Kam 
2007; Huddy and Khatib 2007). Place-based identity differs from place-based 
attachment; the latter is a positive affect toward a particular place, while the former 
encompasses a set of beliefs, attitudes, and emotions related to a geographic place 
(Proshansky et al. 1983). That said, place attachment is one component of place identity.  
The most prominent example of place-based identity in American politics 
research is the American or national identity, though other identities based on smaller 
geographic units have been studied to a lesser extent. American national identity has been 
found to have political impact on a variety of issues, especially regarding immigration 
(Hopkins 2018; Schildkraut 2007; 2014; Theiss-Morse 2009). Wong (2010) finds that 
Americans feel much closer to their country than to other, smaller geographic units. 
Furthermore, she finds that older and longtime residents tend to be more attached to their 
neighborhoods, cities, and states (see also Highton 2000; Sampson 1988; South and 
Crowder 1997). 
But what about the existence of a rural or urban identity? Previous work in 
sociology, and political science to a lesser extent, finds evidence to suggest that at least a 
rural identity exists in a meaningful way cross-nationally. Bell (1992), in his 
ethnographic work in a London exurb, found that residents not only felt that being from 
the country was a part of their identity; they also perceived sociocultural differences – 
such as a peaceful, quieter, tighter-knit, and more predictable lifestyle - between 
themselves (or other rural areas) and the lifestyles of urban residents. Bell points out that 
many of these differences are constructed ideals, and do not necessarily reflect real 
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differences. Despite this, the residents’ rural identity matters because it provides socio-
psychological and material benefits to the residents. Ching and Creed (1997) argue that 
rural residents see themselves as placed below urban areas in terms of the cultural 
hierarchy, where modern developed society assumes city-dwellers as the typical subject. 
Due to this perceived status, rural residents experience otherness in feelings of being 
looked down upon or invisible, perceiving an unfair access to resources (see also Cramer 
2012; 2016; Nelson 2001). Urban areas are often perceived as sophisticated, creative, and 
bastions of progress, while rural areas are characterized by larger society as backwards, 
stagnant, and generally inferior (Bryan 1981; Lay 2012; Vanderbeck and Morse Dunkley 
2003; Williams 1973).  
Rural identity and perceived differences between rural and urban areas also 
manifest themselves as cultural and lifestyle differences, such as tastes in music, clothing, 
as well as perceived differences in values (Lyons and Utych 2021; Marks 1991; Parker et 
al. 2017). Furthermore, population density, size, and diversity are conducive to change, 
innovation, and unconventional behavior (Fischer 1975; Glenn and Lester 1979). Various 
studies throughout Western developed countries have found a positive correlation 
between openness to experience and rural residency (Greaves et al. 2015; Rentfrow et al. 
2015). Rurality may therefore be directly linked to conservatism directly via a tendency 
towards more closed personalities (Johnston et al. 2017; Jost et al. 2003). A relatively 
recent review of sociological literature concluded that rural areas may also be more 
conservative due to the influence of religion on values and attitudes, as well as a lack of 
exposure to new ideas and viewpoints that comes to areas with many people from 
differing backgrounds (Lichter and Brown 2011). Therefore, one expects rural Americans 
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have more “traditional” values that are inherent to being in a lower population-density 
area.  
Ching and Creed (1997) further argue that anti-intellectualism is another 
component of rural identity, not only due to differences in education levels between rural 
and non-rural areas, but also because intellectuals assume an urban subject and the rural 
subject is either invisible or needs development and improvement. Rurality is therefore 
associated with having common sense and life experience, versus book smarts; this 
preference for common sense in rural areas has been found in more recent work as well 
(Cramer 2016; Wuthnow 2019). Older but highly influential scholarship on anti-
intellectualism found that certain parts of rural America in particular is inclined toward 
this distrust of experts and intellectuals (Hofstadter 1963). 
Work by Cramer (2012; 2016) not only gives further evidence for rural residents 
perceiving value and lifestyle differences between rural and urban areas; she also 
provides a theory of rural consciousness to explain how place-based attachment ties to 
political attitudes. The original purpose of Cramer’s book was to understand why people 
living in outstate Wisconsin held disdain for public employees. During this time 
Wisconsin also elected a Tea Party affiliated governor - Scott Walker - making Cramer’s 
work move beyond public employee animosity into other topics, such as support for 
Walker, attitudes toward Obama, certain policy positions, and so on. Cramer developed 
the concept of rural consciousness, which is an identification of being rural along with a 
feeling that rural residents are treated unfairly by elites and policy makers, both of whom 
the rural residents associated with cities or urban centers. Rural residents felt disrespected 
or looked down upon by these groups and were proud of their rural way of life and 
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values, which include hard work, slower pace of life, and common sense. Similar out-
group resentment and anger has been found in other sociological studies of rural areas, 
with the out-group foils being urban residents, professionals, and the federal government 
(Hochschild 2016; Wuthnow 2019). In these works, a key component of place-based 
consciousness is the affective of anger and resentment to non-rural residents.  
These feelings of place-based identification were also linked to perceptions of 
economic unfairness, where rural residents felt they were not receiving their fair share of 
government funding despite the perception that their area needed help. Similarly, earlier 
work by Cramer (2012) highlights that rural identity is contingent on working class 
identity. Finally, Cramer also says rural consciousness comes with a feeling that 
policymakers and other leaders do not adequately represent the interests of rural areas. 
Cramer’s notion of rural consciousness meets the stipulation that the group – rural 
residents – have ideological beliefs about their social standing (i.e., that they are at a 
disadvantage compared to urban areas). In addition, it appears that the rural residents 
interviewed by Cramer identified with being a rural resident. However, these works fail 
to provide evidence that the group wants to engage in collective action to better their 
position; the interviewees in Cramer’s ethnographic study seemed to share a certain set of 
political attitudes and vote preferences, but they did not appear to be actively mobilizing 
in a political sense. A desire for collective action to better the group’s position is a 
necessary component of group consciousness (Miller et al. 1981). Therefore, Cramer’s 
work does not parse out group membership or group identification from group 
consciousness. Other scholars have noted that people who identify with a social group 
engage in various forms of managing this identity when in-group membership becomes 
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more negative and/or under threat. Group members who feel they are in a group with low 
status may try to leave the group (“individual mobility”), change the ways in which their 
group might be better than others (“social creativity”), and if these do not work, then they 
engage in collective action (Ellemers 1993; Tajfel and Turner 1979). Since it appears that 
collective action has not necessarily occurred for potential rural identifiers, it is likely that 
they are using other coping mechanisms, such as social creativity, to do so. Such a 
strategy might resemble something like, “others may look down on us, but we work hard 
and care about each other.” Indeed, this better resembles interviewees’ attitudes in 
Cramer, thus suggesting that this is not rural consciousness, but rather rural identifiers 
engaging in social creativity to maintain group status and positive group-based 
psychological benefits. It is for all these reasons that I focus on rural identity here rather 
than rural consciousness. 
Another unclear aspect of Cramer and similar scholars is how much rural identity 
or affiliation relates to other forms of social identification. Beyond class, the word 
“urban” has been linked with liberalism and racial minorities for whites especially 
(Gilens et al. 1999); residents in rural Wisconsin could have been using metro centers as 
code words for these other concepts. Or, rural identity in Cramer’s study could have been 
another form of place-based identification, such as nationalism, or affiliation with one’s 
state, local community, city, or neighborhood. Munis (2020) and Farhart and Sheagley 
(n.d.) argue that it is not rural consciousness per se driving these relationships. Rather, it 
is place consciousness based on a general proclivity for attachment to various geographic 
locales that predicts political outcomes. Munis finds that place-based attachment at 
various levels is higher in rural areas compared to non-rural areas, for example. However, 
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other recent data has found that place attachment and belonging does not vary much 
between rural and urban settings. According to a 2018 Pew Study, 60% of both urban and 
suburban residents said that they feel very or somewhat attached to their community, 
while 57% of rural residents said the same (Parker et al. 2018). This is true even though 
rural residents are older and are more likely to have lived in their community longer – 
two traits that predict place-based or community attachment, as described above.  
The few other political science studies on rural identity and urban-rural affect that 
I am aware of, beyond Cramer, are Lyons and Utych (2021) and Jacobs and Munis 
(2018). Lyons and Utych (2021) find evidence that rural and non-rural respondents are 
affectively polarized against one another using experimental evidence, though they do not 
delve into measurements of rural identity per se. Finally, Jacobs and Munis (2018) find 
that pairing rural imagery to fictional candidates in an experimental setting makes rural 
residents more likely to support that candidate, thus suggesting that there is indeed some 
sort of symbolic attachment to rural areas that can be tapped for voting appeals. These 
studies, while suggesting that rural identity is in place nationally, do not fully explore the 
contours and meaning behind rural identification. 
What is Populism and How Does it Fit with Rural Identity? 
 
What Is Populism? 
Thus far, I have discussed threat from broader social and economic forces on parts 
of rural America, as well as a symbolic or cultural difference via rural identity; all of 
these factors place rural America – particularly white rural America – as an unstable or 
threatened intermediate-status group within the social hierarchy. In the next section, I 
outline what populism is and why right-wing populism applies particularly well to rural 
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areas and to extant knowledge on rural identity. This also implies that populism can be 
thought of in terms of intergroup dynamics.  
Many researchers have debated over the best definition of “populism.” Populism 
is a term often used by journalists, scholars, and others as a label for a range of 
phenomena with little attention given to its definition (Bale et al. 2011; Barr 2009; 
Roberts 2006). One major area of disagreement in understanding populism conceptually 
is what it is: is populism an ideology, a movement, a rhetorical framework or a way of 
persuasion, a type of leader, a type of party, a manner of mobilization, some of these 
things, none of these things, or something else? Given the wide variety of ways in which 
populism is applied, some scholars have argued that the term has little explanatory power 
(Hofstadter 1963). However, in the past couple decades of research, there have been 
some prominent advances in understanding the phenomenon we know as populism. 
 Cas Mudde, whose understanding of populism has largely been rooted in right-
wing populism in Europe, takes the view that populism is an ideology. More specifically, 
he argues that it is a “thin ideology” (Mudde 2004; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012; 2017). 
A thin ideology is unlike a typical ideology in that it does not provide a comprehensive 
framework for forming answers to political questions; rather, thin ideologies shape a 
small part of the political agenda but are combined with other prevailing ideologies 
dependent on the particular context. For instance, populism can be adapted to either right-
wing or left-wing ideologies. Populism-as-ideology for Mudde, Kaltwasser, and others is 
an ideology divided into two homogenous and antagonistic groups – “the pure people and 
the corrupt elite” – with the former being the rightful will over politics (Mudde 2004, 
543). Right-wing populism adds a third element, which is scapegoating a lower-status 
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group that is perceived to be favored ahead of “the people” by the corrupt elites. In 
addition, more recent work in this vein has argued that an anti-establishment political 
identity must first form for populist ideology to take root (Meléndez and Kaltwasser 
2019). As noted above, rural identity constitutes a political identity that has anti-
establishment and anti-elitism as a key motivator.    
 Other scholars see populism as a mode of speaking or a way for political actors to 
persuade the public. In other words, populism is a discursive style. Populism is therefore 
a language to convince ordinary people as being morally upright while elites are cast as 
self-serving, undeserving, and manipulative of “ordinary” people; it is a way of speaking 
that fosters pitting “the people” against the elites (Kazin 1995, 1-3). This sentiment can 
also be seen in Hofstadter, as he implies populist politics as being tied to rhetoric or a 
certain mode of expression (Hofstadter 1964, 4-6). In contrast to populism-as-ideology, 
populism-as-rhetoric implies that political actors do not hold a set of core populist beliefs. 
Rather, populism is used selectively and strategically to persuade, and the level and 
degree of populism used by a political actor likely changes over time and according to 
circumstances. It is adaptive. Populism is therefore measured as a potentially unstable 
continuous scale (Gidreon and Bonikowski 2013). 
 In their analysis of populist candidates in the 2016 presidential election, Oliver 
and Rahn (2016) adopt a similar rhetoric-based definition of populism to show that 
candidate Donald Trump was, indeed, a populist. They define populism as a rhetoric that 
“pits a virtuous ‘people’ against nefarious, parasitic elites who seek to undermine the 
rightful sovereignty of the common folk.” (Oliver and Rahn 2016, 190). Oliver and Rahn 
(2016) operationalize populist attitudes as being comprised of anti-elitism, mistrust of 
37 
 
experts – anti-intellectualism- and having affinity with the nation; notably, this definition 
and operationalization also implies a clear intergroup dynamic. In a related fashion, 
LaClau (1977; 2005) and Aslandis (2016) both saw populism as a mode of discourse. 
 Weyland (2001) similarly defines populism as a political strategy of a 
personalistic leader who aims to mobilize an unorganized mass often using emotional and 
grievance-based appeals. Bonikowski and Gidron (2016) argue for the idea of populism 
as a discursive strategy by showing that presidential candidates who are the most 
outsiders tend to adopt populist rhetoric, providing evidence that populism is more a 
political strategy than a set ideology. Judis (2016) takes a slightly different approach to 
these two prominent notions of populism-as-ideology and populism-as-rhetoric or 
discourse. He specifically addresses Kazin’s (1995) definition. For Judis, there is not “set 
of features that exclusively defines movements, parties, and people that are called 
populist…” (Judis 2016, 2). Rather, the people and parties we call populist merely have 
family resemblances but not particular defining traits. Instead, for Judis, populism is a 
political logic where pitting the people against the elite foster certain demands against 
those in power.  
However, Judis does agree with Kazin (and others) that populism is related to an 
idea of the ordinary people as noble against the elite opponents who are construed as self-
serving; populism seeks to mobilize the people against the elites. This is the defining 
commonality between the various notions of populism. At its core, populism is about the 
exaltation of the people, the antagonization of the elite, and pitting the former against the 
latter. In these cases, who constitutes the “people” and the “elite” are highly subjective 
and context-dependent. For example, the elites could be intellectuals, the political class, 
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the upper classes, the rich, and/or a certain ethnic, racial, or religious group. Similarly, 
the people could be simply a segment of the voting population or a certain demographic 
group rather than the entirety of a population or a voting public, but whatever group is 
denoted as the people are in any case construed as the “true” or “rightful” people. There 
is therefore also a moral element in populism common across different definitions. The 
“people” are virtuous, sovereign, and (supposedly) have a general will, while the elite are 
immoral, corrupt, and degenerate.  
Finally, there is an elite-driven implication to populism, where either a 
charismatic leader or a group of elites employ populism or activate populism in the 
public. This implies both a supply side and a demand side to populism. There is a certain 
subset of the population that tends to be predisposed to following populism, especially 
under certain circumstances of threat, decline, or disruption (Golder 2016; Judis 2016). In 
such circumstances, people feel dispossessed of their values and way of life in the face of 
both economic and social change. When this occurs, there are “winners” and “losers” of 
such changes; oftentimes, the perceived winners are resented by the losers. At these 
moments, political actors step in to exploit the populist mood.   
It is unclear how much this sense of decline is related to economic feelings of 
loss. Bad economic times create a more competitive environment for resources, making 
native residents hostile to immigrants and perceived outsiders (Rydren 2007), though 
others find that economic grievances and prospects are either unrelated to, or irrelevant, 
in comparison to cultural or immigration-related grievances (Ivarsflaten 2008; Mols and 
Jetten 2016). Heightened immigration in Europe and the U.S. over the past couple 
decades also contributed to this climate, where concerns over not only perceived 
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economic competition but also fear of racial displacement by Latinos (or Muslims in 
Europe) had been building for years among certain sectors of the public (Craig and 
Richeson 2014). Such anxieties among whites in particular have led to fear of cultural 
displacement and a threat to whites as a racial group, though heightened immigration and 
favors given to immigrants also potentially threaten those who 1) fear falling down the 
societal hierarchy, and 2) fear cultural and social changes that further alienate values and 
worldview that are perceived as already alienated by elites. Again, such out-group 
resentment of lower status groups is particularly characteristic of right-wing populism. 
Likely, the economic feelings of loss are at least partially symbolic, or they are 
related to a relative status loss that is intertwined with political and social decline in what 
Gest et al. (2018) call a nostalgic deprivation. Nostalgic depravation is a sense that things 
used to be better than they are now (see also Ivarsflaten 2008). For example, heightened 
inequality and the collapse of working-class jobs has significantly affected men’s abilities 
to marry and provide for a family, which contributes to their feelings of status loss 
alongside the applaudable advances of women’s rights (Cahn and Carbone 2011). Men, 
in general, have been told they should have heightened control and status, yet their status 
is diminished in society on several levels (Faludi 1999). Hence, men tend to support 
populism more than women. This gender-based loss of status is one of many instances of 
certain groups feeling threatened or feeling as if they are “going down” in society. 
Overall, such groups in society experiencing decline in various forms are angry with and 
resent elites because these groups feel forgotten or ignored by political and social leaders 
(Gest 2016; Inglehart and Norris 2017). Rurality – particularly rural identifiers – would 
be one such group, given the above discussion. 
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Putting it All Together 
To summarize the above discussions, research has found that the urban-rural 
political divide has been increasing due to social sorting, as well as threat from economic 
and social decline. This concern is not only material in nature; it leads to a clear 
delineation of a group – rural areas feeling left out or left behind compared to others in 
society – as well as a threat to group status. Rural areas see urban areas and coasts as 
populated by arrogant elites, experts, and intellectuals who look down on them in favor of 
low-status groups in society, such as immigrants. In other words, rural residents’ position 
as an intermedia-status group in society under threat leads to out-group derogation above 
- to those deemed responsible (urban and coastal ‘elites’) – as well as below – those who 
receive unearned favors by such elites (such as immigrants). It is not urban areas per se 
that are the issue – rural residents understand that there may be metro or urban residents 
that are in a similar plight as them (such as a white rural resident not being resentful of a 
white member of the working class in an urban area). Rather, the rural out-groups are 
more complex. 
Further, although the threat experienced by rural identity has potentially been 
spurred on by economic and social changes, the threat is mostly experienced as symbolic 
and status-based, as predicted by SIT. All these characteristics lend themselves very 
strongly to right-wing populism, as it matches the grievances and group status of rural 
identifiers because of rural areas’ precarious middling position because populism aligns 
such intermediate-level groups as morally good and the high and low status groups as 
bad, thus fulfilling the need for in-group positivity. 
If this is the case, rural social identification should positively predict attitudes 
toward populist politicians (Chapters 3 and 4), while negatively predicting attitudes 
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toward immigrants (Chapters 3 and 5) and experts/intellectuals (Chapters 3 and 6), as 
such stances fulfill the group-based psychological needs of a threatened intermediate-
status group. These out-group attitudes should be affective and group-based. Further, 
strong rural identifiers should theoretically be positively attached to the in-group (rural 
areas), but not necessarily as resentful or negative towards metro areas generally (Chapter 
3); instead, previous literature confounds metro or urban areas with certain out-groups 
associated with those areas. Rural identifiers’ concerns should be only weakly or 
completely unrelated to economic issues, or even class concerns, but rather reflect a sense 
of shared decline (Chapter 4) and symbolic threat (Chapter 5). Notably, these tendencies 
hold for rural identifiers regardless of race. 
Methodological Approach  
 
To test the above expectations, I employ analytical strategies using various cross-
sectional and panel surveys, experimental data, and a county-level data set of local 
economic, social, political, and demographic variables. Below, I provide a basic overview 
of these data sources and how they are used in this study, though a shortened version of 
this overview can be found in Table 2.1. More information on these data sets, including 
sample characteristics, can also be found in the relevant chapters used. Throughout this 
dissertation I will refer to these studies either by their data set name (such as “Study 2” or 
“CSPP”) or by their date and source (such as “May 2019 Lucid” or “ANES 2019”). 
Table 2.1: Data sources for this study. 
Data Set 
Name 













N = 940 
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The most relied-upon data sets are original surveys and survey experiments 
(Studies 1- 6) using Lucid’s Fulcrum Academic service (referred to here as “Lucid”). 
Though not nationally representative, Lucid targets representativeness on several known 
demographic benchmarks—including race, age, sex, household income, and Census 
region. Furthermore, Coppock and McClellan (2019) find that demographic and 
experimental findings on Lucid are similar to U.S. national benchmarks and better 
representative than traditional convenience samples on several demographic, political, 
and psychological factors. Lucid has been used for data in previous studies relating to 
rural political behavior and other non-rural studies on political behavior (Callaghan et al. 
2019; Lunz Trujillo et al. 2020; Munis 2020). I also account for potential deviations from 
representativeness by weighting these data sets to population benchmarks on race, age, 
sex, income, and educational attainment. These are post-stratification weights created 
with the svywgt command in Stata.  
These original Lucid survey data sets form the basis for understanding what rural 
social identity is and its correlates. I mainly rely on these sets because they use the 
measure of rural social identity strength adapted from the Huddy et al. (2015) measure of 
partisan social identity strength. Other data sets either do not have measures of rural 
social identity – though many have questions of subjective rural residency – or the 
measures are based on a less comprehensive set of questions (such as the ANES data set, 
which only measures identity importance). Some of the data from Lucid also contain an 
original survey experiment meant to activate rural identity for rural residents to test 
whether this predicts a change in anti-intellectualism. 
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The 2019 ANES pilot (Study 7) was conducted using non-probability sampling. It 
was fielded on American adults online through YouGov – an online opt-in panel - in 
December 2019 by taking a random sample of individuals from a nationally 
representative pool (according to 2016 Census data) (N = 3,000). Since this was an online 
opt-in panel, to further approximate national representativeness, YouGov used propensity 
score matching to get a sample as close to Census targets as possible and ended up with a 
sample size of 3,000 respondents. YouGov also developed weights according to 
respondent race, age, gender, education level, and 2016 presidential vote choice (ANES 
2019). This method produces a sample that looks similar to a probability sample on the 
matched characteristics, but may still differ in unknown ways on unmatched 
characteristics. I rely on the ANES data set as an additional validation of findings from 
the Lucid surveys; as mentioned above, I only use the ANES data for validation because 
it only measures rural identity using one question, rather than the multi-item scale used in 
the Lucid surveys. 
The 2018 CCES (“Cooperative Congressional Election Studies”) Common 
Content data set contains a very large number of survey data responses of American adult 
voters (N = 60,000) (Schaffner et al. 2019). Such a large sample size of voters adds 
additional validity for the scope of this study when looking at rural residents, as getting 
enough responses from rural respondents to run certain statistical analyses can be a 
challenge if the sample size is smaller. However, the use of the CCES here is 
unfortunately limited due to it having no questions capturing rural social identification. 
The CCES is administered through YouGov and uses non-probability sampling, which 
produces samples similar to probability samples on matched demographic targets but 
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may or may not be dissimilar on non-matched demographics. For this reason, I also use 
the survey weight provided by the CCES data. 
Study 9 is a three-wave multi-investigator panel survey designed, funded, and 
implemented by the Center for the Study of Political Psychology (CSPP) at the 
University of Minnesota. This survey was conducted using YouGov. Between October 6 
and 14, 2020, YouGov interviewed 2815 adult U.S. citizens who were matched down to a 
sample of 2615 respondents in the final data set. The respondent demographic makeup on 
age, gender, race, and education was constructed using stratified sampling from the 2018 
American Community Survey (ACS). YouGov successfully recontacted 1865 
respondents from wave one who completed wave two of the survey. Wave two was 
conducted between October 23 and November 2, 2020. For wave three, YouGov 
recontacted respondents from waves one and two; 1471 individuals completed the survey. 
Wave three was conducted between November 9 and 16, 2020. For each wave, the cases 
were weighted to the ACS sampling frame using propensity scores and post-stratification 
on 2016 presidential vote choice (wave three only), gender, age, race, and education 
level. I included an original experiment on this survey, as well as questions asked in 
Waves 1 and 3, particularly looking at how rural residency and rural identity relate to 
immigration; this is the primary data set for Chapter 5. That said, rural identity is also 
measured using only two questions that capture identity strength and importance, which 
is more comprehensive than ANES but still not as full of a scale as the Lucid studies. 
Finally, Study 10 is a data set of several merged data sources at the county level. 
The data set includes 2,820 counties out of 3,007 total counties in the United States 
(93.7% of all counties). I use several sources of data, including RUCC codes (from the 
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United States Department of Agriculture, or USDA) to measure the urban-rural 
continuum and county vote shares for presidential candidates from the MIT Election Data 
and Science Lab (MIT Election Data and Science Lab 2018). In addition, the data set also 
includes information from the USDA, the US Census Bureau, the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation’s County Health Rankings data, and the Penn State Social Capital Scores. 
More information on the specific measures and dates can be found in Chapter 4. I use this 
data set to examine local economic and social decline on vote choice for rural areas, and 
also merge it with Lucid data to conduct multi-level models. 
Looking Forward 
In this chapter, I discuss the relevant literature and studies surrounding the urban-
rural divide, as well as describe how social identity theory and populism can relate to 
rural identity. In doing so, I set up the key elements of my main argument: for rural 
Americans, perceived in-group threat from economic, social, and cultural sources has led 
to a need to delineate the group and preserve its status. Since rural identifiers occupy an 
intermediate status group in society, they have a natural affiliation with right-wing 
populism, which resents both a morally corrupt elite and lower-status groups (such as 
immigrants) perceived to be favored by the elite. Therefore, the out-groups are more 
complex for rural identifiers than simply “urban”; further, rural identity is a distinct 
identity from place identity because rurality has a specific status and set of norms and 
values associated with it. Further, rural identity is not as contingent on individual levels 
of class but on symbolic in-group concerns; any economic factors for rural identifiers 
would therefore be more at the local or group-level and not at the individual level. 
In the next chapter, Chapter 3, I use Studies 1-4 to begin this analysis and lay the 
groundwork for Chapters 4-6. I introduce the rural social identity strength measure 
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adapted from Huddy et al. (2015)’s partisan social identity strength questions. Further, I 
examine expected affective, political, and demographic correlates of rural social identity 
to argue that rural social identity strength is more focused on positive in-group affect 
rather than negative metropolitan affect (the assumed out-group). Then, I show that 
politically rural identity is not linked on the traditional Republican-Democratic spectrum; 
rather, it is more affiliated with specific group-based populist sentiment, such as anti-
immigration and anti-intellectualism, which are explored further in Chapters 5 and 6, 
respectively. Finally, I also set the stage for Chapter 4 by asserting that rural identity is 
not white working class affiliated; this is because identity is mostly symbolic and group-
based, so immediate economic concerns are less of a driver than group-based economic, 




CHAPTER 3: Correlates and Characteristics of Rural Identity 
 
“Puttin’ on a cowboy hat and a pair of boots doesn’t make you country; Like puttin’ on a ball 
gown and glass heels won’t make me Cinderella.” 
― Kellie Elmore, “Magic in the Backyard” 
 
This chapter sets up several elements of the overall argument. First, I 
methodologically introduce the concept and measurement of rural social identity: how I 
measure rural social identification, how much people socially identify as rural, what its 
correlates are, and how do these elements differ from objective and subjective location as 
well as a metro social identity. In addition, I establish my measure of rural social identity 
(based on partisan identity strength by Huddy et al. 2015) as a psychological and 
affective measure, thus validating that rural identity is indeed a social identity associated 
with positive feelings toward the in-group. I also feel it is necessary to do so because 
existing measures of rural identity either rely on rural or place-based resentment, which 
may capture sentiments and ideas outside of rural identification, or they do not 
sufficiently address identity strength, which is key in understanding the effects of social 
identities on social and political outcomes (Huddy et al. 2015). That said, research by 
Lyons and Utych (2021) do find that there is a positive in-group and negative out-group 
(urban areas) tendency for rural residents using experimental evidence to measure 
implicit bias, though this is not rural identity specifically. Finally, I examine how much 
rural social identity is based on positive in-group affect versus negative out-group (i.e., 
metro) affect. Theoretically, we would expect the latter to be stronger, given previous 
scholarship’s emphasis on rural resentment. However, I find this not to be the case; in-
group affect is much stronger, in contrast to previous expectations from those such as 
Cramer (2016) and Lyons and Utych (2021). 
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More broadly, accomplishing these things sets up the next three chapters of the 
dissertation by verifying that rural social identity exists and can be measured 
quantitatively, that it predicts certain political outcomes, that it falls under the definition 
of being a social identity, and that we understand how much rural social identity is based 
on affect of the in-group versus the out-group. This exploratory chapter provides a taste 
of what is to come; in it, we see that education level, partisanship, income, race, and 
affect do not correspond to prior expectations, while other elements, such as anti-
intellectualism and opposition to pro-immigration policies (but not economic or social 
operational ideology), correspond to rural social identity. 
How Do We Measure Rural Residency and Rural Identity? 
 
Before understanding what rural identity is, it is important to understand what I 
mean by “rural.” There are various ways to define and measure “rural”, and decades of 
academic research by sociologists, demographers, geographers, and other scholars have 
debated the best way to do so (Hart et al. 2005; Miller & Luloff 1981). Researchers often 
use definitions and quantitative scales created by government agencies based on objective 
criteria, such as population density, population size, and distance from metropolitan 
centers. However, another way to look at what constitutes “rural” is a subjective 
definition; these terms are whatever people believe they are, based on a set of individual-
level criteria. “Rural” often subjectively means isolation, low population density, or part 
of a small town, all of which are similar to the underpinnings of the quantitative measures 
listed above. Agriculture and large tracts of wilderness are also common associations 
with rural areas, as are certain stereotypes or sociocultural traits (Hart et al. 2005). For 
example, a rural culture could theoretically exist in an urban area.  
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Given that the focus of my argument is based on a subjective psychological self-
identification, I primarily use subjective definitions of rural residency in the context of 
this study. Values and worldview can be imparted onto individuals living in rural areas 
(or to individuals living in certain places more generally), and on individuals that were 
socialized in rural areas during their childhood (Wong 2010). However, subjective self-
identification and objective measures of rurality often differ a fair amount. For this 
reason, I often also use Census designations of the urban-rural continuum (“RUCA” 
codes). For a much more in-depth discussion of how I define and measure these terms in 
this study, please refer to the Chapter 2 (theory chapter) appendix. 
To study rural social identity, I draw from a variety of sources. First, I use four 
original survey data sets. The data were collected by Lucid, an online opt-in panel that 
hits nationally representative demographic targets. These surveys were fielded at four 
separate points between late 2018 and early 2020; sample size, survey field dates, and 
respondent demographic makeup can be found in Table 3.1 below. Generally speaking, 
the demographic makeup of these surveys is very close to national demographic targets, 
except for Survey 1; this survey was part of a multi-investigator study and included a 
Black respondent oversample. For Surveys 2 through 4, I requested that the demographic 
makeup of the respondent sample be as close to nationally representative as possible on 
the demographics listed in the table. 
 
Table 3.1: Demographic characteristics of Lucid samples, unweighted. 
Variable Study 1: Late 
October 2018  
Study 2: May 
2019 
Study 3: August 
2019 
Study 4: April 
2020 
Female 53% 52% 51% 50% 
College Degree 36% 40% 31% 45% 





64% 73% 69% 70% 
Hispanic 13% 12% 16% 10% 
Democrat 51% 49% 49% 44% 
Republican 38% 40% 39% 40% 
Independent 11% 11% 12% 16% 











Rural (self-id) 44% 42% 43% 23%+ 
Non-Metro 
(RUCA 4-9) 
22% 16% 16%  
N 940 531 825 492 
+ Study 4 asks people whether they live in a rural area, a small town, a suburb, a small city, or a large city. 
“Rural” here includes respondents who chose “rural area” or “small town”. A replication of this table with 
weighted data can be found in the chapter appendix. 
 
Current measures of rural identity, or related concepts such as rural consciousness 
and rural resentment, tend to either use one of two types of measures. The first consists of 
additive scales that tie rural identity with perceived feelings of resentment at the out-
group alongside assumed effects or correlations of rural identity, such as feelings of 
political and economic underrepresentation or rural disrespect (such as Munis 2019; Lunz 
Trujillo and Crowley 2020). These scales are helpful for measuring a particular bundle of 
concepts that theoretically go together according to Cramer (2016), however, they are 
potentially problematic because it is unclear which element of the scale would drive a 
relationship with another variable. Further, these measures potentially confound social 
identification with other factors. 
The second measure uses questions that ask whether one identifies as rural (or as 
from a different place), such as those found in the American National Election Studies 
(ANES) or in Lyons and Utych (2021). However, this is problematic because it measures 
the ‘boundary’ of group membership only. Only capturing the boundary of group 
membership or identity – i.e., whether or not that person identifies with the group – fails 
to capture the variation in group member identification with that group and their 
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subsequent attitudes and behaviors. Therefore, measuring social identities according to 
their strength provides a better indication of how prototypical of the group any given 
individual is, and thus gives us a better idea of what that particular social identity means 
(Huddy 2001; 2003). For example, Germans who have stronger regional identities feel 
more positively about their region than their nation, as opposed to Germans with 
moderate or weak regional identities (Simon et al. 1995). Simply measuring whether 
someone identifies with the region or not would not yield the same information about 
regional identity. People who identify more strongly with the group exhibit greater in-
group pride and bias, and discriminate against out-groups more (Huddy 2001). Thus, 
identity strength is better for detecting the tendencies of that group. 
For these reasons, I believe that to fully understand rural identity, we must 
measure rural identity strength. To measure the concept of rural identity, I adapt the 
partisan identity strength scale by Huddy and colleagues (Huddy 2013; Huddy et al. 
2015). Like in the discussion of the studies in the previous paragraph, these studies by 
Huddy and colleagues argue that the political effects of social identities are most 
pronounced among stronger identifiers, so measuring the strength of the identity (and not 
just the identity itself) is crucial. Table 3.2 displays the five-item battery I use to measure 
rural identity. 
Table 3.2: Question wordings for rural identity and metro identity survey measures. 
Item 
Number 
Question Wording Response Options 
1 How much is being from a small town or rural 
area part of your identity?  
5-point scale, “None at 
all” to “A great deal” 
2 How important is being a small town or rural 
resident to you? 
5-point scale, “Extremely 
important” to “Not at all 
important” 
3 How well does the term “small town or rural 
resident” describe you?  
5-point scale, “Extremely 
well” to “Not well at all” 
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4 When talking about small town or rural 
residents, how often do you use “we” instead 
of “they”? 
5-point scale, “Always” to 
“Never” 
5 To what extent do you think of yourself as 
being a small town or rural resident? 
5-point scale, “A great 
deal” to “Not at all” 
 
 The rural identity scale across the three survey data sets has a very high 
Cronbach’s alpha score between 0.89 and 0.95. Correlation coefficients between each 
item can be found in the chapter appendix. Furthermore, I ran a Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis for rural identity using Study 2 data, which generated the results found in Figure 
3.1. Based on this information, the rural identity scale appears to be internally coherent. 













Note: All coefficients significant at p > 0.001. 2 
 
Figure 3.2 below provides the distribution and mean of rural social identity 
strength for Study 2. I show Study 2’s results because it measures rural social identity 
strength for both self-identified rural and non-rural residents (unlike Studies 1 and 3, 
though similar distributions for these data sets can be found in the appendix). The 
resulting distribution is roughly normal, though skewed slightly towards higher values. 
                                                          
2 Identical CFA for the rural identity scale on Studies 1 and 3 show similar results. 
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Note: N= 491, mean = 0.40, standard deviation = 0.33 
 
Figure 3.3 below shows the same distribution of rural identity strength, but 
divided into rural versus non-rural residents (using both self-identification and RUCA 
codes). As expected, the rural identity strength measure is higher, on average, for rural 
residents using both methods of measuring rurality. Furthermore, the distribution and 
means for rural versus non-rural respondents is similar across the two measures of 
rurality, despite sizeable differences in subsample size. That said, there are some non-
rural residents who are still fairly high on the rural identity strength spectrum. I do a 
similar analysis for Study 3 data; this can be found in the appendix. 
 
Figure 3.3: Rural social identity strength distributions by rural residency (self-identified 




Note: 1): N= 214, mean = 0.60, standard deviation = 0.29; 2) N= 277, mean=0.24, standard deviation=0.26; 
3) N=81; mean=0.57, standard deviation =0.29; 4) N=410, mean =0.36, standard deviation=0.32. 
 
However, this could be due to former rural residents maintaining stronger levels 
of rural identity, even after they move to non-rural areas. Therefore, in Figure 3.4 I also 
show distributions of rural identity strength for those who 1) grew up in a rural area and 
live in a rural area now, 2) grew up in a rural area and do not live in a rural area now, and 
3) grew up in a non-rural area and live in a rural area now. Individuals in groups 2 and 3 
have the same mean score, which is lower than the average score for rural identifiers who 
grew up in rural areas and still live in rural areas (1). A similar analysis was done with 




Figure 3.4: Rural social identity strength distributions by currently living in a rural area 
and/or grew up in a rural area, and by non-rural respondents, for Study 2 data. 
 
Note: 1): N= 162, mean = 0.66, standard deviation = 0.27; 2) N= 84, mean=0.40, standard deviation=0.26; 
3) N=52; mean=0.40, standard deviation =0.26; 4) N=193, mean =0.17, standard deviation=0.23. 
 
Such a breakdown shows that many of the non-rural residents who scored higher 
levels of rural social identity strength were indeed residents who grew up in rural areas 
and then moved to non-rural areas. Interestingly, those who grew up in rural areas and 
then moved away from rural areas actually display a slightly bimodal distribution of rural 
identity strength. This suggests that rural identity strength is concentrated among 
individuals who have spent some amount of time residing in a rural area at some point in 
their lives, i.e., that rural identity strength is related to place-based experience. 
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Similarly, one would expect that the more time spent living in a rural area, the 
stronger their rural identity strength on average. In Study 3, I asked respondents who self-
identified as having grew up or as currently living in a rural or small town how long they 
have lived in a rural area or small town. Possible response options include less than one 
year, one to five years, six to ten years, 11 to 15 years, 16 to 20 years, 21 to 25 years, 26 
to 30 years, and over 30 years. The time rural respondents spent in living in rural areas 
was slightly correlated with rural social identity strength (0.19).  
The data from other studies yield similar distributions for self-identified rural 
residents. Figure 3.5 below shows these distributions for Lucid Studies 1, 3, and 4, as 
well as for the ANES 2019 data, looking at rural residents only (self-identified). Studies 
1-3 used the five-item measure based on Huddy et al. to measure rural social identity 
strength, while Study 4 used just one of these five items – “On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 
being not at all and 10 being a lot, how much is being from a rural areas or small town 
part of your identity?” – with a ten-point slider response scale. The distributions from 
Studies 1 – 4 are very similar, with the rural identity importance in Study 4 more skewed 












Figure 3.5: Distribution of rural social identity strength variables for Studies 1, 3, 4, and 









Rural Identity, Rural/Metro Affect, and Rural Resentment  
 
Previous work on rural identity in political science points to rural resentment, 
especially against urban areas, as being a key feature (Cramer 2012; 2016). However, 
rural identity could also exist without such resentment against urban areas. Previous work 
on social identities more generally, and on rural identity in particular, posit that people 
who socially identify with a group should hold positive affect toward the in-group and 
many times – though not always – have negative affect toward the out-group 
(Branscombe et al. 1999; Huddy 2003). Rural social identity is a psychological 
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attachment to rural areas where group members derive self-esteem and other 
psychological benefits from being part of a group with perceived shared commonalities; 
rural resentment is when rural areas feel out-group dislike due to the perception that the 
out-group looks down on them or does not give them fair resources or representation. 
This section aims to test the affective dimensions of rural identity, including its expected 
positive affective relationship with rural areas and its negative affective relationship with 
metro areas.  
Using Study 3 data I asked respondents to complete a series of affective 
evaluations for rural areas, and for metro areas, based on affective candidate evaluations 
found in the ANES. All respondents were asked how often they feel each of six emotions 
when thinking about residents of small towns and rural areas, with the six emotions being 
anger, proud, resentful, happy, afraid, and hopeful. The response options included 
“always”, “most of the time”, “about half the time”, “sometimes”, and “never”. Then, 
respondents were asked how often the feel each of these six emotions when thinking 
about residents of large cities and suburbs, with the same possible response options. 
These variables were coded from a zero to one scale, with one being “always’ and zero 
being “never.” 
Figure 3.6 below shows the means for each of the affective dimensions for rural 
(self-identified or RUCA) or grew up rural (self-identified) respondents – which are in 
shades of orange- and metro (self ID or RUCA) respondents, shown in shades of blue. 
The most striking feature of these results is that very little affective differences appear for 
metro versus rural residents. Across the board, on average, respondents report feeling 
resentful, proud, and hopeful of rural and small-town residents more often. They also 
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report feeling less angry, afraid, or happy about them less often. How often respondents 
report feelings of suburban and big city residents lie somewhere in the middle of these. 
Figure 3.6: Average scores on affective scales of urban and rural areas, by rural and 
urban respondents.  
 
 
Note: Metro resident (Self ID) here means that the respondent said they do not live in a rural area and they 
did not grow up in a rural area. Study 3 data. 
 
 Perhaps, however, rural identity strength is a better indicator of affective feelings 
toward these places, as would be suggested by scholars such as Huddy (2001; 2003). In 
particular, we would expect that rural residents who feel particularly negative feelings 
toward the out-group, i.e., metro residents, would also strongly identify with rural areas. 
Furthermore, it is unclear which of these affective measures is more significantly related 
to rural identity strength. Therefore, I ran OLS regression models for rural respondents 
only with the rural and metro affective measures predicting rural social identity strength. 













Rural resident (Self ID) Rural resident (RUCA) Grew up rural (Self ID)




Table 3.3: Predicting rural social identity strength using rural and urban area affective 






















Grew up Rural 






ID) only + 
Rural: 
Anger 
0.08 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.09 
 (0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
Rural: 
Resentful 
-0.06 0.07 0.05 -0.04 -0.11 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Rural: 
Afraid 
0.01 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.02 
 (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Rural: 
Proud 
0.07 0.26* 0.12* 0.09 0.03 
 (0.06) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
Rural: 
Happy 
0.22** 0.29* 0.23*** 0.22** 0.22* 
 (0.08) (0.13) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) 
Rural: 
Hopeful 
0.17** 0.13 0.15** 0.12 0.18** 
 (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Metro: 
Anger 
0.06 0.15 0.04 -0.03 0.12 
 (0.07) (0.11) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
Metro: 
Resentful 
0.06 0.01 0.12 0.20** 0.02 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Metro: 
Afraid 
0.03 -0.07 -0.03 -0.06 0.06 
 (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
Metro: 
Proud 
0.03 -0.27 0.10 0.10 0.17 
 (0.09) (0.16) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) 
Metro: 
Happy 
-0.09 -0.05 -0.21*** -0.14* -0.20** 
 (0.07) (0.11) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) 
Metro: 
Hopeful 
-0.01 0.22 -0.07 -0.09 -0.04 
 (0.08) (0.14) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Constant 0.32*** 0.16* 0.30*** 0.32*** 0.37*** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
r2 0.30 0.45 0.34 0.29 0.34 
N 330.00 109.00 386.00 355.00 252.00 
+Non-rural here means that the respondent said they do not live in a rural area and they did not grow up in 
a rural area. Standard errors in parentheses. Data weighted to population benchmarks. * = p < 0.05, ** = p 




 Most strikingly, negative feelings toward metro areas do not have a statistically 
significant relationship with rural identity strength for rural residents (Models 1-2). The 
only time negative out-group affect has a significant relationship with rural identity 
strength is for metro respondents only (according to RUCA codes); those metro 
respondents higher in rural identity strength are more likely to feel resentment toward 
metro residents. Rural identity strength and happiness toward rural and small-town 
residents are also significantly correlated for this group, while rural identity strength and 
happiness toward suburban and large city residents are negatively correlated for metro 
residents (according to RUCA codes). Similarly, for non-rural self-identifiers, rural social 
identity strength is significantly and positively correlated with more frequent feelings of 
happiness and hopefulness toward rural residents, and is significantly and negatively 
correlated with more frequent feelings of happiness toward suburban and metro residents. 
 To further investigate the relationship between metro resident resentment and 
rural identity for rural residents, I include bivariate regressions between metro resident 
resentment and the rural identity strength measure (Table 3.4). The results from these 
bivariate regressions are more in line with expectations – metro resident resentment is 
positively and significantly correlated with rural identity strength for respondents who 
stated they grew up or currently live in a rural area. However, this relationship is not 
significant for rural residents according to RUCA codes.   
Table 3.4: Study 3 data showing frequency of respondent resentment toward suburban 
and large city residents and rural social identity strength, for rural respondents only. 
 (1) 
Rural ID Strength 
(2) 
Rural ID Strength 
(3) 
Rural ID Strength 




Grew up Rural (Self 
ID) only 
Metro: Resentful 0.19*** 0.11 0.25*** 
 (0.05) (0.12) (0.05) 
Constant 0.55*** 0.55*** 0.51*** 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) 
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r2 0.05 0.01 0.09 
N 341.00 114.00 403.00 
OLS regression results. Standard errors in parentheses. Data weighted to population benchmarks. 
Significance: * p > 0.05, ** p > 0.01, *** p > 0.001.  
 
 Going back to Table 3.3 above, it is also striking that, for rural residents, rural 
identity strength tends to have a significant and positive relationship with positive in-
group affect. More specifically, for residents who self-identify as currently living in a 
rural area, rural identity strength and more frequent feelings of happiness and hopefulness 
for rural residents are correlated. For rural residents according to RUCA codes, rural 
identity strength is predicted by more frequent feelings of pride and happiness toward 
fellow rural residents. Finally, for respondents who reported growing up in a rural area – 
regardless of where they live now – rural identity strength is correlated with more 
frequent feelings of pride, happiness, and hopefulness about rural and small-town 
residents. In addition, for this group, rural identity strength is negatively correlated with 
feelings of happiness toward suburban and large city residents.  
 Similar to these analyses, I also use data from the May 2019 (Study 2) and April 
2020 (Study 4) Lucid surveys to corroborate the above findings on affect. For the Study 2 
data, the 5-item measure described above is used to measure rural identity strength. For 
Study 4, this is measured using only one question from the five-item rural identity 
strength measure used above: “On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being not at all and 10 being 
a lot, how much is being from a rural area or small town part of your identity?” Rural 
residence is self-identified, with the rural resident variable designating currently a rural 
resident or grew up in a rural area. To measure affect toward rural and metro areas, I use 
feeling thermometers. Respondents were asked to rate their feelings toward rural/small 
town residents, with the response initially coded from 0 to 100, and of metro residents, 
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again with the response initially coded from 0 to 100. The question order presentation 
was random. These variables were then recoded to run from zero to one before running 
any statistical analysis.  
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 below show regression results of how well the rural and metro 
feeling thermometer predict rural identity strength for all respondents. For the Study 2 
data (Table 3.5), rural social identity strength significantly and positively predicts 
feelings toward rural residents, unsurprisingly. This is true of those respondents who 
grew up and live in a rural area, those who only currently live in a rural area, those who 
are white rural residents, and those who are non-white rural residents. Notably, the urban 
residents feeling thermometer is negative but not significant in any of these models. 
Additionally, the correlation coefficient between the urban resident feeling thermometer 
and rural social identity strength for those who say they live in or grew up in a rural area 
is 0.04 – no correlation - while for the rural resident feeling thermometer it is 0.30. 
Table 3.5. Feeling thermometers of rural and metro residents predicting rural identity 
strength, Study 2 data. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








 Rural (self-id), 
grew up and live 
Live rural area 
only (self-id) 
Rural (self-id), 









0.38*** 0.51*** 0.36*** 0.46* 




-0.12 -0.04 -0.09 -0.22 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.17) 
Constant 0.41*** 0.32*** 0.41*** 0.42** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.13) 
r2 0.10 0.23 0.10 0.12 
N 290.00 206.00 240.00 50.00 
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OLS regression results. Standard errors in parentheses. Data weighted to population benchmarks. 
Significance: * p > 0.05, ** p > 0.01, *** p > 0.001.  
 
 Similarly, in the Study 4 data (Table 3.6), rural identity strength significantly and 
positively corresponds with the rural resident feeling thermometer for all respondents 
(Model 1) and for self-identified rural residents only (Model 2). Rural identity strength 
for non-rural residents is positively associated with the rural feeling thermometer but it is 
not statistically significant (Model 3). The metro feeling thermometer significantly and 
negatively predicts rural social identity strength for all respondents (Model 1), though the 
magnitude of the effect is smaller than the effect between rural identity strength and the 
rural feeling thermometer. However, this relationship does not hold for rural residents 
(Model 2). 
Table 3.6: Feeling thermometers of rural and metro residents predicting rural identity 
importance (single-item 10-point scale), Study 4 data. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Rural ID Strength Rural ID Strength Rural ID Strength 






0.43*** 0.58*** 0.23 
 (0.10) (0.16) (0.13) 
Metro Feeling 
Thermometer 
-0.33** -0.18 -0.24 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.15) 
Constant 0.46*** 0.35** 0.50*** 
 (0.07) (0.13) (0.10) 
r2 0.15 0.30 0.04 
N 112.00 41.00 71.00 
OLS regression results. Standard errors in parentheses. Data weighted to population benchmarks. 
Significance: * p > 0.05, ** p > 0.01, *** p > 0.001.  
 
These results, along with the results on the affective measures above, suggest a 
couple things. First, although to some extent rural social identifiers who are rural or 
small-town residents hold negative feelings toward metro or urban residents – i.e., rural 
resentment - this tendency is overshadowed by positive in-group feelings. This suggests 
that rural identity for rural residents is a social identity more strongly based on in-group 
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attachment, rather than the postulated out-group disdain. Second, this tendency occurs 
for both white and non-white rural residents. Finally, these results also suggest that rural 
identity is related to slightly different in-group and out-group affective concerns for 
current rural residents versus non-rural residents. In the case of the former, positive in-
group affect appears to play a stronger role, while for the latter group both positive in-
group affect and negative out-group affect appear to matter more equally.  
 
Rural Identity and Place-Based Attachments 
 
Finally, I also provide evidence that rural identity is both related to general 
affiliation or attachment to rural areas – a characteristic of place-based social identity – 
but is still distinct from a more general affiliation to place, which is a possibility 
presented by scholars such as Munis (2020). In Study 3, I asked a series of questions on 
how much of a sense of belonging the respondents felt to different places. These places 
included “my neighborhood”, “my city”, “my state”, “my country”, and “rural areas”. As 
mentioned previously, place attachment or belonging and place identity are distinct from 
one another. However, they are related and place belonging is a necessary component of 
place identity. These questions can help to understand how general affiliation with rural 
areas differs from affiliation with other places, and how much rural belonging is 
correlated with a rural identity. The correlations between these different levels of 
belonging, as well as rural/non-rural residency (self-identified) for the entire sample are 
listed in Table 3.7. 
 
Table 3.7: Levels of place belonging correlated with rural residency (Self ID). 
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neighborhood 1.00    
  
       
Belonging to city 0.69 1.00     
       
Belonging to 
state  0.62 0.70 1.00  
  
       
Belonging to 
country 0.45 0.51 0.58 1.00 
  
       
Belonging to 
rural areas 0.46 0.43 0.44 0.35 
1.00  
       
Rural resident -0.01 -0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.26 1.00 
Source: Study 3 data (N = 825). 
 
 Although overall respondent levels of belonging to rural areas are moderately 
correlated with belonging to one’s neighborhood, city, state, and country, these 
correlations are lower than those between belonging to city, state, neighborhood, and 
country. 
 How well do these measures correlate with self-identified levels of rural identity? 
Table 3.7 shows these correlations with current or former rural residents only (N = 497). 
Current or former rural residents who feel a belonging to their neighborhood, city, state, 
and country also tend to have a strong belonging to rural areas. But, in terms of rural 
identity, only belonging to rural areas is moderately to highly correlated. This suggests 
that rural identity is based on rural place affiliation, rather than simply an affiliation with 
their locale. 
 
Table 3.8: Levels of place belonging correlated with rural social identity, for rural 
residents only (Self ID). 
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neighborhood 1.00    
  
       
Belonging to 
city 0.67 1.00   
  
       
Belonging to 
state  0.58 0.65 1.00  
  
       
Belonging to 
country 0.43 0.51 0.52 1.00 
  
       
Belonging to 
rural areas 0.53 0.52 0.49 0.41 
1.00  
       
Rural social id 0.25 0.22 0.22 0.12 0.48 1.00 
Source: Study 3 data (N = 825). 
 
 Such results suggest that rural social identity is somewhat distinct from simply 
feeling belonging to a particular place, which stands in contrast to some other 
interpretations of place-based identity (e.g., Farhart and Sheagley n.d.,; Munis 2020). 
That said, there are moderate correlations between rural social identity, meaning that 
belonging to place generally corresponds to multiple levels of place attachment. 
  
Political and Social Correlates of Rural Identity 
Race and Other Psychological and Demographic Correlates 
 
This next section examines what correlates with rural identity; who are rural 
identifiers, and what distinguishes them politically? In this first subsection, I use data 
from Surveys 1 and 3 to predict rural identity using a variety of variables to establish its 
relevant correlates and characteristics.  
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I expect several factors to potentially correlate with stronger rural social 
identification. These include age, education level, income level, evangelical 
identification, and being white, as all of these characteristics are more typical of both 
rural areas and of stereotypes of rural residents, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
Given the uneven economic recovery of rural areas since the Recession, I also include a 
variable for whether being unemployed is a predictor of rural identity. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, a rural identity would have associated cultural norms associated with it, 
such as hunting recreationally. For this reason, I include a variable measuring whether the 
respondent likes to hunt in the model. In addition, I also control for common 
demographic control variables such as being Black, being Hispanic, and gender. 
Previous research indicates that there may be a relationship between rural identity 
and right-wing political predilections, such as identifying as conservative and Republican 
(Cramer 2016). Further, previous research on white identity finds that rural residents are 
more likely to be white social identifiers (Jardina 2019); therefore, I include this in the 
model. Related measures of racial attitudes, particularly psychological predictors of more 
hostile racial attitudes such as racial resentment, social dominance orientation, and 
authoritarianism, have also been included. Previous research finds that need for cognitive 
closure – that is, a need for definitive answers – can be fulfilled by socially identifying 
with groups (Luttig 2018). Therefore, I also add this in as a predictor to verify that rural 
identity strength is not simply a measure of how much a respondent is inclined to be 
groupish. Finally, openness to experience – a Big 5 personality trait that is often 
associated with political ideology – may also be negatively affiliated with rurality, given 
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the discussion in the previous chapter. I therefore include it in the model as well. The 
question wordings for all of these measures can be found in the chapter appendix. 
Table 3.9 contains the results of these predicting rural social identity using Survey 
3 data, which contains all the measures discussed. As predicted, rural social identity 
strength is positively and significantly associated with need for cognitive closure, white 
identity, and hunting recreationally. Interestingly, age negatively predicts rural identity, 
controlling for other factors; this is unexpected, as place attachment tends to correlate 
with being older. Also surprising is that being an evangelical is negatively correlated with 
rural identity. It could be the case that people who are older have a clearer sense of self 
and have less need to associate themselves with group identities. As will be seen below, 
time spent living in a rural area does significantly predict rural identity strength. In 
addition, being employed predicts greater levels of rural identity, as well as greater 
authoritarianism. For only white respondents, rural identity and white identity are 
correlated. Partisan identity, symbolic ideology, racial resentment, race/ethnicity, and 
other demographic and psychological variables do not significantly predict rural identity.  
 
Table 3.9: Predicting rural social identity, Study 3 data. 
 Rural social identity (Rural only) 
Rural social identity 
(Rural only; white 
respondents only) 
Rural social identity 
(Non-white 
respondents only)+ 
Age -0.13** -0.12* 0.04 









Education level -0.01 0.03 -0.16 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.18) 
Black  0.00 - - 
 (0.05) - - 
Hispanic 0.02 0.03 - 
 (0.04) (0.04) - 







White Identity - 0.15** - 
 - (0.05) - 





Gender = Male 0.03 0.01 0.07 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) 
Party ID 0.01 0.03 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) 





Likes to hunt 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.22* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) 
Need for closure 0.20** 0.20** 0.04 









Racial resentment 0.03 0.01 - 
 (0.07) (0.07) - 
Authoritarianism 0.12* 0.11* -0.05 









R2 0.27 0.23 0.21 
N 433 354 0.79 
Standard errors in parentheses. * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001All variables standardized 
from zero to one. Data weighted to population targets. 
+ This was not run on non-white rural residents only because the sample size was not large enough.  
 
Table 3.10 below repeats a similar analysis, but also includes some of the affect 
measures of rural and urban areas in the model, as well as variables relating to living in 
rural areas. These variables are theoretical precursors to having a place-based identity: a 
sense of belonging or affiliation with the group, positive affective attachment to the 
group, and actually living in these areas (group membership). Negative affective 
attachment to the established out-group according to previous literature, urban areas 
(Cramer 2016; Lyons and Utych 2021), is also included in the model to verify the rural 
identity measure and to compare negative out-group affect to positive in-group affect. 
Please see the appendix for specific question wordings of these variables. 
 
Table 3.10: Predicting rural social identity, Study 3 data. 







Education level 0.01 
 (0.05) 




HH income 0.08 (0.05) 
Unemployed -0.04 (0.05) 
Gender = Male 0.01 
 (0.02) 
Party ID -0.00 
 (0.03) 





Likes to hunt 0.07* 
 (0.03) 
Evangelical -0.06* (0.03) 


















Time in rural area 0.15*** (0.04) 
Negative rural affect -0.11 (0.07) 






Positive metro affect -0.01 (0.08) 
N = 430, adj. R2 = 0.50. * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. All 
variables standardized from zero to one. Data weighted to population targets. 
 
Like in the findings from Table 3.9 above, Table 3.10 suggests that age and being 
evangelical are negatively and significantly correlated with rural social identity strength, 
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while liking to hunt recreationally and need for cognitive closure are positively and 
significantly associated. The relationship between unemployment and authoritarianism 
becomes insignificant. 
As would be expected, rural social identity strength is positively and significantly 
correlated with feeling a sense of belonging to rural areas, having spent more time in 
rural areas, and general positive in-group affect. However, much like the findings from 
the above section on the decomposed affective measures, negative out-group affect is not 
statistically significant, though it is positively correlated. This stands in contrast to 
previous assumptions and expectations that rural identity and rural consciousness are 
more focused on resentment toward urban areas than feeling positively toward the in-
group.  
Although white identity does appear to be associated with rural identity, race and 
ethnicity are not. Additionally, the average scores of the rural identity strength measure 
do not seem to vary between race or ethnicity. The average rural identity score for whites 
is 0.57, while for Hispanics it is 0.58 and for blacks it is 0.58. Similar results occur using 
the data from the other three surveys. These results provide evidence that rural identity 
exists for non-white rural respondents at similar levels to white respondents.  
 
Class and Individual Economic Decline 
 
Beyond the demographic predictors and validation measures, one major 
demographic factor paired with rural identity in previous literature is that rural identity 
has overlap with working class identity (Cramer 2012). Other literature employing the 
decline thesis suggests that rural areas behave as they do politically in the United States 
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because they are disproportionately comprised of working-class whites who have 
experienced economic disruption and decline for a number of reasons (Gest 2016; 
Hochschild 2016). 
 In the Study 3 data, I ask respondents which socioeconomic class they identify 
themselves with. This is measured using the question, “Which socio-economic class do 
you consider yourself to be now?” The possible responses include “poor”, “working 
class”, “middle class”, “upper class”, and “rich.” Respondents could only select one of 
these options. This measure of class correlates with rural residency (subjective) at -0.11, 
rural residency (RUCC binary) at -0.09, and rural social identity strength at 0.09. I also 
find very little difference in the distribution of rural social identity strength scores 
between self-identified working class and non-working-class respondents (Figure 3.7). 
Figure 3.7: Rural social identity distributions for self-identified working class and not 
working-class respondents, Study 3. 
Left: N= 154, mean = 0.58, standard deviation = 0.27; Right: N=332, mean = 0.58, standard deviation = 
0.27. 
 
 Such preliminary findings suggest that rural identity may, in fact, not be related to 
working class identity as much as previous scholarship suggests. Further, I also examine 
how income and education level – alternative proxies to class – relate to the rural social 
identity strength measure.  Table 3.11 below shows the results of OLS regression models 
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predicting the relationship between rural identity strength and either income or education 
level, according to rural versus metro residency. In addition, correlations between rural 
identity strength and these two indicators can be found in the appendix; these measures 
have very low correlations. 






















Grew up Rural 






ID) only + 
Household 
Income 
0.15* 0.01 0.11 0.10 0.25** 
 (0.07) (0.15) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) 
Education 
Level 
0.09 0.10 -0.00 0.01 0.06 
 (0.08) (0.19) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
Constant 0.50*** 0.51*** 0.53*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 
 (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
r2 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.08 
N 309.00 105.00 369.00 337.00 236.00 
+Non-rural here means that the respondent said they do not live in a rural area and they did not grow up in 
a rural area. Standard errors in parentheses. Data weighted to population benchmarks. Significance: + p > 
0.10, * p > 0.05, ** p > 0.01, *** p > 0.001.  
 
The results from Table 3.11 show that education level is unrelated to rural identity 
strength, regardless of respondent location. Furthermore, for both self-identified rural and 
non-rural residents, income level is significantly and positively related to rural social 
identity strength. In other words, individuals with higher levels of income are more likely 
to be stronger rural identifiers, which is the opposite of what prior research on the 
relationship between class and rural identity predicts.  
Working class decline and the subsequent turn to more extreme right-wing 
political attitudes is not necessarily one’s current socioeconomic situation, according to 
some scholars. Rather it is a reflection of fears over relative deprivation. For example, 
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Gest et al. (2018) find that nostalgic deprivation – that is, a relative perceived decline in 
economic, social, and political standing over time - among the white working class in the 
U.S. and the U.K predicts more far-right attitudes.   
Although my data does not have the exact same measure of relative deprivation, I 
have a similar one for the relative economic deprivation. If the decline thesis is true for 
rural identifiers in the U.S., and that concerns of the white working class map onto rural 
concerns, then rural identifiers should also have similar fears of relative deprivation. 
However, I find that this is not the case. Stronger rural social identifiers from self-
identified rural areas are actually more optimistic about the economic trajectory of the 
country, at least in August 2019. In Survey 3, I asked respondents to fill in the blank for 
the following opinion statements: 1) “Life in our country today is ____________ than it 
was 50 years ago for people like me.”, and 2) “When children today in our country grow 
up, financially speaking they will be ____________their parents.” For the first statement, 
respondents had seven response options that ranged from “much better” to “much 
worse.” For the second statement, responses ranged on a seven-point scale from “much 
better off than” to “much worse off than.” I rescaled these variables to go from zero to 
one, with one being “much worse” or “much worse off than.” In both cases, rural social 
identity strength is negatively correlated with the better than 50 years ago item (-0.12) 
and with the economic prospects for the future question (-0.18).  
Of course, this relationship could be due to the expected Trump support of 
stronger rural identifiers; when presidential co-partisans are in office, people tend to think 
the economy is going well or they attribute poor economic conditions to factors other 
than elected co-partisan officials (Bisgaard 2015). But, the Gest et al. (2018) findings 
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cited above were conducted after Trump had won the 2016 presidential election. To 
further address this potential concern, I ran OLS regression models predicting these two 
economic evaluation measures using only rural social identity strength as the independent 
variable, and then again controlling for party identity strength. The results suggest that 
economic evaluations now compared to 50 years ago do not significantly relate to rural 
social identity strength, regardless of having party identity in the model (Table 3.12 
below). However, rural social identity strength does have a significant and negative 
relationship with the feeling of children being economically worse off than ourselves, 
even controlling for party identity. In other words, stronger rural identifiers are less likely 
to say that their children will be worse off economically speaking than themselves. 
Table 3.12: Predicting perceptions of relative economic deprivation, according to 
partisan and rural identity, Study 3 data. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Worse than 50 
years ago 
Worse than 50 
years ago 
Children worse off Children worse off 
Rural Social ID 
Strength 
-0.11 -0.11 -0.21*** -0.22*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Party ID - -0.04 - 0.00 
  (0.05)  (0.04) 
Constant 0.50*** 0.51*** 0.58*** 0.58*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) 
r2 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 
N 485.00 464.00 483.00 462.00 
Standard errors in parentheses. Data weighted to population benchmarks. OLS regression results. Standard 
errors in parentheses. Data weighted to population benchmarks. Significance: + p > 0.10, * p > 0.05, ** p > 
0.01, *** p > 0.001.  
 
 Given these results, it appears that expectations surrounding rural social identity 
as encapsulating concerns of working class decline do not hold, at least at the individual 
level. If anything, rural social identity is stronger with those who are wealthier and who 
have a more optimistic view of the trajectory of the economy. What could account for 
this unexpected finding? 
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 Previous research finds that people who more strongly identify with politically-
relevant groups tend to be higher in education, interest, and resources (Verba et al. 2003). 
This is because such individuals are better able to connect their experiences and 
surroundings to form a collective identity, and to map that identity onto politics. Further, 
people higher in political interest are more likely to pay attention to partisan news and 
information sources that provide group-based cues (Prior 2018). Under this line of 
thought, people who are higher in education and income level would be more likely to 
socially identify as rural.  
To examine this explanation, I repeat the analyses in Table 3.11 above, but 
include an additional variable measuring political interest. This measure is the average of 
two survey questions: “How often do you pay attention to politics and elections?” (the 
response options are a five-point scale from “never” to “always”), and “How interested 
are you in information about what's going on in government and politics?” (response 
options are a five-point scale from “never interested” to “always” interested”). These two 
items have a scale reliability coefficient of 0.92, and an interitem covariance of 1.32. The 
scale was then recoded to go from zero to one, with one indicating the highest level of 
political interest. The results of the models including political interest can be seen in 
Table 3.13. 
Table 3.13: Predicting rural social identity strength, with political interest. 







Grew up Rural 






ID) only + 
Household 
Income 
0.11 -0.07 0.07 0.07 0.19** 
 (0.07) (0.14) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
Education 
Level 
0.07 0.06 -0.05 -0.03 0.04 





0.17** 0.19 0.20** 0.19** 0.18* 
 (0.06) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
Constant 0.42*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.42*** 0.44*** 
 (0.06) (0.11) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
r2 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.12 
N 309.00 105.00 369.00 337.00 236.00 
+Non-rural here means that the respondent said they do not live in a rural area and they did not grow up in 
a rural area. Standard errors in parentheses. Data weighted to population benchmarks. Significance: + p > 
0.10, * p > 0.05, ** p > 0.01, *** p > 0.001. Study 3 data. 
 
 From the results in Table 3.13, we can see a change in significance for self-
identified rural residents:  household income is no longer significant. Meanwhile, 
political interest is positively associated with rural social identity strength, and is 
significant for all models except the rural residents according to RUCA codes model. 
Though household income is a factor for non-rural residents, political interest is generally 
more strongly associated with rural identity strength, thus backing up the argument that 
rural identity does not intersect with working class concerns; rather, rural identifiers tend 
to be more politically interested. The politically interested are, in turn, more likely to be 
higher in education, income level, and socioeconomic class. 
 That said, this relationship may be even more nuanced. In the following chapter, I 
take a deeper dive into the relationship between class and rural identity, and find repeated 
support that being part of the working class does not predict rural social identity, nor does 
the interaction of working class measures and rural identity predict political outcomes. I 
particularly look at these tendencies for white respondents, as many decline thesis 
accounts specifically talk about the white working class. Moreover, I not only individual-
level measures of class but also take into account relative economic deprivation of 
respondent context. I find that rural identifiers in areas that had the strongest recovery 
after the Great Recession were much less likely to support right-wing politics than 
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average, while those in areas that had the weakest recovery after the Great Recession 
were more likely to support Trump, strongly identify as Republican, and strongly identify 
with being conservative.  
Trump Support, Partisanship, and Ideology 
 
The next section deals with rural identity and political outcomes. I first measure 
Trump support in the 2016 presidential election using logistic regressions. A value of one 
on this outcome variable counters for a self-reported vote for Trump and a zero being 
voted for someone else (Table 3.14). For Surveys 1 and 3 I include a model for only rural 
respondents, as the rural identity questions were only asked to current or former rural 
residents. For Survey 2, all respondents were asked the rural identity question, so there 
are separate models for rural respondents only, non-rural respondents only, and the entire 
sample.  
 

























Party ID 0.62*** 5.42*** 4.17*** 
 (0.08) (0.61) (0.55) 


















Black  -0.66 -0.52 -0.28 
 (0.57) (0.88) (0.70) 
Hispanic -1.29* 0.51 0.22 
 (0.54) (0.63) (0.50) 
Gender  0.77** 0.71* -0.39 
 (0.29) (0.34) (0.32) 
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Age 2.25** 1.44 0.83 
 (0.71) (0.76) (0.71) 


























































Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All variables standardized from zero to one. Samples weighted to 
general population. Significance: * p > 0.05, ** p > 0.01, *** p > 0.001. 
 
 According to these results, rural social identity consistently predicts support for 
Trump in 2016 for self-identified voters, even controlling for a myriad of variables 
known or expected to predict support for Trump. This comports with previous literature 
expecting this relationship (Mendelberg 2017). Notably, Trump vote is also significantly 
predicted by rural social identity for non-white rural respondents as well using Study 3 
data, though this was done in a bivariate model because the number of rural non-whites in 
the sample is fairly low (N = 51). Further, the average rural social identity strength score 
for rural residents (self-identified) is 0.62 for non-white Trump voters (N = 23), 0.43 for 
non-white non-Trump voters (N = 9), 0.52 for white Trump voters, and 0.44 for white 
non-Trump voters. See chapter appendix for details. 
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 Similarly, we would also expect, given prior literature, that rural social identifiers 
would be more inclined toward Republicanism and/or being conservative (Cramer 2016; 
Wuthnow 2019), though it is unclear if the relationship would occur with symbolic 
ideology, operational ideology, or both. Table 3.15 below shows the results of OLS 
regressions predicting partisan identity, while Table 3.16 shows the results of OLS 
regressions predicting a seven-point symbolic ideology scale. 
 



































































































r2 0.43 0.42 0.49 
N 518 466 397 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All variables standardized from zero to one. Samples weighted to 
general population. Significance: * p > 0.05, ** p > 0.01, *** p > 0.001. 
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r2 0.31 0.29 0.34 
N 533 487 412 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All variables standardized from zero to one. Samples weighted to 
general population. Significance: * p > 0.05, ** p > 0.01, *** p > 0.001. 
 
 Contrary to expectations, rural social identity strength does not consistently 
predict partisanship, controlling for other factors. This is in line with more recent work 
that finds that place consciousness is not predictive of partisanship (Munis 2020). But for 
rural respondents, stronger rural social identity does predict symbolic conservatism. 
Interestingly, when looking at the entire sample in the Study 2 results, this relationship 
not only becomes insignificant; it also becomes negative.  
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In addition, rural social identity strength for non-white rural residents does not 
significantly predict party identity using Study 3 data, but it does significantly predict 
more conservative symbolic ideology (see chapter appendix for details). The average 
rural social identity strength score for non-white rural residents (self-identified) is 0.61 
for those who identify as conservative and 0.50 for those who identify as liberal. For 
reference, both conservative and liberal white rural residents have an average rural social 
identity score around 0.40. For party identity, the average rural social identity strength 
score for white and non-white rural Democrats is around 0.42. For white Republicans it is 
0.50 and for non-white Republicans it is 0.46. For non-white rural Independents it is 0.57 
and for white rural Independents it is 0.51. 
 To see whether this tendency holds with operational ideology, I construct three 
dependent variables to measure the concept: positions on economic issues, positions on 
social issues, and positions on immigration. Positions on economic issues are based on 
two questions measure how much the respondent supports raising minimum wage to 
$15/hour, and how much the respondent supports more government spending on services. 
These questions have seven-point response option scales ranging from strongly oppose to 
strongly support. The responses to these two questions have a scale reliability coefficient 
of 0.70. I averaged these items together, reverse coded them so higher values indicate 
more conservative stances, and rescaled the measure to go from zero to one.  
 Second, positions on social issues encompass how much respondents support 
policies to combat climate change, and how much respondents support stronger 
background checks for firearms. These questions had seven-point response scales ranging 
from strongly oppose to strongly support. The responses to these two questions have a 
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scale reliability coefficient of 0.71. Again, I averaged these items together, reverse coded 
them so higher values indicate more conservative stances, and rescaled the measure to go 
from zero to one. 
 Finally, immigration has been an issue very central to politics recently, 
particularly for populist politicians and their supporters. Further, immigration is a 
complex issue which spans both the social and economic realms. Therefore, I create a 
separate ideological measure for immigration attitudes. Respondents were asked how 
much they support the separation and detention of migrants at the U.S.-Mexican border, 
and how much they support stricter immigration laws. These questions had seven-point 
response scales ranging from strongly oppose to strongly support. The responses to these 
two questions have a scale reliability coefficient of 0.67. Again, I averaged these items 
together and rescaled the measure to go from zero to one. 
The results of the OLS models predicting these three outcome measures, using 
Survey 3 data, are shown in Table 3.17 below. Very notably, the only significant 
relationship between rural identity and the outcome measures is the immigration attitude 
scale, once control variables are accounted for. In other words, stronger rural identifiers 
tend to hold stronger anti-immigration attitudes. This relationship even holds when only 
looking at non-white (and only white) rural respondents. Interestingly, just looking at 
correlations between conservative immigration stances and rural social identity by rural 
respondent race, the correlation is 0.29 for whites, 0.44 for blacks, and 0.42 for 
Hispanics. 
Table 3.17: Predicting operational ideology, Survey 3 data, self-identified rural 
respondents. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Economi Social Social Immigratio Immigratio Immigratio Immigratio
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c Issues Issues Issues n Issues n Issues n Issues n Issues 




All rural All rural White rural Non-white 
rural 
Rural ID  0.13 0.25** 0.09 0.43*** 0.26*** 0.22** 0.27*** 





- 0.13 0.12 0.09 
   (0.06)  (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) 
Symbolic 
Ideology 
- - -0.00 - 0.22* 0.20 0.25** 






- 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 
   (0.08)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Black - - 0.07 - 0.11* - - 
   (0.06)  (0.05)   
Hispanic - - 0.09 - -0.11* -0.15 -0.11 
   (0.06)  (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) 
Age - - -0.12 - 0.01 0.04 -0.00 
   (0.07)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Education 
Level 
- - 0.09 - -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 
   (0.08)  (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) 
Income - - -0.06 - 0.03 0.03 0.03 
   (0.07)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Female - - -0.06 - -0.01 0.00 0.00 
   (0.04)  (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
White 
Identity 
- - - - - 0.16* - 
      (0.07)  
Constant 0.37*** 0.20**
* 
0.03 0.31*** 0.04 -0.07 0.07 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) 
r2 0.01 0.05 0.34 0.14 0.51 0.51 0.50 
N 224.00 226.00 205.00 225.00 204.00 169.00 204.00 
Standard errors in parentheses. All variables standardized from zero to one. Samples weighted to general 
population. Significance: * p > 0.05, ** p > 0.01, *** p > 0.001. 
 
   
 Given the support for Trump – who made harsher policies on immigration a 
cornerstone of his campaign in 2016 - and the anti-immigration attitudes among rural 
identifiers, I believe immigration and attitudes toward immigrants is a key factor in rural 
identity and its political expression in the United States. Therefore, rural identity may not 
be explicitly class-based; however, it is very strongly linked with populist concerns over 
migrants. In a later chapter I further investigate this link and conclude that immigrants, 
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particularly undocumented immigrants, serve as an out-group for many rural identifiers. 
Immigrants are seen as an out-group because rural areas occupy a middle position in the 
societal status hierarchy: therefore, right-wing populism (as defined by Mudde and 
Kaltwasser 2017) is a natural framework that maps onto rural identifiers, who see 
themselves as positive representatives of the American people getting stepped on by 
elites (experts in urban areas) who favor immigrants perceived to be cutting in line ahead 
of rural areas (Hochschild 2016). To round out this argument, I also examine anti-
intellectualism – a distrust of experts and intellectuals - as a group-based norm of rural 
identifiers in the final substantive chapter of this project. I measure anti-intellectualism 
using part of Oliver and Rahn’s (2016) populism measure; notably, I find that the other 
part of the measure – distrust of political elites – is not significantly associated with rural 
identity (see chapter appendix for details, as well as Chapter 6). These findings hold for 
rural white and non-white respondents. Rural social identity strength and anti-
intellectualism are moderately correlated for white rural respondents at 0.27 and for black 
rural respondents at 0.21, and for Hispanics they are correlated at 0.35. 
Summary and Discussion 
 This chapter serves to distinguish some of the characteristics and contours of rural 
social identification, and to clarify some points in previous research on the topic. First, 
rural social identity strength tends to be stronger among rural residents, particularly 
among those who self-identify as living in a rural area versus living in a rural area 
according to objective measures of rural residency. Second, rural social identifiers who 
live in rural areas are actually more in-group oriented than defined by negative feelings 
toward urban areas; rural social identity strength positively corresponds with general 
positive feelings toward rural residents, and with more often feeling proud, hopeful, and 
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happy about rural areas – compared to any feelings toward metro or urban areas. This is 
true of both white and non-white rural residents. 
 Next, stronger rural identifiers, in contrast to previous assumptions and 
expectations not only focusing on rural identity (Cramer 2012; 2016) but also rural 
identity potentially linked with white working-class interests and decline (Fukuyama 
2018), are not more likely to be working class or lower in income/education level. 
Further, they are actually optimistic about the economic future of their children. If 
anything, being higher in socio-economic status corresponds with greater rural social 
identification. This is likely due to higher socio-economic status individuals being better 
at linking their identities and surroundings with politics; further, those higher in class are 
also more politically active and interested. I delve into this relationship more in the next 
chapter. In addition, I also find that average rural social identity strength does not 
significantly differ across race or ethnicity. Thus, confounding rural identifiers (and, as I 
examine in the next chapter, rural conservatives) with the white working class is a 
potentially misleading and problematic assumption. 
 Politically speaking, rural social identity corresponds to the expected political 
outcomes: stronger rural identifiers tend to Trump in 2016, tend to be stronger 
Republicans (though the significance on this relationship is mixed), and tend to 
ideologically identify as more conservative. In terms of issue stances, however, stronger 
rural identifiers are not more economically or socially conservative, controlling for other 
factors. However, they are much more likely to support restrictive measures on 
immigration. In Chapter 5 I talk about how views toward immigrants – following the 
logical of rural identity’s perceived middle position within the status hierarchy – lends 
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itself to the structuring of right-wing populist ideology. This leaves immigrants as 
another significant out-group for rural identifiers beyond the general urban/metro out-
group. Finally, I find that stronger rural social identifiers are more populist than weaker 
rural identifiers. Notably, however, they are more populist along the anti-
intellectualism/anti-expert dimension, but not along the political anti-elitism dimension. I 
examine this in more detail, as well as rural social identity strength’s relationship with 




CHAPTER 4: Decoupling Rural (and Rural Identity) from the Working Class 
 
 
Narratives after the 2016 presidential election often spoke of the rural white 
working-class voter coming out in droves to support Republican presidential candidate 
Donald Trump (Cohn 2016; Francis 2018; Fukuyama 2018; Mendelberg 2017). This 
narrative echoes the popular and academic explanation that certain groups within society 
have experienced economic relative deprivation, thus fueling resentment that drove 
populist support for Trump in 2016 (Gest 2016; Sides et al. 2017). According to this, the 
groups more likely to have felt this relative economic decline are often the white working 
class or rural residents, whose blue-collar jobs in manufacturing, agriculture, and more 
have taken a particular hit in recent decades (such as Scala and Johnson 2015, but see 
Rothwell and Diego-Roswell 2016).  
Further, previous scholarship on the role of rural social identity in predicting 
candidate support – especially for outsider Republicans – points to the importance of 
working-class membership in this equation (Cramer 2016; Cramer Walsh 2012). Cramer, 
in fact, argues that rural identity and consciousness are intertwined with economic 
circumstances. Similarly, studies on the relationship between racial and ethnic minority 
identity strength and political behavior (such as voter turnout) find that stronger racial or 
ethnic identity strength varies across personal and community economic or class 
indicators (Jardina 2018; Valenzuela and Michelson 2016). The tendency in such studies 
is that stronger racial or ethnic identity is affiliated with lower socioeconomic levels, 
similar to what is proposed by Cramer. 
However, these assertions of the link between rurality – especially rural social 
identity – and class have not been formally tested. What is the relationship between rural 
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social identity, (or rural residency) and class when predicting recent Republican support 
in the United States, particularly among whites? Answering such a question tests the 
popular and academic narrative of the 2016 presidential election where rurality and rural 
identity are linked with right-wing support via white working-class membership, and it 
tests the theoretically proposed nature of rural social identity.  
In fact, there may be reason to believe that there is either no relationship between 
class and rurality when predicting right-wing support for whites especially, or that rural 
identity is linked to political outcomes for the middle to upper classes. First, older 
scholarship finds that middle class rural residents have supported the radical right in 
places such as 1930s Germany due to the economic insecurity of the middle class, or the 
threat of it (Loomis and Beagle 1946); this stood in contrast to the poor and working class 
in cities which were more left-leaning or Communist. This is not to say that middle class 
rural whites are Nazis; rather, I instead emphasize that we should be careful with 
confounding rural with working class – other socioeconomic classes do exist in rural 
areas, after all - or assuming that rural areas necessarily act on the same political impulses 
of the white working classes in metro areas.  
Second, it could also be the case that rural identity in particular is strongly tied to 
a lack of status, respect, and dignity (Cramer 2016; Fukuyama 2018; Lunz Trujillo and 
Crowley 2020), which is in line with expectations from Social Identity Theory (SIT). SIT 
scholarship argues that social identification is based on symbolic concerns rather than 
material conflict (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Huddy 2003), though material conflict can 
play a role. This has two possible implications that run counter to prevailing wisdom. The 
first is that class may not relate to rural identity and political outcomes in any meaningful 
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way. More generally, economic self-evaluations have not consistently predicted political 
behavior in the public for the most part (Achen and Bartels 2016; Sears and Funk 1990), 
though other research has found that factors such as personal income matter in some 
locations over others (Gelman 2009). Rather, group identity and sociotropic economic 
concerns are more notable. For instance, many accounts of support for Trump suggest 
that the concern driving his support is mostly symbolic or sociotropic economic in nature 
(Mutz 2018; Sides et al. 2017).  
An alternative possibility is that middle to upper class rural individuals could be 
more focused on the symbolic aspect because the material aspect, at a personal level, is 
less of an immediate concern. This is further cemented by previous research finding that 
those who are more politically engaged in general tend to have more resources (Brady et 
al. 1995), and are also more apt to link themselves and their immediate surroundings to 
political groups and grievances (Federico 2004; Mason 2018). Relatedly, the working 
class in Detroit were less likely to affiliate with the partisan leaning of their 
neighborhood; perhaps poorer or working-class individuals are, for whatever reason, less 
apt to link their environmental circumstances to politics (Huckfeldt 1984). In other 
words, in contrast to the expectation that rural residents or rural identifiers who are white 
working class more strongly support the right, rural residents or stronger rural identifiers 
support the right if they are higher in class indicators such as income, education level, 
and self-identified class membership. 
That said, it is true that rural areas do have proportionately more white working 
class and non-college degree whites than metro areas do (Farragan 2020), including 
lower income levels on average (though this is complicated as cost of living tends to be 
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lower in rural areas as well). Rural areas are also disproportionately white, though a 
significant number of non-whites (20-25%) do live in rural America (Illing 2017). 
Therefore, perhaps in some ways it does make sense to say the white working class and 
rural Americans are related, politically speaking. But it does not mean that these two 
groups are necessary going to behave the same ways, or for the same reasons. Further, 
this does not answer the question of the proposed theoretical link between rural identity 
and the working class when understanding rural political behavior. 
In the previous chapter, I consistently found no link between class variables and 
rural identity. In this chapter, using ANES, CCES, and original survey data, I test 
whether rural residents or rural social identifiers – particularly whites - who are low to 
medium in income and education level were more likely to support Donald Trump in the 
2016 election or were more likely to trust Trump. Notably, I find that there is consistently 
little to no relationship between rurality and class variables for white voters when 
predicting Trump support. Further, I find that at times rural social identity strength 
predicts Trump support more for white voters higher in class indicators, which runs 
counter to previous expectations (Cramer Walsh 2012). In other words, there is no 
tendency for less educated and working-class rural whites to identify socially with rural 
areas, or for rural working-class white voters to vote Trump compared to those in other 
classes; white rural social identifiers more associated with higher class membership are 
more likely to support a right-wing outsider presidential candidate. Again, such findings 
echo those in Chapter 2 (Tables 3.8-3.10, 3.12), as well as in studies on general place 
consciousness (Munis 2020); here, rural social identity is not significantly linked with 
variables relating to class, specifically with household education level, income level, and 
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self-identified working-class membership. In other words, rural identity and indicators of 
class may not be related in the way we think, and we may be politically oversimplifying 
or even conflating the white working class with rurality and rural identity.  
However, using county data that represents 94% of all counties in the United 
States, I also find that median income loss between 2010 and 2016 predictes a greater 
vote share percentage supporting the Republican presidential candidate in 2016 (Donald 
Trump) compared to the percentage supporting the Republican presidential candidate in 
2008 (John McCain). This is only true in non-metro counties; in metro counties, a 
decrease in median income actually corresponds to a decrease in support for the 
Republican presidential candidate. This falls in line with findings from previous 
scholarship (such as Ogorzalek et al. 2019), but with added nuance; relative economic 
decline has different effects for metro versus non-metro areas. In addition, county 
manufacturing and mining dependence had a very small effect on Republican candidate 
county vote share change over time (and agriculture has no significant effect at all) once 
other factors are controlled for, which does run counter to some narratives of what drives 
the urban-rural voting divide in the U.S. (Rodden 2019; Scala and Johnson 2015; Scala et 
al. 2017). This is, however, in line with other research finding that whites living in places 
where manufacturing has been in decline since 1990 were not more likely to be Trump 
supporters (Rothwell and Diego-Roswell 2016).  
Then, I merge together the individual-level original survey data and the county-
level data set and employ a series of multilevel models. I find that rural identifiers are 
much more likely to have supported Trump, to identify as Republican, or to say they are 
stronger conservatives, if they live in areas of greater economic decline. Conversely, 
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stronger rural identifiers who live in areas that have experienced gains in median income 
are unlikely to have supported Trump in 2016, or to say that they identify as Republican. 
Since we know from the other analyses in this chapter that rural identifiers who support 
Trump tend to be higher in income and education, it appears that working class decline 
explanation applies to rural identifiers who have concerns about their local economic 
conditions but not necessarily about their personal socioeconomic status. This is 
somewhat related to recent scholarship, which finds that Trump support is higher among 
higher income individuals in areas of local economic decline (Ogorzalek et al. 2019); 
though I add nuance to this by looking at urban-rural differences. 
Part I. Individual Class, Rural Identification, and Right-Wing Support 
 
As noted above, this first section deals with looking at whether rural social 
identification and rurality predict support for Trump for those white voters who are lower 
in education level or for those who make low to moderate income. This is accomplished 
by using multiple cross-sectional survey data sets to examine the relationship between 
rurality and class variables, as well as between rural social identity strength and class 
variables, to predict support for Trump. Particular attention is given to white voters, given 
popular and scholarly expectations. 
Methods and Analytical Strategy 
To test these expectations, I rely on four survey data sets – two from Lucid 
(Studies 2 and 3), one from an ANES (2019) pilot, and one from CCES (2018). Technical 
information about these weights can be found in Table A4.1 in the Chapter 3 appendix. 
The first variable I operationalize is rural residency. There are various ways to 
define and measure these terms, and decades of academic research by sociologists, 
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demographers, public health scholars, and recently political scientists have debated the 
best way to do so (Hart et al. 2005; Nemerever and Rogers 2020). Researchers often use 
definitions and quantitative scales created by government agencies based on objective 
criteria, such as population density, population size, and distance from metropolitan 
centers. These include measurements such as the Rural-Urban Continuum Codes 
(“RUCC”), which was developed by the USDA3 and are based on Census tracts and are 
defined according to metropolitan center size and population size, and whether the county 
is adjacent to these metropolitan centers. I use RUCC codes as an objective measure of 
rurality for the Lucid data. The Chapter 2 appendix contains more information on 
defining and measuring “rural” and “urban”, and the Chapter 4 appendix contains more 
information about the RUCC measure categories.  
To measure subjective rural self-identification, the Lucid data respondents were 
asked if they live in a rural area now (response options were again “yes” or “no”). The 
correlation between a current metro resident according to the binary measure developed 
from the RUCC codes and a current self-identified rural resident is 0.43. To measure 
rural identity strength, I used the adapted five-item partisan identity strength scale by 
Huddy and colleagues (Huddy 2001; 2013; Huddy et al. 2015) described in Chapter 3.  
Similarly, rural residency in the ANES data is measured according to whether the 
respondent said that they currently live in a rural area or small town. Rural identity 
strength is measured according to how important the respondent feels being from a rural 
area is to them, and is measured using a three-part question (ANES wording based on 
                                                          
3 Please see documentation on RUCC codes from the USDA website here: 




Munis 2020). Respondents were first asked where they currently live, and then they were 
asked where they grew up. If respondents answered “rural area” for either of those two 
responses, then they were asked how important being a “country (or rural) person” is to 
their identity, with five possible responses ranging from “not at all important” to 
“extremely important”. Non-rural respondents were not asked whether being a rural 
person is important to them.  
Finally, the CCES data measures rural residency by asking people whether they 
currently live in a city, suburb, town, rural area, or other. Rural residency is 
operationalized where a 1 indicates rural or town residency, and 0 is everything else. The 
CCES does not contain a measure of rural social identity strength or importance. 
I measure class using three objective variables and one subjective variable. The 
first two objective measures - household income level and education level - are measured 
using the variables provided by Lucid or the ANES. For Lucid, education level is 
respondent-identified according to a seven-point scale, while yearly household income 
options are presented on a 24-point scale of income brackets. For the ANES and the 
CCES, education contains six response options while household income contains 16 
possible respondent values. Details of the different values can be found in the chapter 
appendix. In addition, I also create a measure of education for all data sets that is a binary 
college-educated (1) versus never got a college degree (0). For the Lucid data, this 
income measure is correlated with subjective rural residency at -0.00, with objective rural 
residency at -0.09, and with rural social identity strength at 0.02. The education variable 
is correlated with subjective rural residency at -0.06, with objective rural residency at -
0.05, and with rural social identity strength at -0.01. Among subjective rural respondents, 
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36% have a college degree, while 40% of objective rural respondents have one and 41% 
of subjective rural respondents with a rural social identity strength of greater than 0.50 
have one. 
The August 2019 Lucid (Study 3) data also includes a subjective measure of class 
identification. This is measured using the question, “Which socio-economic class do you 
consider yourself to be now?” The possible responses include “poor”, “working class”, 
“middle class”, “upper class”, and “rich.” Respondents could only select one of these 
options. This measure of class correlates with rural residency (subjective) at -0.11, rural 
residency (RUCC binary) at -0.09, and rural social identity strength at 0.09. For only 
white respondents, these correlations are -0.14, -0.10, and 0.08, respectively. This 
suggests that a more objective measure of rurality captures a slightly lower-class identity, 
on average, than subjective measures.  
This analysis uses three outcome variables. The first is whether the respondent 
says that they voted for Trump in 2016 (1 = yes, 0 = no), rather than voting for someone 
else. This variable is confined to people who said that they voted in the 2016 presidential 
election. This is a dependent variable for the Lucid, ANES, and CCES analyses. Since 
this measure is subject to social desirability bias, as respondents tend to overreport 
whether they voted, and since a respondent may support Trump even though they did not 
vote, I use a second measure of Trump support in the May 2019 Lucid data. This second 
measure is based on a question asking respondents how much they trust Donald Trump 
according seven-point scale, with higher values indicating greater trust in Trump. Please 
see the chapter appendix for wording details. Lastly, I analyze the standard seven-point 
party identity scale as a dependent variable. 
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Finally, the analysis also includes demographic control measures that could 
account for other factors potentially driving Trump support. These include measures for 
age (continuous variable), gender (binary measure), race/ethnicity (a binary variable for 
Black, another for Hispanic, and another for White), party identity strength (7-point 
scale), symbolic ideology (7-point scale), and racial resentment items (a four-item 
additive scale). All variables have been standardized from zero to one. Please see the 
appendix for details on the racial resentment, symbolic ideology, and party identity items. 
To analyze these data, I employ either OLS or logistic regressions containing 
interactions between the measures of class and rural residency, or between class and rural 
social identity strength, predicting either voting for Trump in 2016, party identity 
strength, or in Donald Trump. For each model, I repeat the analysis for all respondents 
and for only white respondents, as theoretically we expect the rural white working class 
to support Trump. Furthermore, previous research finds that white identifiers are more 
likely to be rural, as white identity and rural identity may share similar senses of 
alienation and unfairness (Jardina 2019).  
 
Results 
In Table 4.1 below, I interact self-identified rural residency and three measures of 
class – education level (continuous), yearly household income level (continuous), and 
college-educated (binary) to predict support for Trump in the 2016 election. As noted 
above, I run these models for all respondents and for only white respondents. Results 
using the objective urban-rural measure instead of self-identified rural residency can be 
found in the chapter appendix; this yields a similar result where rural residency interacted 
with class variables are not statistically significant when predicting Trump vote. 
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Table 4.1: Predicting self-reported vote for Trump in 2016, for all voting respondents 
and only white voting respondents, with interactions between rural and class variables. 
































All Voters White 
Voters 
          
Rural Resident 
(Subjective) 
1.60* 2.29* 2.80* 2.26+ 1.32 3.20 1.12 1.42 1.77 
 (0.38) (0.90) (1.37) (0.95) (0.88) (2.55) (0.58) (1.36) (1.93) 
College Degree 0.67 1.11 1.43 - - - - - - 
 (0.17) (0.46) (0.60)       
Income Level - 1.28 1.66 1.87 0.96 2.02 - 1.36 1.63 
  (0.72) (1.02) (0.94) (0.70) (1.51)  (0.76) (1.02) 
Education Level - - - - 0.75 1.55 0.50 0.56 1.16 
     (0.58) (1.27) (0.29) (0.61) (1.32) 
Party ID - 107.77*** 103.68*** - 110.67*** 104.57*** - 111.57*** 108.33*** 
  (55.01) (59.06)  (57.12) (60.75)  (58.31) (64.53) 
Racial 
Resentment 
- 10.82*** 10.70** - 11.72*** 10.16* - 10.53*** 10.07* 
  (7.37) (9.80)  (8.05) (9.23)  (7.33) (9.31) 
Hispanic - 1.42 1.29 - 1.39 1.30 - 1.41 1.34 
  (0.58) (0.63)  (0.58) (0.64)  (0.59) (0.69) 
Female - 0.92 0.87 - 0.94 0.88 - 0.95 0.88 
  (0.32) (0.33)  (0.32) (0.34)  (0.33) (0.35) 
Political Interest - 4.23+ 4.52+ - 4.29+ 4.64+ - 4.47+ 4.61+ 
  (3.18) (3.71)  (3.30) (3.91)  (3.43) (3.90) 
Age - 0.34 0.35 - 0.35 0.35 - 0.36 0.36 
  (0.27) (0.30)  (0.27) (0.30)  (0.29) (0.32) 
Symbolic 
Ideology 
- 5.92* 15.04*** - 5.62* 14.80** - 5.71* 14.03** 
  (4.18) (12.22)  (4.04) (12.18)  (4.16) (11.98) 
Rural X College 1.33 0.72 0.72 - - - - - - 
 (0.54) (0.50) (0.57)       
Rural X Income - - - 0.94 2.40 0.58 - - - 
    (0.77) (2.96) (0.80)    
Rural X 
Education 
- - - - - - 2.45 1.87 1.83 
       (2.21) (3.16) (3.36) 
N 601.00 563.00 456.00 568.00 563.00 456.00 601.00 563.00 456.00 
Note: + = p < 0.10, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001, standard errors in parentheses. Results are 
of logit models; odds ratios shown. Results in bold show statistical significance at p < 0.05; results in italics 
show marginal statistical significance at 0.10 > p > 0.05. All variables (independent and dependent) have 
















Figure 4.1: Predicted marginal effects of self-reported vote for Trump in 2016, by 
measures of class and rural residency, for white respondents who voted. 
  
Table 4.1 indicates that, controlling other factors, measures of class do not 
significantly interact with rural residency to predict Trump support. This is true for all 
respondents who indicated that they voted, as well as for white respondents who 
indicated that they voted. Figure 4.1 above shows these dynamics in marginal effects 
plots for the respondent models with white voters (Models 3, 6, and 9). In each case, a 
similar pattern emerges. Regardless of rural residency or non-rural residency, there is 
little relationship between class variables and Trump support in 2016. For white rural 
voters, the probability of voting for Trump in 2016 is flat across the class variables, 
except for education level, which actually shows that higher levels of education slightly 
(but not significantly) predict higher support for Trump. Therefore, the lack of a 
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relationship between rural residency and objective class indicators starkly suggests that 
the narrative of the rural white working-class supporting Trump in 2016 may be 
insufficient.  
Given the commentary surrounding the 2016 presidential election, the plots in 
Figure 4.1 seem highly counterintuitive, and even suspect. To help clarify this matter, I 
include frequency tables of college degree attainment and Trump vote in 2016 by rural 
and non-rural respondent (Figure 4.2). Certainly, as expected, when comparing rural 
Trump voters to non-rural voters generally, the former group is disproportionately 
comprised of non-degree voters (compared to non-rural voters, who are about equal 
degree-holders versus not degree holders). What is more relevant, however, is a 
comparison of rural non-Trump rural voters to rural Trump voters. In both cases, the 
percentage of Trump and non-Trump voters in rural areas who did not have a college 
degree was 59% (38/(38+26) = 59% and 55/(55+38) = 59%). This suggests that the 
narrative of the non-college educated rural voter going for Trump is misleading; the non-
college educated rural voter went for various candidates nearly equally. 
Figure 4.2: Respondent frequency of Trump and non-Trump voters by rural residency 
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Perhaps, however, that this is an artifact of race as well; non-college educated 
voters who supported candidates other than Trump may be disproportionately rural 
people of color. Therefore, I also look at the same results from Figure 4.2 but for white 
respondents only (Figure 4.3). Again, degree holders in non-rural areas were more likely 
to vote for Trump than non-degree holders (though degree holders in non-rural areas 
were more likely to vote for anyone compared to non-degree holders). Remarkably, just 
like in Figure 4.2, both rural non-Trump voters and rural Trump voters were again 
approximately 59% (27/(27+19)) and 60% (54/(54+36) non-degree holders (for white 
respondents). Such a finding suggests that education level does not adequately explain 
the urban-rural divide when considering Trump support in 2016; more rural respondents 
voted for Trump than non-rural respondents, but the proportion of rural respondents who 
were not college educated did not differ between Trump voters and non-Trump voters 
(for whites and for all races).4 
Figure 4.3: Respondent frequency of Trump and non-Trump voters by rural residency 
(subjective) and college degree attainment, using Lucid data (only white respondents). 
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Further testing the assumptions of rural identity hinging on working class 
membership – particularly white working-class membership – I repeat the analyses in 
Table 4.1, but replacing rural residency with rural social identity strength. Table 4.2 
below suggests that rural social identity strength is either once again not contingent on 
class indicators when predicting Trump support. Or, in the case of college education, 
white voters with a college degree were even more likely to have voted for Trump 
compared to those without a college degree. Further, although the interactions between 
rural social identity strength and class are not significant, they are nearly all above one, 
indicating that stronger rural identity strength corresponds to greater likelihood of Trump 
support for those higher in class. The positive interaction in Model 3 can be found in 
Figure 4.4 below. 
Table 4.2: Predicting self-reported vote for Trump in 2016, for all voters and white 
voters, with interactions between rural social identity strength and class variables. 
 


















































          
Education 
Level 
- - - - 0.71 1.27 0.08+ 0.08 0.09 
     (0.70) (1.33) (0.12) (0.17) (0.22) 
Income 
Level 
- 1.15 0.70 2.45 0.09 0.08 - 1.29 0.80 
  (0.96) (0.69) (2.99) (0.16) (0.14)  (1.05) (0.76) 
College 
Degree 
0.21* 0.14* 0.13* - - - - - - 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.13)       












  (226.70) (292.58)  (258.58) (285.40)  (227.06) (290.11) 
Symbolic 
Ideology 
- 2.25 3.79 - 2.03 3.11 - 2.21 3.50 




- 5.54+ 4.41 - 6.87* 5.51 - 5.89+ 4.64 
  (5.05) (4.81)  (6.47) (6.00)  (5.41) (5.03) 
Hispanic - 1.28 1.04 - 1.24 1.05 - 1.32 1.09 
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  (0.89) (0.80)  (0.84) (0.79)  (0.91) (0.84) 
Female - 0.84 0.88 - 0.77 0.84 - 0.84 0.89 




2.98* 2.05 2.08 8.47* 0.55 0.81 0.96 0.66 0.56 
 (1.61) (2.14) (2.45) (7.80) (0.90) (1.49) (1.20) (1.73) (1.61) 
Political 
Interest 
- 8.94* 11.21* - 9.07* 10.96* - 9.57* 11.83* 
  (8.66) (11.94)  (8.71) (11.57)  (9.30) (12.55) 
Age - 0.84 0.76 - 0.73 0.65 - 0.79 0.68 




5.61+ 20.10+ 46.20* - - - - - - 




- - - 0.43 134.36 109.23 - - - 




- - - - - - 22.10 60.28 143.99 
       (46.71
) 
(256.70) (650.41) 








Note: + = p < 0.10, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001, standard errors in parentheses. Results are of logit 
models, odds ratios shown, in Models 1-3; Models 4-6 shows results from OLS regressions. Results in bold show 
statistical significance at p < 0.05; results in italics show marginal statistical significance at 0.10 > p > 0.05. All 
variables (independent and dependent) have been recoded from zero to one. Data weighted to population benchmarks. 
Lucid (Summer 2019) data used. 
 
Figure 4.4: Marginal effects plots for the interaction between rural social identity 




Finally, the tendency seen in Figure 4.4 is even more pronounced when changing 
the dependent variable to trust in Trump. As noted above, this variable can be found in a 
Lucid data set from May 2019, rather than the Lucid data collected in August 2019 that is 
used in Tables 4.1 and 3.2. These models, found in Table 4.3, look at rural and white 
respondents only. The marginal effects plots for the interactions in Models 1-3 can be 
found in Figure 4.5 below. 
Table 4.3: Predicting self-reported Trust in Trump, for only white self-identified rural 
respondents, with interactions between rural social identity and class variables. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Trust in Trump Trust in Trump Trust in Trump 
 Rural and White 
Respondents 
Rural and White 
Respondents 
Rural and White 
Respondents 
    
Education Level 0.84 - 1.04 
 (0.15)  (0.09) 
College - 0.83+ - 
  (0.09)  
Household Income 1.15 1.14 0.63** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) 
Party ID 1.69*** 1.66*** 1.68*** 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) 
Racial Resentment 1.40* 1.49** 1.45** 
 (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) 
Age 1.06 1.01 0.98 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) 
Ideology 1.01 1.01 1.02 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Hispanic 0.99 0.98 0.98 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Male 0.90* 0.91+ 0.91* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Rural Social ID 
Strength 
1.10 1.24+ 0.86 
 (0.18) (0.16) (0.11) 
Rural ID Str. X 
Education 
1.62+ - - 
 (0.41)   
Rural ID Str. X College 
Degree 
- 1.53* - 
  (0.28)  
Rural ID Str. X Income - - 2.82*** 
   (0.75) 
r2 0.26 0.25 0.25 
N 168.00 170.00 168.00 
Note: + = p < 0.10, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001, standard errors in parentheses. Results are 
of logit models, odds ratios shown, in Models 1-3; Models 4-6 shows results from OLS regressions. Results 
in bold show statistical significance at p < 0.05; results in italics show marginal statistical significance at 
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0.10 > p > 0.05. All variables (independent and dependent) have been recoded from zero to one. Data 







Figure 4.5: Marginal effects plots for the models in Table 4.3 showing Trust in Trump, 
for only white self-identified rural respondents, with interactions between rural social 














In almost every case, when moving beyond Trump vote choice into general 
support for Trump among voters and non-voters, white rural residents who are higher in 
rural social identity strength are more trusting of Trump if they are more educated or if 
they make more money. This is in sharp contrast to expectations set up in the previous 
literature on rural social identity and support for outsider Republican candidates. Notably, 
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the relationship between rural residency, class, and Trump support is not significant with 
partisan identity as the dependent variable; Tables A4.3 and A4.4 in the chapter appendix 
contain analyses similar to those found in Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 but with party identity 
as the dependent variable. This potentially suggests some sort of effect for rural identity 
strength that is Trump-specific. 
To verify that these effects are not due to quirks of this particular sample, I 
perform the same analysis using the 2019 ANES pilot data. In this data set, rural 
residency is self-identified, with rural meaning a small town or rural resident, and non-
rural meaning a suburban or urban resident. Then, I interact this variable with respondent 
household income level, respondent education level, and college degree attainment 
(Table 4.4). These models only include white voters. I repeat each analysis with and 
without control variables, including party identity strength, ideology, age, gender, and 
race. The outcome variable is again a binary Trump vote in 2016, with one indicating 
support for Trump. 
 
Table 4.4: Predicting Trump vote in 2016 using ANES data by rural identification and 
class measures (income and education level).  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
























       
Rural Res. 1.42*** 1.40 1.52* 1.74 1.38 1.86 
 (0.19) (0.33) (0.35) (0.65) (0.32) (0.72) 
Degree (BA/BS) 0.42*** 0.57** - - - - 
 (0.06) (0.15)     
Income - 1.07 - 0.97 0.85 1.40 
  (0.52)  (0.47) (0.29) (0.77) 
Education Level - - 0.29*** 0.56 - 0.45** 
   (0.07) (0.24)  (0.15) 
Age - 0.30** - 0.29** - 0.29** 
  (0.15)  (0.14)  (0.15) 
Female - 0.84 - 0.84 - 0.84 
  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.16) 
Party ID - 401.00*** - 406.60*** - 406.22*** 
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  (158.22)  (163.28)  (163.84) 
Racial Resentment - 0.02*** - 0.02*** - 0.02*** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Political Interest - 1.07 - 1.05 - 1.06 
  (0.43)  (0.42)  (0.42) 
Rural X Degree 1.23 0.87 - - - - 
 (0.27) (0.37)     
Rural X Education - - 1.00 0.60 - - 
   (0.37) (0.38)   
Rural X Income - - - - 1.68 0.41 
     (0.87) (0.38) 
Pseudo r2 0.04 0.63 0.04 0.63 0.01 0.63 
N 1751.00 1499.00 1751.00 1499.00 1530.00 1499.00 
Note: + = p < 0.10, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001, standard errors in parentheses. Results are 
of logit models, shown with odds ratio coefficients for ease of interpretation. Results in bold show 
statistical significance at p < 0.05; results in italics show marginal statistical significance at 0.10 > p > 0.05. 
All variables (independent and dependent) have been recoded from zero to one. Data weighted to 
population benchmarks. Models 3 and 4 show respondents who said they either currently live in a rural area 




The results in Table 4.4 somewhat echo the corresponding findings in Tables 4.1 
– 4.3 above using the Lucid data. The interactions between rural residency and education 
level or college degree, as well as between rural residency and income level, are not 
statistically significant for white respondents. This is true regardless of whether control 
variables are or are not included in the models. The marginal effects plots of these 
insignificant interactions show that educational attainment, for example, is nearly flat in 
predicting support for Trump among rural and non-rural respondents (Figure 4.6 below). 
It does appear that higher educational attainment does slightly decrease the likelihood of 
Trump support for rural residents; however, this is a very substantively small 
relationship. If I replace rural residency with rural identity importance, there is a similar 
lack of statistically significant relationships when interacting with class variables to 




Figure 4.6: Marginal effects predicting the probability of Trump vote by rural residency 
interacted with education level. Interaction from Model 4 in Table 4.4; interaction not 
statistically significant. White respondents only. ANES (2019) pilot data. 
 
 Finally, the CCES data show that higher levels of socioeconomic status indicators 
correspond to greater likelihood of Trump vote in 2016 for rural respondents (especially 
for rural white respondents), compared to urban and suburban respondents (Table 4.5). In 
every single case, the interaction terms are either positive or not statistically significant. 
Figure 4.7 below shows these interactions in more detail. 
Table 4.5: Predicting Trump vote in 2016 using CCES data by rural residency 
(subjective) and class measures (income, education level, and college degree attainment). 






























































 (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) 
Degree 
(BA/BS) 





       (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) 
Educatio
n Level 




0.78* - - - 








1.01 1.48* - - 1.84*** - - 1.85*** 
 (0.14) (0.08) (0.24)   (0.25)   (0.25) 










- - 1.32*** - - 1.32*** - - 1.32*** 










   (4.97)   (4.96)   (4.94) 
Gender = 
Female 
- - 0.87** - - 0.87** - - 0.87** 
   (0.04)   (0.04)   (0.04) 
Age - - 0.10*** - - 0.10*** - - 0.10*** 
   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01) 
Hispanic - - 0.81 - - 0.81 - - 0.80 





1.73* - - - - - - 




- - - 0.96 1.31** 1.43* - - - 
    (0.09) (0.12) (0.25)    
Rural X 
Degree 
- - - - - - 0.98 1.14* 1.13 



















Note: + = p < 0.10, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001, standard errors in parentheses. Results are 
of logit models, shown with odds ratio coefficients for ease of interpretation. Results in bold show 
statistical significance at p < 0.05; results in italics show marginal statistical significance at 0.10 > p > 0.05. 
All variables (independent and dependent) have been recoded from zero to one. Data weighted to 










Figure 4.7: Marginal effects predicting the probability of Trump vote by rural residency 
interacted with income level, education level, and degree attainment.  
 
 
Note: Interactions from Models 3, 6, and 9 in Table 4.5; income and education level interactions 
significant, degree attainment not significant. White respondents only. CCES (2018) data. 
 
Figure 4.7 indicates further that as income and education levels increase, rural 
white voters are more likely to have voted for Trump compared to someone else. That 
said, the effects are substantively quite small. For example, for the richest white 
respondents, rural residents are less than 0.05 more likely to vote for Trump than non-
rural residents. However, the richest white rural residents are around 0.10 more likely to 
support Trump compared to the poorest white rural residents. Such findings echo those 
from the Lucid data above; indicators of class are either unrelated to Trump support for 
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white rural respondents, or, richer rural white respondents are more likely to have 
supported Trump compared to poorer white respondents. 
 In addition, and also like the results from the Lucid data, the interactions between 
rural and class variables for white respondents using the CCES data are not statistically or 
substantively significant when predicting party identity strength (and when including 
control variables) (Table 4.6, Models 3, 6, and 9). When the models are only bivariate 
models, these interactions are statistically significant. With education level and degree 
attainment, the lowest values tend to predict a value of around 0.55 on the party identity 
scale while the highest values predict a value of a little less than 0.65 on the party identity 
scale for white rural respondents. However, since this effect goes away when including 
control variables, this relationship is likely accounted for by something other than the 
class variables. Conversely, predicted party identity values for the poorest white rural 
respondents versus the richest white rural respondents are 0.58 and 0.62, respectively. 
Though this is a statistically significant interaction, it is substantively quite small. See 
Figure 4.8 below for a visualization. 
Table 4.6: Predicting partisan identity using CCES data by rural residency (subjective) 
and class measures (income, education level, and college degree attainment). 







































0.14*** 0.10*** 0.01 0.12*** 0.06*** 0.01 0.14*** 0.09*** 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Degree 
(BA/BS) 





       (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Education 
Level 




0.02* - - - 




0.10*** -0.02 0.04*** - - 0.04*** - - 0.05*** 





- - 0.15*** - - 0.15*** - - 0.15*** 




- - 0.38*** - - 0.38*** - - 0.38*** 









   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00) 
Age - - 0.06*** - - 0.06*** - - 0.06*** 
   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01) 
Hispanic - - -0.03* - - -0.03* - - -0.03* 
   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02) 
Rural X 
Income 
0.02 0.06* 0.00 - - - - - - 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)       
Rural X 
Education 
- - - 0.00 0.05*** 0.00 - - - 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)    
Rural X 
Degree 
- - - - - - -0.01 0.03* 0.00 
       (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 






 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 



















Note: + = p < 0.10, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001, standard errors in parentheses. Results are 
of OLS regression models. Results in bold show statistical significance at p < 0.05; results in italics show 
marginal statistical significance at 0.10 > p > 0.05. All variables (independent and dependent) have been 






















Figure 4.8: Marginal effects predicting party identity by rural residency interacted with 
income level, education level, and degree attainment.  
 
 
Note: Interactions from Models 3,4, 5, 6, 8, and 9 in Table 4.6; Model 2, 5, and 8 interactions are 
significant and Model 3, 6, 9 interactions are not significant. White respondents only. CCES (2018) data. 
 
Again, contrary to expectations, rural residency and rural identity do not intersect 
with class in the expected manner when understanding Trump support or partisanship. In 
fact, if anything, rural residents who are middle to upper class and who more strongly 
identify with being rural were more likely to vote for Trump compared to everyone else. 
Similarly, rural white working-class voters with strong rural identification were not more 
likely to vote for Trump on the whole, or to be stronger-identified Republicans. The 
discrepancy in rural social identity strength between ANES and Lucid could be due to 
several factors, including differences in sample characteristics, misreporting of voting in 
the 2016 election, and a single measure for rural social identity strength in ANES versus 
a multi-dimensional measure in the Lucid data. In any case, the evidence still stands that 
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rural identity and residency correspond to Trump support without an emphasis on the 
working class. Thus far, however, I have only used objective measures of class 
identification. In the next subsection, I repeat these analyses but using self-identified 
class placement. 
What About Subjective Working-Class Identification? 
As previously mentioned, socioeconomic class can be difficult to capture using 
objective quantitative measures, as it is often thought of as a subjective or cultural 
identity instead (Walsh et al. 2004). Therefore, I repeat the analyses above using data 
from the Lucid study fielded in August 2019 that contains a subjective class membership 
question. (N=819). Figure 4.9 below shows the distribution of class membership by 
different measures of rural and non-rural, for white respondents only. As is expected, 
non-rural and lower rural identifiers have proportionately larger segments of middle class 
identifiers or higher. Conversely, more rural or rural identifying respondents say they are 
poor or working class, though most still consider themselves middle class. 
 Figure 4.9: Respondent distribution of various rural/non-rural measures, by subjective 








Rural (sub) Non-Rural (sub) Rural (obj) Non-Rural (obj) Rural ID > 0.5 Rural ID =< 0.5
Poor Working Class Middle Class




Table 4.7 below displays results of logit regressions using the interaction between 
rural residency (or rural social identity) and this class variable to predict Trump support 
in 2016. For white rural respondents (subjectively defined), the likelihood of voting for 
Trump did not vary by class membership; this likelihood was approximately the same for 
those who identified as poor, working class, or middle class. The same is true for rural 
social identity strength; white voters were no more likely to vote for Trump if they were 
strong rural social identifiers who were working class than if they were middle class, 
upper class, or rich. 
Table 4.7 Predicting Trump vote (2016) by rural residency (or rural identity strength) 
and self-identified class membership, for white respondents only.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Trump Vote = 
1 
Trump Vote = 
1 
Trump Vote = 
1 
Trump Vote = 
1 
 White Voters White Voters White Voters White Voters 
     
Party ID - 99.23*** - 302.34*** 
  (60.48)  (273.98) 
Racial Resentment - 10.25** - 5.35+ 
  (9.05)  (5.24) 
Hispanic - 1.06 - 0.96 
  (0.56)  (0.79) 
Female - 0.89 - 0.78 
  (0.32)  (0.38) 
Political Interest - 3.30 - 8.04* 
  (2.75)  (8.21) 
Age - 0.39 - 0.87 
  (0.34)  (0.92) 
Symbolic Ideology - 13.25** - 3.11 
  (11.09)  (3.70) 
Rural Social ID Str. - - 4.29 3.20 
   (5.72) (8.56) 
Rural Resident 2.40 1.88 - - 
 (1.56) (2.77)   
Working Class 1.84 0.97 1.81 1.69 
 (1.05) (1.16) (1.83) (3.12) 
Middle Class 2.08 1.30 1.35 0.49 
 (1.05) (1.50) (1.26) (0.73) 
Upper Class 2.54 1.39 2.57 0.10 
 (1.77) (1.77) (4.29) (0.22) 
Rich 19.67* 19.70 8.81 35.22+ 
 (24.02) (53.36) (11.68) (71.50) 
Rural X Working Class 0.99 1.03 - - 
 (0.78) (1.71)   
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Rural X Middle Class 0.92 0.84 - - 
 (0.65) (1.30)   
Rural X Upper Class 0.84 2.18 - - 
 (0.99) (4.50)   
Rural X Rich 0.58 1.97 - - 
 (1.00) (5.83)   
Rural ID Str. X Working 
Class 
- - 0.77 0.17 
   (1.22) (0.58) 
Rural ID Str X Middle Class - - 1.65 3.37 
   (2.49) (9.95) 
Rural ID Str X Upper Class - - 2.22 194.06 
   (5.56) (834.71) 
Rural ID Str. X Rich - - 1.00 1.00 
   (.) (.) 
N 474.00 472.00 290.00 289.00 
Note: + = p < 0.10, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001, standard errors in parentheses. Results are 
of logit models; odds ratios shown. Results in bold show statistical significance at p < 0.05; results in italics 
show marginal statistical significance at 0.10 > p > 0.05. All variables (independent and dependent) have 
been recoded from zero to one. Data weighted to population benchmarks. Lucid (August 2019) data used. 
Zero for the class variable is Poor. August 2019 Lucid (Study 3) data. 
 
Figure 4.10 Predicted marginal effects of Trump vote (2016) by rural residency (or rural 




 Figure 4.10 shows that, although these interaction terms are not significant, the 
trend for stronger rural identifiers is that as subjective class increases, the likelihood of 
Trump support among white voters increases. This is true with controls (right-hand side 
graphs) and without controls (left-hand side graphs). In many cases, however, the 
relationship between class and Trump support for white voters follows the same 
trajectory regardless of rurality especially, and regardless of rural social identity strength 
to a lesser extent. 
In addition, the chapter appendix contains these analyses, but replacing Trump 
support with the seven-point party identity scale as the dependent variable (Table A4.6). 
Once again, in most cases the interactions are not significant with some exceptions, such 
as the interaction between rural identity strength and subjective class identity. This result, 
shown in Figure A4.6, indicates that rich white rural residents who are strong rural 
identifiers tend to be less Republican than their weaker rural identifying counterparts. It is 
unclear why this effect is opposite to the tendency in Figure 4.9 above, however, the 
tendency is driven largely by the rich, which is a fairly small group, which makes the 
error margins quite large and the estimate uncertain. Poor, working class, and middle 
class white rural residents tend to all have the same relationship between rural identity 
strength and party identity strength.  
These findings are entirely in line with the above results and from findings from 
previous chapters:  there is nothing special about white working-class membership for 
rural residents or rural social identifiers when examining candidate support. If anything, 
rural social identifiers in the white working class were less likely to support Trump 
compared to middle class or upper class/rich white rural social identifiers. In the next 
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section, I explore how economic indicators predict Trump support at the county level for 
rural versus non-rural counties. 
Part II. County-Level Economic Indicators, Rurality, and Republican Presidential 
Support  
Methods and Analytical Strategy 
As outlined at the beginning of the chapter, I also look at economic variables and 
vote share at the county level. To do so, I use OLS regressions with various county-level 
measures. The data set includes 2,820 counties out of 3,007 total counties in the United 
States (93.7% of all counties). 
I use the RUCC codes to measure the rural-urban continuum; any RUCC code 
above 3 is considered “non-metro”, with values one through three considered “metro.” 
The dependent variable used here is the change in county vote share going to the 
Republican candidate between 2008 (John McCain) and 2016 (Donald Trump). To create 
this variable, I subtract the county percent of the vote that went to Donald Trump minus 
the county percent of the vote that went to John McCain. Thus, a county where 100% of 
the vote went to McCain and 0% went to Trump would get a score of -1.0, while a county 
where 100% of the vote went to Trump and 0% of the vote went to McCain would have a 
score of 1.0; counties where the percent of the votes for Trump and McCain are the exact 
same would have a score of 0.0. This variable ranges from -0.28 to 0.36. These data were 
taken from the MIT Election Data and Science Lab (MIT Election Data and Science Lab 
2018). 
Regarding independent variables, local economic decline encompasses factors 
such as median county income change over time (since the Great Recession), reliance on 
commodities or manufacturing (which have been harder hit since the Great Recession), 
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and unemployment level change. Median county income data is taken from the U.S. 
Census Bureau from 2010 and 2016 for all counties; the change in median county income 
variable was created by subtracting the 2016 median household income value for each 
county from the 2010 median household income value for each county. This variable was 
then standardized to range from zero to one. Commodity reliance was codified using the 
2004 United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) ERS Atlas of Rural and Small-
Town America data set (USDA ERS 2018). This data set contains binary variables for 
each county specifying whether that county is reliant on either mining or farming. In 
addition, this same dataset includes a dummy variable indicating whether a county is 
reliant on manufacturing. Finally, the county unemployment level change data was also 
taken from this data source by subtracting the binary low employment county designation 
in 2004 from the same variable in 2014.  
In addition, social decline is a similar factor to the local economic decline thesis, 
and is measured using county level health factors and total population increase or 
decrease over time. The latter data was taken from the 2000 and 2010 U.S. Census data; I 
created population change over time by subtracting the 2000 total county population from 
the 2010 total county population. The former was taken from the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation’s County Health Rankings data. 5 This metric is based on several factors 
relating to quality of life and length of life in that county. From these factors, each county 
gets a score, and each county is given a rank based on how this score relates to the scores 
of other counties. Here, higher values indicate better ranked, and hence healthier, 
counties. Finally, I also include control variables that could potentially influence 
                                                          
5 Available at: https://www.countyhealthrankings.org/ 
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presidential vote, such as religious institutions per capita, median age, education level, 
and percent population Hispanic or Black. All of these values were taken from 2010 U.S. 
Census data, except for religious institutions per capita. This was taken from the 2009 
Penn State social capital scores by county.  
Results 
 The results of the county-level analysis predicting the change in county percent of 
vote share going to the Republican presidential candidate between 2008 and 2016 can be 
found in Table 4.8. Looking at Models 1 and 2, it is notable that all the independent 
variables predict changes in vote share in similar ways for metro versus non-metro 
counties, with one exception: the change in median income between the Great Recession 
between 2010 and 2016. This factor positively and strongly predicted a shift toward 
Trump for metro areas, while for non-metro areas, this factor was small and statistically 
insignificant. The only other large difference between metro and non-metro counties is 
the effect of population increases; in both types of counties, greater population increases 
translated to less support for the presidential candidate, though this effect was much more 
pronounced for rural counties. Notably, both of these factors relate to the thesis that 
economic and social decline contributed to increased Trump support. Further, mining and 
manufacturing dependence positively and significantly predicts a shift toward Trump. 
However, this effect is small compared to other factors. Reliance on agriculture or 
farming is not statistically significant. 
Table 4.8: Predicting the change in percent of vote share for the Republican presidential 
candidate between 2008 and 2016, by metro and non-metro counties. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












 Non-Metro Metro All All All All 
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-0.22*** -0.17*** -0.20*** - -0.21*** - 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01)  
% Co. Black 
(2010) 
-0.21*** -0.16*** -0.19*** - -0.20*** - 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01)  
Median Co. 
Age (2010) 
0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** - 0.00*** - 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  
Total Co. Pop 
Increase (2000 
to 2010) 
-0.22*** -0.05*** -0.12*** - -0.10*** -0.22*** 




0.00 -0.00 0.00 - 0.02*** - 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)  (0.00)  
Manufacturing-
Dependent Co. 
0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** - 0.04*** - 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  
Mining-
Dependent Co. 
0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** - 0.12*** - 




0.11*** 0.12*** 0.12*** - -0.21*** - 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01)  




-0.01 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.24*** 0.08*** - 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)  
Change in Co. 
Low 
Employment 
Level (2004 to 
2014) 
0.00 -0.00 0.00 - 0.00 - 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  
Change in Co. 
Low Education 
Level (2004 to 
2014) 
0.00 -0.00 -0.00 - -0.00 - 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)  (0.00)  
Religious 
Establishments 
in Co. Per 
Population 
(2009) 
-0.02+ 0.04+ -0.00 - -0.01 - 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)  (0.01)  
Rural Co. = 1 
(RUCC) 
- - 0.07*** 0.20*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 
   (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Rural Co. X 
Change in 





   (0.03) (0.03)   




- - - - -0.22*** -0.22*** 
     (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant 0.10*** -0.18*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.04*** 0.12*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
r2 0.46 0.56 0.54 0.16 0.54 0.19 
N 1723.00 1040.00 2763.00 2819.00 2763.00 2819.00 
Note: + = p < 0.10, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001, standard errors in parentheses. Results 
from OLS regression models. Results in bold show statistical significance at p < 0.05; results in italics 
show marginal statistical significance at 0.10 > p > 0.05. All variables (independent and dependent) have 
been recoded from zero to one.  
 
 To further investigate the two independent variables that strongly differ in 
predicting the outcome variable between metro and non-metro counties, I interact the 
rural binary variable with these two factors (change in median income level and change 
in overall population over time) and create a marginal effects plot for both of these 
interactions. The left graph of the figure shows the effect of the change in total population 
by metro versus non-metro counties in predicting Republican candidate vote share 
change. Regardless of county type, the tendency is similar; counties with larger 
population increases were more likely to move away from voting Republican, while 
counties with larger population decreases were more likely to vote more Republican, 
though the latter tendency is slightly more pronounced for non-metro counties. 
 However, the effect of median income change on presidential vote share is the 
opposite for metro versus non-metro counties (Figure 4.11, right graph). For metro 
counties, larger gains in median income translate to greater support for Trump compared 
to McCain, while larger decreases in median income translate to less support for Trump 
compared to McCain. Conversely, for non-metro counties with large increases in income, 
shifts to Trump compared to McCain were much less pronounced compared to non-metro 
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counties with large decreases in income over time. The latter finding would fit with the 
explanation that rural areas have undergone economic decline, driving them to Trump.  
 
Figure 4.11: Marginal effects plots showing predicted change in percent of vote share 
for the Republican presidential candidate between 2008 and 2016, by metro and non-







One element potentially overlooked here is the effect of race:  often the decline 
thesis implies that the economic decline driving rural areas to Trump applies to whites or 
to majority white counties. Therefore, I rerun Model 4 in Table 4.8 above but only for 
counties with at least 87% of the population being white. This number was chosen 
because the median county in the United States was 87% white in 2010. The resulting 
marginal effects plot with the interaction shown can be found in Figure 4.12 below 
(regression results for the model can be found in the appendix). 
Figure 4.12: Change in percent of vote share for the Republican presidential candidate 
between 2008 and 2016, by metro and non-metro counties and change in median county 








 Thus, the results for all counties and white-majority counties are similar. 
However, the effect of median income change is much less pronounced for non-metro 
counties. This suggests that the economic decline thesis may have some traction for rural 
white counties, but not as much as one might think. Conversely, support for Trump 
(compared to McCain) increased substantially, on average, for majority white metro 
counties doing well since the Recession but not for mostly white metro counties doing 
poorly since the Recession. This finding also suggests that the white working-class 
decline thesis for Trump support is potentially problematic in metro areas as well. 
Part III. Individual-Level and County-Level Interactions 
How, then, can we reconcile the potential differences found in Parts I and II 
above? Previous scholarship has suggested that many white Trump voters felt economic 
woes based on projections of economic decline within their own racial identity (Sides et 
al. 2017), and that those who were wealthier living in poorer areas were more likely to be 
Trump supporters (Ogorzalek et al. 2019). I argue along similar lines, but not to the same 
degree; as noted in the introduction, I advance the argument that rural residents and rural 
identifiers are using more sociotropic evaluations of economic health based on local 
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conditions, rather than personal conditions. This feeds into perceptions that the in-group 
is not doing well even if they personally are doing fine. Hits to the working class impact 
the community and send signals to those within the community regardless of individual 
class, particularly if the community is smaller (i.e., more rural) as social networks are 
tighter and effects are relatively easier to see. 
 To test these expectations, I merge the county-level data into the May 2019 Lucid 
data, as this survey asked rural identity strength questions to all participants and not just 
to self-described rural residents. Then, I perform a mixed effects multi-level logistic 
regression because the effect varies across individuals. The primary outcome variables 
are at the individual level and include Trump vote (2016) and trust in Trump, which are 
described in depth in Part I above. In addition, I also examine the seven-point party 
identity scale and symbolic ideology as dependent variables. Rural identity strength is the 
primary independent variable and its measurement is also described in Part I above, as 
well as in the previous chapter in much more depth. Respondent zip code constitutes the 
second level of the multilevel models. For the second level independent variable 
measuring local economic change, I use the change in average income between 2011 and 
2016 at the zip code level.  
Results: Trump Support 
 As noted above, Trump support is measured both by self-reported vote for Trump 
in the 2016 presidential election, and by how much the respondent trusts Trump. Given 
the above discussion, I expect the interaction between median zip code income level 
change between 2011 and 2016 and individual-level rural social identity strength should 
be negative. Table 4.9 below displays the results, while the marginal effects plot of the 
interaction between rural identity strength (respondent level) and local income change 
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(zip code level) is shown for Trump vote (Figure 4.12). Very similar results can be found 
for Trust in Trump in the chapter appendix. 
Table 4.9: Mixed effects models predicting self-reported Trump vote in 2016 and Trust 
in Trump, with weighted data, May 2019 Lucid data. 
 (1) (2) 
 Trump vote 2016  
(binary) 
Trust in Trump (continuous) 
   
Zip code change in average income 3.41 1.02* 
 (5.24) (0.43) 
Rural id strength 7.96+ 1.60*** 
 (4.21) (0.27) 
Rural id X Zip income change -11.84 -2.45*** 
 (8.57) (0.58) 
Constant -2.91 -0.26 
 (2.58) (0.21) 
Level 2 effects only   
Zip code change in average income 4.72* 0.25* 
 (6.43) (0.05) 
Constant 2.19 0.00 
 (1.81) (0.00) 
Residual - 0.07* 
  (0.01) 
N 361.00 488.00 
Note: + = p < 0.10, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001, standard errors in parentheses. Models 
1 and 2 show the results of mixed effects models. Results in bold show statistical significance at p < 0.05, 
results in italic show statistical significance at 0.10 > p > 0.05, results in regular font show statistically 
insignificant results. Models do not include control variables. All variables (independent and dependent) 
have been recoded from zero to one. 
 
Figure 4.12: Interaction between rural identity strength and local income change from 





 The results for Trump vote in 2016 and trust in Trump are statistically 
insignificant, though the nature of the interaction (Figure 4.12) shows that for the weakest 
rural identifiers, context mattered, while for stronger rural identifiers it did not. However, 
stronger rural identifiers in areas generally experiencing decreased income levels predict 
greater trust in Trump, while those in areas of increased income levels over time predict 
lower trust in Trump. The results are reversed for lower rural identifiers.  
 That said, it is unclear whether these results are specific to rural residents. Figure 
4.13 below shows a three-way interaction between local average income level change, 
rural social identity, and current rural versus non-rural resident (self-identified) to predict 
a vote for Trump in 2016. Although the three-way interaction is marginally significant at 
p = 0.058 (see chapter appendix for a table of the model results), a graph of the marginal 
effects shows that the effect I describe above between local economic conditions and 
place-based identity matters in the expected way for rural residents only. Rural residents 
higher in rural social identity and who live in zip codes that saw a decrease in income 
over time were more likely to vote for Trump. Conversely, rural residents higher in rural 
identity and who live in zip codes that experienced an increase in income over time were 
less likely to vote for Trump in 2016, compared to votes for other candidates. For non-
rural residents, neither local economic conditions nor rural identity strength, when 
interacted, appear to predict vote choice in 2016. The difference in the interaction 
between rural and non-rural respondents similarly applies – and is statistically significant 
- when rurality is measured using objective rural designations (see chapter appendix). 
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Figure 4.13: Interaction between rural identity strength, local income change, and self-
identified rural residency.  
Note: See appendix for model results table, as well as for model results with objective rural codes. Three-
way interaction marginally significant at p = 0.058. 
 
 Further, partisanship and symbolic ideology present similar results: for rural 
respondents, stronger rural identifiers living in places with the largest decrease in local 
income are stronger Republicans and more conservative. Conversely, rural respondents 
who are stronger rural identifiers living in places with the largest increase in local income 
over time are stronger Democrats and more liberal. For weak rural identifiers, this trend 
is reversed. Finally, for non-rural residents, rural identity strength and local economic 
context have no significant relationship. See chapter appendix for details. 
Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
 The results from the above analyses present a consistent picture. First, stronger 
rural social identifiers - particularly white rural social identifiers- are more likely to have 
supported Trump if they were middle to upper income, relatively more educated, or saw 
themselves as middle class to rich, if there was any significant relationship between class 
variables and rurality on Trump support at all (which there many times there was not). 
Further, the relationship between Trump support and rural residency was not significantly 
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related to class at all for whites. Or, the interaction was statistically significant but 
substantively very weak. This is indicative that rurality and rural social identity does not 
map onto politics according to strictly white working-class sentiment.  
However, rural counties that experienced economic decline since the Great 
Recession voting in relatively greater numbers for Trump in 2016 compared to McCain 
in 2008. This discrepancy can be understood to a greater degree by looking at the 
relationship between local economic conditions and individual-level indicators of class: 
rural identifiers in areas of decline are more right leaning compared to rural identifiers in 
areas doing well, and compared to non-rural identifiers in areas of decline. This tendency 
holds not only for predicting Trump support, but also for predicting party identity 
strength and symbolic ideology. This is somewhat surprising, as rural residency or rural 
identity strength do not conditionally predict partisan identity strength according to class 
variables like they do with predicting Trump support. Such a discrepancy perhaps 
suggests that local level conditions are a key factor in understanding the dynamic 
between class, rural identity, and political behavior. 
Although I include party identity, this analysis mostly focuses on Trump support 
because previous scholars have suggested that rural identity and rural resentment helped 
fuel Trump’s victory in the 2016 presidential election (Lunz Trujillo and Crowley n.d.; 
Mendelberg 2017; Munis 2020; also see Chapter 2); thus, it engages with a common 
dependent variable in the literature dealing with the white rural and/or working class in 




From this chapter, it may also be the case that symbolic concerns likely matter 
more for rural identifiers beyond local sociotropic concerns such as economic decline 
detailed here, particularly given the symbolic and status-based nature of social identity 
(Branscombe et al. 1999; Huddy 2003). What, then, are these symbolic group-based 
concerns composed of for rural identifiers? In the next two chapters, I take a look at what 
it means to identify as rural – and how this relates to politics – apart from anti-urban 
sentiment and Trump support. More specifically, I examine immigrants as a major out-
group, which ties not only to a mistrust of outsiders but also to the perception that 
immigrants are ‘cutting in line’ ahead of more deserving groups such as rural areas and 
are favored by elites. This second out-group based element – anti-elitism or anti-





CHAPTER 5: Immigrants as a Rural Identity Out-Group 
 
“You can live here all your life, and still be considered an outsider.” 
― E.D. Rea 
In Chapters 3 and 4, I argued that rural identity appears unrelated to working class 
membership or personal economic concerns. Also in Chapter 3, I found that in-group 
positive affect was much more predictive of rural social identity strength than negative 
affect toward urban areas. My broader argument about the intermediate status of rural 
areas in the United States suggests that a rural social identity should feel negatively 
toward a lower-status out-group. Here, I argue that one of these out-groups are 
immigrants. 
 Previous research has found that rural residency has been linked to less 
permissive or more hostile immigration attitudes. For example, rural Americans are 
particularly supportive of restrictions on immigration (Fennelly and Federico 2008), and 
rural Americans hold stronger anti-immigrant sentiment compared to non-rural 
Americans (Garcia and Davidson 2013). Notably, Garcia and Davison also found that 
American identity predicted more hostile immigration attitudes for urban residents but 
not for rural residents, suggesting that nationalism is less of a factor for rural residents, 
and that the reasons for anti-immigration sentiment vary by population density. From 
these studies, however, it is unclear what these reasons are; the authors speculate that the 
link with population density is due to physical isolation and a lack of interaction with 
immigrants, as well as being older, poorer, less educated, and more politically 
conservative. 
In his large-scale ethnographic study of rural Americans, Wuthnow (2019) notes 
that hostile immigration sentiment in rural areas is not only determined by political 
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predilections of rural Americans, but also due to social influences such as experiences 
and attitudes from churches, family, and friends. In addition, Wuthnow concludes that 
rural residents’ way of life is being threatened by outside forces and perceived that the 
government was giving special favors to lower status groups in society, such as 
immigrants, who were also perceived as “working the system.” This sentiment is echoed 
by Hochschild’s ethnographic study (2018); among many of the rural residents 
interviewed, immigrants were perceived as cutting in line ahead of people like them, and 
that a “precious way of life…was being left behind.” (Hoschschild 2018, pg. 259). Such 
resentment is echoed in Cramer’s (2016) study of rural identity in Wisconsin; however, 
Cramer mainly talks about anti-urban sentiment without linking rural identity specifically 
with immigrants as an out-group. 
The link between rural identity and immigration attitudes has not been 
quantitatively tested at the national level. In Chapter 3 (Table 3.16), I find that more 
restrictive immigration policy attitudes are significantly associated with rural social 
identity strength, but not with social or economic operational ideology, with and without 
controlling for party identity, symbolic ideology, racial resentment, white identity, and 
other demographic variables. Taken alongside the above studies, this suggests that a 
potential driver of the link between rurality and heightened anti-immigration sentiment is 
largely through resentment that the government and so-called elites favor immigrants – a 
characteristic of right-wing populism (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017) where “the people” 
are perceived to be excluded by a corrupt and uncaring elite at the expense of a lower-
status group.  
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Using data from a YouGov panel survey and survey experiment, in this chapter I 
argue that rural identity is threatened not only by elites, experts, and intellectuals - an out-
group affiliated with urban areas (Lunz Trujillo 2021) or general anti-urban resentment 
(Cramer 2016) - but also by immigrants who are perceived threats to rural way of life. 
Thus, the assumed rural out-group is more complex than simple anti-urban sentiment, 
which has been argued by previous scholarship (Cramer 2016; Lyons and Utych 2021; 
Munis 2020; Parker et al. 2018). 
In other words, the discussion and analyses in this chapter suggest the following 
contributions: 1) the relationship between rurality and anti-immigration sentiment goes 
beyond the demographic and political tendencies of rural areas, 2) that this relationship is 
in part defined by rural Americans – especially white rural Americans - as a group 
perceiving themselves as in the middle of a status hierarchy and forgotten or ignored by 
those of higher status while also seeing themselves as superior to lower-status groups, 3) 
that rural social identity and subjective rural identification capture politically-relevant 
attitudes than objective rural measures, and provide additional theoretical understanding 
beyond objective or categorization measures of rurality, and 4) that rural social identity is 
not only defined by anti-urban resentment; there are multiple relevant out-groups, 
including immigrants, in line with expectations from right-wing populist literature, social 
identity theory (SIT), and rural sociology and public health. 
It is worth noting here that I am not able to reliably look at policy-based and 
affective immigration attitudes for whites versus non-whites here, as these results are 
based on a relatively small sample size. For example, there are only approximately 20 
black rural respondents for each experimental condition (and in some cases less), and 
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only five to nine rural Hispanics per experimental condition. Since this is not a high 
enough number, I cannot make conclusions on non-whites regarding the experimental 
data, though I do take a look at racial differences in the cross-lagged models and in 
models using the experimental data. For the treatment effect figures below, I include 
separate figures in the appendix for non-whites but again there is not enough power for 
the results to be reliable.  
In the next section, I outline in further detail why immigrants in particular are 
poised to be an out-group for rural Americans. 
 
Why Anti-Immigrant Sentiment is Linked with Rural Identity 
 
I expect anti-immigrant sentiment is particularly strong for rural identifiers for 
three reasons. The first is a rural-specific cultural value of a distrust of outsiders (Keller 
and Owens 2020; Wagonfeld 2003). Wagonfeld lists this as a rural-specific value along 
with “self-reliance, conservatism, … religion, work orientation, emphasis on family, 
individualism, and fatalism.” (Wagonfeld 2003, 38). That said, Wagonfeld says that some 
scholarship argues that rural and urban values, while perceived to be different in society, 
are in reality mostly indistinct from one another. However, more recent quantitative 
studies have found a mistrust of outsiders to be correlated with rurality (Keller and 
Owens 2020). Above and beyond this, previous ethnographic studies find that suspicion 
of outsiders is a component features of rural identity, though this study was done in 
England (Bell 1992). Finally, as mentioned above, Wuthnow (2019) notes that the in-
group threat of rural residents stems from a perceived invasion of (low-status) outside 
forces who are being favored by elites at their expense. 
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Why might this be the case? Rural identity by definition hinges on categorizing 
people according to their membership within a geographic space. In addition, the 
inherently small size of rural communities makes one become familiar with many 
individuals who live there; the smaller and more isolated the community, the more 
readily obvious being an outsider becomes. In contrast, one encounters many unknown 
people on a regular day-to-day basis in more densely populated areas. Therefore, one is 
less inclined to be suspicious of unknown individuals because one encounters them all 
the time. Finally, these tendencies compound into distrust or suspicion when paired with 
the perception that outsiders with power impact rural areas without the consent of those 
within rural areas. Rural Americans view immigrants and their associated groups (such as 
Hispanic, Muslim, etc.) as outsiders because their “outsiderness” is superficially 
perceived in several ways, including racial or ethnic difference, language, cultural habits, 
alongside very much being from somewhere else. 
Second, some in rural areas perceive immigrants to be cutting in line ahead of 
them and favored by elites (Cramer 2016; Hochschild 2018; Wuthnow 2019). However, 
above and beyond what Cramer (2016) concludes as the rural out-group (i.e., urban areas 
and government); the perceived elites in urban and coastal areas are purportedly favoring 
immigrants and racial minorities (also disproportionately in cities) at the expense of rural 
areas. In many rural areas there is a general sense of things generally going poorly or not 
as well as in other places; given this is both a material threat and a symbolic threat to 
dignity, there is a human impulse to salvage the in-group by locating out-groups to blame 
for the cause of such decline, according to social identity literature (Branscombe et al. 
1999; Kinder and Kam 2009).  
138 
 
Not only does social psychology theoretically suggest this dynamic via social 
identity theory (SIT); the right-wing populism literature does as well (Mudde and 
Kaltwasser 2017). According to the definition of right-wing populism, a right-wing 
populist divides the society into “the people”, who are morally good and deserving, 
against a corrupt “elite” who purportedly favors lower-status groups perceived to be 
cutting in line ahead of the deserving people. This causes those who see themselves as 
part of the people to scapegoat and blame these lower-status groups. With regard to a 
rural identity in particular, the perception of rural areas is not only that urban and coastal 
elites are biased against them; it is also that such elites favor those in cities (particularly 
poorer racial minorities) and especially immigrants, who are seen is cutting in line in 
front of citizens (Cramer 2016; Hoschschild 2016; Wuthnow 2019). Such an explanation 
is particularly compelling given that anti-intellectualism is associated strongly with rural 
social identity (see Chapter 6 or Lunz Trujillo 2021). 
This relates to the third reason, which is the activation of anti-immigration 
attitudes by right-wing populists using this same logic. The mid- to late- 2010s also saw 
an increase in anti-immigration rhetoric by conservative political elites in particular, 
including politicians such as Donald Trump and media pundits such as Laura Ingraham. 
Notably, such figures (like Ingraham) often talk about immigration negatively while 
showing images of rural America. This is captured in Figure 5.1, when Ingraham went on 
a highly controversial rant about demographic changes due to immigration purportedly 
causing us to live in a different and more undesirable America. During this segment, the 
upper right repeatedly featured images of rural and agricultural America when illustrating 
who or what in the U.S. is under threat. 
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Figure 5.1:  Screenshot of The Ingraham Angle episode aired on August 8, 2018. The 
segment featured rural and farming imagery while Ingraham talks about “massive” 
demographic changes due to immigration.  
 
This U.S. phenomenon is part of a broader rise in far-right populist support 
stemming from anti-immigrant sentiment. Such sentiment has increased in Western 
countries over the past couple decades, fueled by increased migration to Western 
countries from the Middle East and Eastern Europe – particularly in Western Europe – 
and from East Asia and Latin America to the U.S. and Canada. Supporters of the far right 
have adopted anti-immigrant sentiment over feared cultural changes and perceived 
impact on the economic climate (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2020). Thus, rural 
identifiers who are also right-leaning and white (Jardina 2019) will be especially prone to 
anti-immigrant sentiment. 
For these reasons – immigrants being perceived as “cutting in line” or in direct 
economic competition, and immigrants being seen as outsiders to rural areas in a number 
of ways – alongside elite cueing of anti-immigrant rhetoric - make immigrants a 
perceived rural identity out-group. I would like to take a moment here to note that this 
does not make all rural residents, or even all rural social identifiers, anti-immigrant and 
xenophobic. In fact, many rural identifiers are themselves immigrants or related to 
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immigrants. Furthermore, an ethnographic study of rural residents in Iowa found their 
views on immigration are complex and nuanced, and rurality by no means determines 
attitudes toward immigrants. Many rural Americans are welcoming of migrants in 
communities experiencing population decline or a need for workers (Lay 2012; Wuthnow 
2019). For example, below I find that one particular group – white rural Democrats – 
actually feel more positively toward undocumented immigrants when exposed to a 
prompt suggesting that the proportion of racial and ethnic minorities will 
disproportionately increase in rural areas especially. Exposure to this treatment for all 
other rural groups does not significantly alter feelings toward undocumented immigrants, 
compared to the control group. That said, this effect may not be statistically significant. 
To repeat: I am not saying that all rural residents are hostile toward immigrants or 
outsiders. Rather, I argue that immigrants are a rural identity outgroup – with some 
exceptions - and that there is an association between anti-immigration sentiment and 
rural identity for the reasons I have outlined above, particularly for non-Hispanics and 
non-Democrats. To test my argument, I draw on cognitive approaches to SIT, which state 
that social identities are not fixed but dynamic and vary according to situational features 
such as group salience and group threats (Hogg et al. 1995; Huddy 2003; Stets and Burke 
2000). I therefore establish an empirical link between rural social identity and immigrants 
as an outgroup by examining changes between waves one and three of panel data on 
American adults collected Fall 2020 (YouGov, N=1471). Using cross-lagged models, I 
first analyze how changes in rural identity strength and importance over time relate to 
changes in measures of immigration attitudes. In addition, since immigration attitudes are 
strongly linked with attitudes toward the perceived ethnic groups associated with 
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immigrants, I also look at how rural social identity strength and importance changes 
relate to white racial identity (Jardina 2019) and the difference between white and 
Hispanic feeling thermometer ratings (Valentino et al. 2013) over time. This verifies that 
the immigrant out-group is symbolically oriented and racially coded for rural social 
identifiers. 
From this analysis, I find overall that increases in rural social identity strength 
predict greater anti-immigrant attitudes over time, and that increases in anti-immigrant 
sentiment predict stronger rural social identification. That said, the latter effect is larger 
than the former. Further, stricter immigration attitudes, greater racial social identity 
strength and importance, and greater differences in feelings toward whites versus 
Hispanics predict rural identity strength and importance for white rural respondents, but 
not vice versa. There are no significant effects for Hispanic rural respondents. For black 
rural respondents, this dynamic is only significant for stricter immigration attitudes 
predicting rural identity strength. These results provide evidence that perceived symbolic 
threat by an outgroup heightened ingroup identification (Branscombe et al. 1999). 
This finding is further backed by experimental evidence from wave two of the 
survey. In this experiment, I find that acknowledging disrespect towards rural areas in the 
U.S. (i.e., disrespect towards the ingroup) results in more positive attitudes toward 
undocumented immigrants compared to the control group among rural respondents. This 
is expected, as SIT sees symbolic group threats and disrespect as primary drivers of 
social identification and outgroup derogation (Tajfel 1981). Further, highlighting 
economic (material) threat to rural areas or demographic threat to rural areas does not 
significantly change feelings toward undocumented immigrants. These null findings are 
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predicted by SIT, which posits that threat is more symbolic to the status of the ingroup 
than material (Tajfel 1981), and do not support explanations of intergroup dynamics 
being material competitions (Bobo 1983). These results also suggest that the immigration 
threat is not necessarily racial, but that immigration is linked with racial/ethnic attitudes 
as indicated by the cross-lagged analysis. 
 
Methods – Survey Information and Cross-Lagged Analysis  
 
 The first test of the causal relationship between rural identity and immigration 
attitudes takes advantage of waves one and three of original panel data conducted in fall 
2020 using YouGov. This three-wave survey was designed, funded, and implemented by 
the Center for the Study of Political Psychology (CSPP) at the University of Minnesota, 
and will be referred to here as the CSPP 2020 data.  
Between October 6 and 14, 2020, YouGov interviewed 2815 adult U.S. citizens 
who were matched down to a sample of 2615 respondents in the final data set. The 
respondent demographic makeup on age, gender, race, and education was constructed 
using stratified sampling from the 2018 American Community Survey (ACS). YouGov 
successfully recontacted 1865 respondents from wave one who completed wave two of 
the survey. Wave two was conducted between October 23 and November 2, 2020. For 
wave three, YouGov recontacted respondents from waves one and two; 1471 individuals 
completed the survey. Wave three was conducted between November 9 and 16, 2020. For 
each wave, the cases were weighted to the ACS sampling frame using propensity scores 
and post-stratification on 2016 presidential vote choice (wave three only), gender, age, 
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race, and education level. The sample demographics for weighted and unweighted data 
can be found in the appendix. 
On waves one and three, all respondents were asked a question on whether and 
how much they thought immigrant numbers in the United States should be increased, 
decreased, or kept the same. This is used as the immigration attitude variable. Although 
this question is more about immigration policy attitudes rather than group-based affect, 
studies of public opinion commonly find that attitudes towards group-affiliated policies 
are correlated with affect towards the group (Conover 1988; Gilens 1999). Further, this 
outcome variable is one of multiple indicators used in the study.  
All respondents were also asked two questions that measure rural social identity. 
The first is a question asks respondents how much being a small town or rural resident is 
important to them, with five possible response options from not at all important (1) to 
extremely important (5). The second question asks respondents the extent to which they 
see themselves as small town or rural residents. The five response options ranged from 
not at all (1) to a great deal (5). For both wave one and wave three, these two questions 
correlated at approximately 0.76. These two questions were averaged together to form a 
rural identity scale, which was recoded to range from zero to one. This scale at wave one 
and this scale at wave three correlate at 0.77.  
To account for and measure the potentially racialized dimension of immigration, I 
also create a measure of feeling toward Hispanics by subtracting white feeling 
thermometer ratings from Hispanic/Latino feeling thermometer ratings for whites. I also 
do this for black respondents by subtracting the black feeling thermometer ratings from 
Hispanic/Latino feeling thermometer ratings. 
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Finally, respondents were also asked whether they were raised in a small town or 
rural area, and whether they currently live in a small town or rural area. The possible 
response options for either of these two questions are yes or no. If a respondent answered 
yes to either of these two questions, they are considered a subjective rural resident. 
Specific question wordings for partisanship, rural identity, and rural residency (along 
with the number of respondents who chose each response) can be found in the appendix. 
These questions form the basis of the cross-lagged modeling strategy. Cross-
lagged models can theoretically help establish causal predominance between two lagged 
variables across time. That said, cross-lagged models have some flaws. First, they do not 
account for contemporaneous relationships between variables, nor do they provide an 
opportunity to include lagged endogenous regressors. Second, they do not account for the 
stability of the theoretical construct over time (i.e., whether the values of the variables 
mean the same thing over time) (Kearney 2017). There are other weaknesses to this 
approach as well. For these reasons, according to Kearney, many have suggested the use 
of cross-lagged path or regression models instead. Here, I employ both. Before I do this, 
however, I examine some features of the variables I just described to gain a better picture 
of the relationship between rural social identity strength and immigration (and racial) 
attitudes. 
Immigration, Racial Attitudes, and Rural Identity: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 The Wave 1 YouGov data confirms general expectations that rural social identity 
strength and importance negatively correlate with more restrictive immigration policy 
attitudes (α = -0.21 [weighted, overall]; α = -0.28 [weighted, white respondents only]. 
Similarly, rural and small-town residents are less supportive of immigration increases 
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(mean score = 0.46 versus 0.55 for everyone else). Figure 5.2 below shows the mean 
immigration attitude values by rural social identity strength/importance. Also recall from 
Chapter 3 that rural social identity strength correlated with the rural resident feeling 
thermometer at 0.30 and the urban resident feeling thermometer – the proposed out-group 
- at 0.04 using Study 2 data. 






















Note: Mean immigration attitude values for each rural social identity value shown. Greater values on the 
y-axis indicate more pro-immigration attitudes. Wave 1 data shown. 
  
 The correlation between immigration stance and rural social identity varies, 
however, by respondent race and partisanship. Rural identity strength for rural black 
respondents correlates with this immigration stance at 0.13, while for white rural 
respondents the correlation is -0.33 and Hispanic/Latino rural residents it is -0.08. For 
rural Democrats the correlation is -0.04, for rural Independents it is -0.06, and for rural 
Republicans it is -0.21. 
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Figure 5.3 shows the relationship between rural social identity 
strength/importance and measures of white-Hispanic and black-Hispanic ethnocentrism. 
This is shown for all respondents (top two graphs) versus rural/small town respondents 
(bottom two graphs). For white rural respondents especially, rural social identity 
importance and strength corresponds to greater ethnocentric (white versus Hispanic) 
sentiment. For black rural respondents, this relationship is non-existent, though the 
overall difference between the two feeling thermometers is higher on average. This 
suggests that white respondents in particular seem to view Hispanics as a rural outgroup 
(or whites as an ingroup), especially for white rural respondents.  
 Figure 5.3: Rural identity and racial feeling thermometer differences, by race (all versus 
rural). 
 
Note: Mean values for each rural social identity value shown. Greater values on the y-axis indicate a wider 




Results – Cross-Lagged Models and Regressions 
 
Immigration Attitudes. Figure 5.4 shows the results of the cross-lagged analysis for all 
respondents in the sample, while Figure 5.5 shows these results for self-identified rural 
respondents only. 
 
Figure 5.4: Results of Cross-Lagged Model between rural social identity 
strength/importance and immigration attitudes, all respondents.  
 
 
Note: Two-wave cross-lagged model for time-lagged effects between rural identity scale and immigration 
attitudes. Standardized coefficients shown near paths, 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. Data 
weighted to population benchmarks.  
 
Figure 5.5: Results of Cross-Lagged Model between rural social identity 
strength/importance and immigration attitudes, self-identified rural/small-town 
respondents only. 
 
Note: Two-wave cross-lagged model for time-lagged effects between rural identity scale and immigration 
attitudes. Standardized coefficients shown near paths, 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. Data 




 The results shown in Figures 5.4 and 5.5 are very similar and do not significantly 
differ between the full sample and rural respondents only. Rural identity in wave one 
significantly predicts rural identity in wave three. Similarly, immigration attitudes in 
wave one also predict immigration attitudes in wave three. Further, in both figures, rural 
identity strength increases over time predict attitudes that are less amenable towards 
immigrants, and less amenable attitudes toward immigrants predict stronger rural identity 
scores. Given this, these results suggest that the relationship between rural residents 
versus all respondents is fairly similar, and that the relationship between rural identity 
strength and immigration attitudes causally moves in both directions. 
 Table 5.1 additionally shows a similar strategy using cross-lagged OLS 
regressions, with and without control variables, for the entire sample and rural-only 
respondents. The results from this table suggest that the findings in Figures 5.4 and 5.5 
above do not hold once control variables from T1 are added into the model. 
Table 5.1: Cross-lagged OLS regression models predicting rural identity (T2) and 
immigration response (T2) for full sample and rural residents only, including bivariate 
models and models with control variables. 

































0.77*** 0.74*** -0.07*** -0.03 0.71*** 0.69*** -0.07*** -0.02 







-0.04 0.77*** 0.71*** -
0.11*** 
-0.05 0.75*** 0.69*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Party ID - 0.04* - -0.01 - 0.07** - -0.01 
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04) 
Symbolic 
Ideology 
- 0.00 - -0.14*** - -0.04 - -0.17*** 
  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05) 
Black - 0.01 - -0.01 - 0.06** - -0.00 
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Hispanic - -0.00 - 0.01 - 0.01 - 0.01 
  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04) 
Income - -0.03 - 0.02 - -0.04 - 0.01 
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  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Education 
Level 
- -0.05* - 0.01 - -0.06* - -0.00 
  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Age - -0.07** - 0.02 - -0.05 - 0.02 
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Female - 0.04*** - 0.01 - 0.03* - 0.01 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Constant 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.16*** 0.24*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) 
r2 0.65 0.66 0.63 0.66 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.64 
N 1471.00 1261.00 1471.00 1261.00 877.00 754.00 877.00 754.00 
Note: * = p < 0.10, ** = p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01, standard errors in parentheses. Results in bold show 
statistical significance. All variables (independent and dependent) have been recoded from zero to one. 
Data weighted to T2 population benchmarks.  
 
However, further analysis may be warranted here, given that race and party 
identity are linked with immigration attitudes. It could be the case, for instance, that 
immigration attitudes are somewhat ossified for partisans. I expect this not only because 
of previous literature, but also due to some of the descriptive characteristics of the data 
noted above. For this reason, I run cross-lagged OLS regressions by respondent race and 
partisanship with control variables from T1 added to the models. These results can be 
found in Table 5.2. According to these results, during the timespan of the survey, harsher 
immigration attitudes tend to lead to stronger rural identification for Independents only, 
while stronger rural identification corresponds to harsher immigration attitudes for whites 
only. 
 
Table 5.2: Cross-lagged OLS regression models predicting rural identity (T2) and 
immigration response (T2), interacted with racial group or partisanship (rural 
respondents only). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 













0.68*** -0.05 0.67*** 0.17* 




-0.02 0.67*** -0.10 0.66*** 
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 (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
Party ID - - 0.00 -0.02 
   (0.02) (0.02) 
Symbolic 
Ideology 
0.00 -0.05 -0.00 -0.06 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
Black 0.02 -0.00 - - 
 (0.03) (0.03)   
Hispanic 0.00 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.08) 
Income -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Education 
Level 
-0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.00 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
Age -0.06 0.02 -0.05 0.00 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Female 0.04* 0.01 0.03 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Independent 0.17** -0.03 - - 
 (0.07) (0.06)   
Republican 0.04 -0.07 - - 




-0.28** - - - 




-0.04 - - - 
 (0.09)    
Independent X 
Rural ID (T1) 
- -0.06 - - 
  (0.09)   
Republican X 
Rural ID (T1) 
- 0.01 - - 
  (0.11)   
White - - -0.05 0.16** 




- - -0.01 - 
   (0.09)  
White X Rural 
Identity (T1) 
- - - -0.28** 
    (0.12) 
Constant 0.20*** 0.24*** 0.31*** 0.11* 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
r2 0.58 0.60 0.57 0.61 
N 415.00 415.00 415.00 415.00 
Note: * = p < 0.10, ** = p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01, standard errors in parentheses. Results in bold show 
statistical significance. All variables (independent and dependent) have been recoded from zero to one. 





White-Hispanic and Black-Hispanic Ethnocentrism. In my analysis, I also include a 
comparison of anti-Hispanic ethnocentrism because in the minds of many Americans, 
immigrants are stereotyped and racialized as being Hispanic; thus, these two terms are 
linked. Though other groups are affiliated with immigration (such as Muslims), I only 
have feelings toward Hispanics available in this data set. Figure 5.6 shows the results of 
the cross-lagged analysis for white respondents between rural social identity strength and 
the difference in white and Hispanic feeling thermometer ratings. Figure 5.7 shows a 
similar analysis, but for black respondents and the difference in black and Hispanic 
feeling thermometer ratings. 
Figure 5.6: Results of Cross-Lagged Models between rural social identity 
strength/importance and white-Hispanic feeling thermometer difference, for all white 
respondents. 
Note: Two-wave cross-lagged model for time-lagged effects between rural identity scale and ethnocentrism 
scales. Standardized coefficients shown near paths, 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. Data 
weighted to population benchmarks.  
 
Figure 5.7: Results of Cross-Lagged Models between rural social identity 





Note: Two-wave cross-lagged model for time-lagged effects between rural identity scale and ethnocentrism 
scales. Standardized coefficients shown near paths, 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. Data 
weighted to population benchmarks.  
 
 The results from Figure 5.7 above suggest that changes in rural social identity 
strength and importance over time do not correspond to differences in feelings toward 
Hispanics for white respondents. However, the opposite dynamic is statistically 
significant; as the gulf between feelings toward whites and Hispanics increases for white 
respondents, they are more likely to increase their rural social identity affiliation. In other 
words, ethnocentrism (against Hispanics, an ethnic group highly linked to immigrants in 
the U.S.) drives rural identity but not vice versa for whites. Conversely, rural identity 
drives decreased ethnocentrism between blacks and Hispanics for blacks. Again, these 
findings corroborate the results above relating to racial identity; pro-white sentiment, and 
possibly anti-Hispanic sentiment, drive rural identification for whites. However, for 
blacks, rural identification creates less of a difference in feeling between the racial in-
group and the Hispanic out-group. This could be a factor of either partisanship – that 
black rural identifiers are politicized according to race, and therefore have a stronger 
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Democratic affiliation – and/or a factor of black rural identity having a different out-
group or set of out-groups than white rural identity. 
 Table 5.3 shows the cross-lagged OLS regression models that correspond to 
Figures 5.8 and 5.9 for rural respondents. For rural whites, the opposite of the cross-
lagged model occurs; rural identity strength drives higher white-Hispanic ethnocentrism 
but not vice versa. This effect only occurs for rural whites and not for all whites in the 
sample (see appendix for details). For rural blacks, a similar result to the cross-lagged 
models occurs; rural identity increases result in lower ethnocentrism scores between 
blacks and Hispanics. 
Table 5.3: Cross-lagged OLS regression models predicting rural identity (T2) and 
White-Hispanic ethnocentrism (T2) for whites, or Black-Hispanic ethnocentrism (T2) for 
blacks, rural respondents only.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Rural ID (T2) White-Hisp. 
Ethnocentrism (T2) 
Rural ID (T2) Black-Hisp. 
Ethnocentrism (T2) 
 Whites Whites Blacks Blacks 
Rural ID (T1) 0.70*** 0.03* 0.61*** -0.04* 




0.06 0.49*** - - 




- - -0.20 0.56*** 
   (0.17) (0.07) 
Party ID 0.09** 0.02 0.04 0.00 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.07) (0.04) 
Symbolic 
Ideology 
-0.03 0.03 0.11 -0.04 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.08) (0.05) 
Hispanic 0.02 0.03** -0.09 -0.15 
 (0.06) (0.01) (0.15) (0.18) 
Income -0.03 0.02 -0.21 -0.06 
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.13) (0.05) 
Education 
Level 
-0.08* -0.03 -0.06 -0.00 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.08) (0.03) 
Age -0.05 -0.03 -0.10 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.12) (0.05) 
Female 0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) 
Constant 0.14** 0.24*** 0.42*** 0.31*** 
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 (0.06) (0.03) (0.13) (0.07) 
r2 0.59 0.43 0.43 0.37 
N 518.00 518.00 178.00 177.00 
Note: * = p < 0.10, ** = p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01, standard errors in parentheses. Results in bold show 
statistical significance. All variables (independent and dependent) have been recoded from zero to one. 
Data weighted to T2 population benchmarks. See appendix for these results with rural and non-rural 
residents. 
 
 In summary, the overall tendency is that attitudes relating to immigration or racial 
affiliation and rural social identity are causally complex, but are affiliated with each 
other. For white respondents and Independents, rural social identity affiliation drives 
immigration attitudes. Rural social identification for black Americans does not 
significantly predict immigration attitudes using this data set. Finally, rural social identity 
tends to drive ethnocentrism (with Hispanics/Latinos being the out-group) for both whites 
and blacks, though for the former the relationship is positive while for the latter it is 
negative. 
In other words, for white respondents, stronger anti-immigration attitudes and 
wider gulfs between feelings about whites versus Hispanics all correspond to stronger 
rural social identification. This implies that for whites in particular, immigrants and 
Hispanics are seen as rural out-groups. Alternatively, black respondents also tend to have 
higher rural social identity strength with more anti-immigration attitude shifts, but not 
with black-Hispanic feeling differences. This could mean that restrictive views of 
immigration undergird black rural social identification, but without the corresponding 
feelings toward a prototypical immigrant ethnic group. Finally, Independents show the 
greatest causal correspondence between immigration attitudes and rural identity, though 
this may be due to partisans having better established stances on immigration. 
These analyses contain some limitations. First, I do not have measures of other 
ethnic categories commonly linked with immigration, such as Muslims, Middle 
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Easterners, or Asians, though I would expect similar results. Second, cross-lagged models 
suffer from some shortcomings. Although I also include cross-lagged regressions, I 
further test of this chapter’s expectations and the validation of the results of this section 
by presenting experimental results from wave two of the CSPP 2020 data. The next 
section describes this survey experiment and its results, ultimately corroborating and 
expanding upon some of the findings from the cross-lagged models. 
Methods – Experiment 
To further provide evidence that immigrants form an outgroup for rural identifiers 
– especially for white rural identifiers - an experiment on wave two of the CSPP 2020 
survey. All respondents were randomly assigned to one of four conditions, which are 
short paragraphs between 92 and 120 words each. Each condition except the control 
condition was designed to increase the salience of rural America – and thus designed to 
activate rural identity - using three different angles. The first treatment condition 
highlights how the economic recovery since the Great Recession has disproportionately 
benefited metro areas, with rural areas not having fully recovered even a decade later. 
This treatment aims to test whether the threat is more economic or material than 
symbolic; according to SIT, out-group threats are primarily status-based or symbolic 
(Huddy 2003; Tajfel 1981). For this reason, I expect exposure to this treatment to not 
move feelings toward immigrants, or to only slightly move feelings toward immigrants, 
in a negative direction if immigrants are indeed an out-group. 
Second, another condition emphasizes how rural Americans are often looked 
down on and negatively stereotyped, though the passage takes on a pro-rural tone. Once 
again, I expect immigrant attitudes to move as a result of exposure to this treatment, as it 
captures – and sympathetically acknowledges – symbolic threat or negativity toward the 
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in-group. Such a link between a threat to rural way of life and immigration can be found 
in previous literature (such as Wuthnow [2019]).  
The third condition draws heavily from Craig and Richeson (2014), which tells 
participants that the United States is set to become a majority-minority nation by 2042. 
However, the treatment also includes a line emphasizing how the population growth rate 
of racial and ethnic minorities in rural America is higher than in other geographic areas. 
This treatment also promotes a potential group-based threat:  that the potential out-group 
will increase over time. However, it differs from the second condition because it is not 
based on a direct threat to the in-group status (rural) but a threat by the out-group 
(immigrants who are racial/ethnic minorities). These two conditions also differ on 
whether the intergroup dynamic is based more on racial differences or more on rural-
specific considerations. Finally, the control condition talks about how people are moving 
around more in the United States recently. This condition was taken from Craig and 
Richeson (2014).  
Then, participants were asked an attention check question with yes or no 
responses. These questions asked about a key point in the previous passage. For the 
control condition, 73% of respondents given that treatment answered the attention check 
question answered correctly, compared to 88% of respondents in the economic condition, 
86% of respondents in the respect condition, and 78% of respondents in the majority-
minority condition. Overall, the pass rate across conditions is 82%. Given that a 
significant proportion of respondents failed the attention check in some conditions 
especially, the experimental results will be analyzed with and without those who failed 
the attention check. 
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After this, participants were asked to rate four groups – Republicans, Democrats, 
Undocumented Immigrants, and Scientists – using feeling thermometers in random order. 
For this analysis, only the Undocumented Immigrants feeling thermometer will be used; 
see the next chapter for the results using the Republicans and Democrats feeling 
thermometers as experimental dependent variables. The use of a feeling thermometer 
here is important in establishing the necessarily emotional dimension of social identities 
(Tajfel 1981). I recoded the Undocumented Immigrants feeling thermometer to range 
from zero to one. Please see the appendix for exact treatment wording and question 
wording. 
Finally, I measure respondent location by their stated location from Wave 1 of the 
survey (self-identified location). The options include living in an urban, suburban, small 
town, or rural area; I combine rural and small town, while keeping urban and suburban as 
separate categories. I also use RUCA codes to determine respondent location; anything 
over a 3 designation is considered rural, while everything else is non-rural. 
Results – Experiment 
 Similar to the results in the above section, rural social identity strength and 
importance is negatively correlated with feelings toward undocumented immigrants for 
those self-identified rural residents in the control group (α = -0.14 [all respondents]; α = -
0.29 [white respondents]). Further, self-identified rural and small-town residents rate 
undocumented immigrants cooler, on average, compared to everyone else using only 
respondents in the experimental control (mean = 0.32 for rural and small town residents; 
mean = 0.51 for everyone else). Similarly, for rural residents according to RUCA codes, 
rural social identity and feeling toward undocumented immigrants in the control group 
are correlated at -0.27 (-0.28 for whites). Again, objective rural residents rate 
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undocumented immigrants cooler, on average, compared to everyone else using only 
respondents in the experimental control (mean = 0.33 for rural and small town residents; 
mean = 0.47 for everyone else). Given the average attention check fail rate of 18% across 
all conditions, I analyze the results for just those respondents who passed the attention 
check. Figure 5.8 below shows these results (see Figure A5.1 in the appendix for these 
results for all respondents). 
Figure 5.8: Experimental results (CSPP 2020) for all respondents (top left) and white 
respondents (bottom left) who passed the attention check, and for white Democrats (top 















Note: I replicate the upper left-hand figure using RUCA codes to determine rural versus non-
rural residency with similar results for rural respondents. See Figure A5.2 in the chapter 








Note: Location determined by self-identification. 
 
The left-hand side of Figure 5.8 displays the results for all respondents who 
passed the attention check (top) and for white respondents who passed the attention check 
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(bottom). Such results suggest four things. The first is that, in the control condition, urban 
and suburban respondents have similar and more positive baseline opinions of 
undocumented immigrants (around 0.5 for all and white respondents) compared to rural 
and small-town respondents (less than 0.4), backing up previous findings from studies 
like Fennelly and Federico (2008).  
The second is that rural and small-town respondents, when primed by hearing 
about the disrespect of rural areas from a rural-sympathetic angle, felt less coldly toward 
the undocumented immigrant group. This is true of all respondents, white respondents 
only, and white Republicans and Democrats. This suggests that acknowledging a 
perceived in-group symbolic threat for rural areas minimized dislike for a proposed out-
group, even if this perceived threat or blow to self-esteem is not directly related to the 
out-group in question. This falls in line with expectations from SIT, in that group 
identification and threats are predicted to be more symbolic and status based (rather than 
primarily material or economic) (Tajfel 1981); in other words, derogating out-groups of 
perceived lower status can bolster in-group pride and self-esteem. Further, 
acknowledging that the group has been wronged or viewed unjustly should reduce the 
need for out-group derogation (Branscombe et al. 1999). It therefore follows from the 
experimental findings that undocumented immigrants are an out-group.  
Third, and less expectedly, the findings by Craig and Richeson (2014) may 
actually only be relevant for white respondents who live in suburbs. The findings here 
may be impacted by a few minor deviations; the dependent variable is slightly different 
here, as well as the fourth condition wording, compared to the Craig and Richeson study. 
However, the dependent variable and the condition are very similar to the original study 
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and the latter only includes an extra line about rural areas. More research in this area is 
needed to make any firmer conclusions.  
Fourth, and related to the third point, is that this loss of white majority-minority 
status does not negatively impact white rural residents’ views of immigrants, suggesting 
that rural anti-immigrant sentiment is not solely about racial or ethnic differences, though 
ethnicity is associated with immigration as noted in the previous section. It appears that 
the reason for this may be the attitudes of white rural Democrats, who are actually 
significantly warmer towards undocumented immigrants when given the majority-
minority condition compared to the control condition. Notably, however, when looking at 
all Democrats who passed the attention check, the effect of the fourth condition on 
feelings toward undocumented immigrants does not hold for rural respondents; it appears 
that this is both an effect of partisanship and being white. See the appendix for details.  
However, this fourth result for rural residents does not hold when using 
regressions to determine statistical significance. Model 1 in Table 5.4 predicts that being 
exposed to the Respect condition (compared to the control condition) tended to result in 
significantly warmer feelings toward immigrants for all rural respondents, in line with the 
second point above. I run the same model but interacting respondent race (Model 2) and 
partisanship (Model 3) to the effect of exposure to the different treatments. According to 
these results, exposure to the treatment conditions did not result in significantly different 
dependent variable values across white/non-white or partisanship (Democrat vs. 
Independent vs. Republican). Finally, Model 4 looks at treatment effects by partisanship 
for only white rural respondents. Again, party does not seem to significantly alter the 
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expected treatment effects. Replacing self-identified rural residents with rural residents 
defined by RUCA codes yields similar results (see chapter appendix for details). 
Table 5.4: Feelings toward undocumented immigrants by experimental treatment 
condition, for rural/small town respondents only (self-identified), by race and/or 
partisanship. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 






















0.07 0.03 0.01 0.02 
 (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) 
Respect 
Condition 
0.11* 0.02 0.06 0.08 




0.04 -0.09 -0.02 0.07 
 (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) 
Respondent 
Race White = 
1 
- -0.22** - - 
  (0.08)   
Economic X 
White 
- 0.02 - - 
  (0.11)   
Respect X 
White 
- 0.09 - - 
  (0.10)   
MM X White - 0.16 - - 
  (0.11)   
Independent - - -0.28*** -0.30*** 
   (0.07) (0.08) 
Republican - - -0.46*** -0.42*** 
   (0.06) (0.06) 
Economic X 
Independent 
- - 0.06 0.11 
   (0.11) (0.13) 
Economic X 
Republican 
- - 0.08 0.05 
   (0.08) (0.09) 
Respect X 
Independent 
- - 0.03 0.05 
   (0.09) (0.11) 
Respect X 
Republican 
- - 0.02 -0.02 
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   (0.08) (0.09) 
MM X 
Independent 
- - 0.05 -0.04 
   (0.10) (0.12) 
Respect X 
Republican 
- - 0.03 -0.09 
   (0.09) (0.10) 
Constant 0.38*** 0.55*** 0.61*** 0.58*** 
 (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) 
r2 0.02 0.07 0.36 0.41 
N 367.00 367.00 367.00 264.00 
Note: Passed attention check only. Standard errors in parentheses. . + = p < 0.10, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 
0.01, *** = p < 0.001. Statistically significant coefficients bolded for emphasis. 
 
Discussion and Concluding Statements 
 
As stated above, this chapter set out to accomplish four things. First, it aims to 
show that the relationship between rurality and anti-immigration sentiment goes beyond 
the demographic and political tendencies of rural areas. As noted in the experimental 
results especially, rural way of life and respect to rural areas – in-group respect – seems 
to play a role in attitudes toward undocumented immigrants, while rural social identity 
strength also corresponds to greater anti-immigration attitudes for political Independents 
and stronger racial social identifiers.  
Thus, anti-immigration sentiment is linked to psychological affiliation with 
rurality and its corresponding respect for rural way of life, while immigrants appear to be 
an out-group, all of which extend beyond simple differences in rural-urban demographics 
and political leanings. This, suggests evidence for the second point of the chapter:  that 
certain rural Americans -particularly white ones - perceive themselves as in the middle of 
a status hierarchy and forgotten or ignored by those of higher status while also seeing 
themselves as superior to lower-status groups, which corresponds to right-wing populism.  
As with any analysis, there are limitations to the data used here. First, the survey 
data from YouGov was collected around the 2020 presidential election; it could be the 
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case that the political climate during this time was unique. In addition, the time between 
waves in the panel survey was relatively short. For these two reasons, the cross-lagged 
analysis in particular would benefit from an additional replication. As mentioned above, 
the experimental analysis, and thus the affective or group-based element of this chapter, 
could not be fully extended to different categories non-white rural residents. Future 
research should delve into this dynamic, though for white rural respondents, there is some 
evidence from the above experiment to suggest anti-immigrant affect hinges more on 
rural group concerns than strictly racial ones (though immigration is racialized and thus 
these two things cannot entirely be separated). 
In the next chapter, I examine sentiments toward the urban rural out-group – 
experts – via anti-intellectualism. I find, both using correlational and experimental 
studies, that rural identity is affiliated with anti-intellectualism and with a greater 




CHAPTER 6: Rural Identity, Anti-Intellectualism, and Misinformation 
Endorsement 
 
Previous research on rural political sentiment and rural identity have pointed to 
hostility towards experts and intellectuals in particular, who are seen as urban-affiliated 
groups. Such accounts often mention an appreciation of common sense along with a 
mistrust of scientists and experts (Cramer 2016; Hochschild 2018), also known as anti-
intellectualism (Rigney 1991). Hofstadter’s (1963) landmark book on anti-intellectualism 
discusses how farmers and agricultural workers for much of U.S. history – which made 
up the vast majority of rural residents before the mid to late 1900s - were split into two 
groups: the smaller group of “gentleman farmers” who successfully wed common sense 
with scientific expertise, and the larger group of “dirt farmers” who resented the 
gentleman farmers and their science-backed success. Hofstadter includes the following 
quote made by a British agricultural scientist after he lectured to American farmers in the 
1800s: “[the farmers were] averse to change, and more averse still to the opinion that they 
are not already wise enough for all they have to do.” (275). Condescending nomenclature 
notwithstanding, such anti-expert resentment has remained a part of rural culture and 
identity in the U.S. even today (Ching and Creed 1997; Cramer 2016).  
Given this, one’s rural social identity strength should positively predict attitudes 
on health and science that contradict scientific consensus via anti-intellectualism, which 
can be seen as a negative group-based affect towards experts and intellectuals. To 
quantitatively test this relationship – something not previously done at the national level 
– while also linking it to health and science misinformation endorsement, I use 
experimental evidence from Studies 5 and 6, as well as cross-sectional survey data from 
Survey 3 and the 2019 ANES pilot (Study 7). Attitudes toward health and science, 
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especially if misinformed, have been shown to strongly influence policy attitudes and 
likelihood of political activism on behalf of the issue. For instance, negative vaccine 
attitudes are the largest predictors of opposition to pro-vaccine policies (Stecula et al. 
2020b), and have prompted anti-vaccine activism to block state-level pro-vaccine policy 
(Joslyn and Sylvester 2017; Motta et al. 2018). In addition, anti-intellectualism helps 
explain rural tendencies toward populism. Populist support is highly linked with anti-
intellectualism, and can even constitute a subdimension of populist attitudes (Merkley 
2020; Oliver and Rahn 2016). As noted in Chapter 3, however, anti-intellectualism seems 
particularly affiliated with rural identity and not negative attitudes toward government 
and political decision-making. 
Put more clearly, I expect the following from this analysis. First, measures of 
rural social identification should positively and significantly predict anti-intellectualism, 
but not populist attitudes against political elites. This has been established in Chapter 3, 
but is further tested below experimentally increasing the salience of rural social 
identification for rural respondents, which results in higher average levels of anti-
intellectualism. Notably, measures of objective rural residency do not significantly or 
positively predict anti-intellectualism. 
In turn, anti-intellectualism has repeatedly been found to predict science and 
health misinformation endorsement, including misinformation relating to vaccines, 
GMOs, and climate change. Since anti-intellectualism is positively associated 
health/science misinformation endorsement, measures of rural social identification str 
positively and significantly associated with health/science misinformation endorsement. 
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Of course, rural social identifiers are not the only ones who adopt anti-
intellectualism and misinformation related to science and medicine. For this reason, this 
chapter also emphasizes how adopting a particular social identity matters for political 
attitudes due to the adoption of perceived group values. Such a stance runs counter to 
many accounts of social identity formation according to Social Identity Theory (SIT), 
which stipulates that social identifiers necessarily need to be demographic members, as 
social identities are typically determined by psychological attachment to a group through 
having group features alongside adopting group norms (e.g., you first psychologically 
identify with rural areas and then you ascribe to perceived group norms and develop 
negative out-group affect, especially under perceived threat from the out-group) 
(Branscombe et al. 1999; Tajfel 1981). In a rural identity, where the group membership 
boundaries are gray, identification with group norms becomes more central. 
Further, scholars have noted that in order to foster the acceptance of scientifically-
backed attitudes and behaviors, scientists and science communicators must recognize and 
speak to skeptics’ concerns based on underlying psychological traits, opinions, and 
values (Nyhan and Reifler 2010). Therefore, understanding the underlying values and 
psychology is an important step in gathering more support for science-backed evidence. 
Finally, this study establishes that measuring rurality as a subjective identity oftentimes 
matters more for political outcomes than more objective measures of rural-urban 
divisions; how to measure rurality is a long-standing debate because various ways to 





Rural Identity, Anti-Intellectualism, and Health and Science Misinformation 
Before proceeding, however, it is important to briefly introduce anti-
intellectualism and its relationship to both rural identity and to health and science 
misinformation endorsement. Hofstadter (1963) defines three forms of anti-
intellectualism, but emphasizes one in particular: anti-elitism that represents distrust and 
dislike of experts purporting to have more knowledge on a subject. Anti-intellectualism, 
especially for individuals who lean right politically, has been on the rise for decades in 
the U.S. (Lewandusky and Oberauer 2016; Oliver and Rahn 2016). Anti-intellectualism 
and distrust of experts are associated with misinformation endorsement – particularly 
when the misinformation or anti-scientific attitude surrounds an issue that enjoys wide 
expert consensus, such as climate change, vaccines, and GMOs (Merkley 2020; Motta 
2017, 2020; Stecula et al. 2020a).  
Such a “consensus gap” occurs when significant swaths of the public disagree 
with scientific consensus. Consensus gaps occur in part due to directional motivated 
reasoning – people will adopt misinformation to comport with their prior political or 
cultural predilections (Kunda 1990; Miller et al. 2016). Such motivated reasoning is more 
likely among those who are politically interested, as increased knowledge or awareness 
not only makes people more aware of where they stand politically and socially, but also 
helps them link the misinformation to their pre-existing tendencies (Kahan 2012; 
Schaffner and Luks 2018). After all, individuals must hear about the misinformation and 
its links; those who are more politically interested are more likely to seek biased news 
sources and other information (Scheuefele and Krauss 2019).  
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For instance, the vast majority of scientific experts agree that the global 
temperature has increased in the past century due to human actions, including the burning 
of fossil fuels and CO2 (Cook et al. 2016). The most prominent characteristic of climate 
change skeptics is that they identify as Republican or politically right-leaning because of 
widespread climate change denial by Republican elites (Mooney 2005). In addition, 
climate change skepticism has been linked to several demographic variables, including 
born again or Evangelical Protestantism, gender, African American race, Hispanic 
ethnicity, education, age, being in the South, rurality, and family income (Evans and Feng 
2013; Krosnik et al. 2006).  
Other consensus gaps occur regarding vaccines and GMOs. One of the most 
persistent pieces of science and health related misinformation endorsement is the belief 
that vaccines cause autism, despite widespread agreement among medical experts that 
vaccines do not cause autism (Lewandowsky et al. 2012). Similarly, most scientists also 
agree that genetically modified organisms (GMOs) – or, more specifically, genetically 
modified food – are safe for consumption. Yet, only 37% of adults think GMOs are safe 
to eat (Funk et al. 2015; McFadden 2016). Skepticism of GMO safety and vaccine 
misinformation endorsement are less politically aligned, compared to climate change 
skepticism. However, other psychological factors may increase the tendency for 
motivated reasoning and misinformation adoption, including gender, religiosity, 
education level, race/ethnicity, disgust sensitivity, and social identification with being 
anti-vaccine for the vaccine misinformation in particular (Callaghan et al. 2019; 
McFadden 2016).  
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As mentioned in more detail in Chapter 3, rurality has been linked with anti-
intellectualism. For instance, Ching and Creed (1997), in line with Hofstadter (1963), 
argue that anti-intellectualism is another component of rural values and identity, not 
necessarily due to differences in education levels between rural and non-rural areas, but 
also because intellectuals are associated with cities while the rural subject is seen as 
undereducated and therefore inferior. Rurality is thus associated with having common 
sense and life experience, versus “book smarts.” Similarly, work by Cramer (2012; 2016) 
notes that rural residents felt disrespected or looked down upon by urban areas and public 
officials, and were proud of their rural way of life and values, which include hard work, 
slower pace of life, and common sense (as opposed to intellectualism or advice from 
experts). Cramer concludes that this resentment manifests itself as anti-urban resentment, 
however, it does appear to be particularly directed against experts. Such out-group 
resentment and anger against experts has been found in other sociological studies of rural 
areas, with the out-group foils being urban residents, professionals, experts, and the 
federal government (Hochschild 2016; Wuthnow 2019). These studies on rural identity, 
however, have not tested whether such rural anti-intellectualism exists nationally. They 
also have not explored other implications of rural identity being linked with anti-
intellectualism, such as attitudes toward health and science policy. Anti-intellectualism 
could therefore help explain why rural areas tend to be less supportive of science-backed 
policy in health, such as during the COVID-19 pandemic (Callaghan et al. 2021), 
environment (Hochschild 2016), and so on. 
In the next several sections, I show how rural social identity is linked with anti-




Cross-Sectional Analysis and Results 
I first begin my analysis by looking at cross-sectional survey data from Study 3 
(Lucid), which will be verified using ANES (Study 7) data below. Technical information 
about these samples can be found in the chapter appendix and in Chapter 2. 
The first variable I operationalize in the Study 3 data is rural residency. There are 
various ways to define and measure these terms, and decades of academic research by 
sociologists, demographers, geographers, and other scholars have debated the best way to 
do so (Hart et al. 2005; Miller and Luloff 1981; Nemerever and Rogers 2021). 
Researchers often use definitions and quantitative scales created by government agencies 
based on objective criteria, such as population density, population size, and distance from 
metropolitan centers. These include measurements such as the Rural-Urban Commuting 
Area Codes (“RUCA”), which are based on Census tracts and are defined according to 
metropolitan centers or small-town cores (based on population density), and the percent 
of the population that commutes to such cores. I use RUCA codes as an objective 
measure of rurality. The chapter appendix contains more information on defining and 
measuring “rural” and “urban”, as well as information about the categories used in the 
RUCA measure. I then collapse the measure into a binary metro (designations 1-3) and 
non-metro (designations 4-9), which is how the Census collapses the RUCA codes into a 
binary metro/non-metro variable. 
To measure subjective rural self-identification, respondents were asked first 
whether or not they grew up in a rural area (response options were “yes” or “no”). Then 
they were asked if they live in a rural area now (response options were again “yes” or 
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“no”). The correlation between a current metro resident according to RUCA codes and a 
current self-identified rural resident is 0.33. To measure rural identity strength, I again 
use the adapted partisan identity strength scale by Huddy and colleagues (Huddy 2001; 
2013; Huddy et al. 2015). Respondents were only given the rural identity strength 
questions if they said that they either grew up in a rural area, or if they currently live in a 
rural area (N = 486). The scale reliability coefficient of the five items is 0.90.  
The anti-intellectualism measure comes from Oliver and Rahn’s (2016) populism 
scale. This is a common way to measure anti-intellectualism (such as Motta 2018) and 
uses three items. The first asks how much respondents put trust in the wisdom of ordinary 
people rather than in experts. The second asks how much they agreed that, when it comes 
to really important questions, scientific facts do not help very much. Finally, respondents 
indicate how much they agreed that ordinary people can really use the help of experts to 
understand complicated things like science (reverse-coded). Response options for all 
three are a seven-point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly Agree” to “Strongly 
Disagree”. The scale reliability coefficient of these three measures is 0.44. 
To separate anti-intellectualism from populism, I also control for anti-elitism in 
politics, which is the second part of the Oliver and Rahn (2016) scale. I use four 
questions asking respondents how much they agree or disagree that 1) people like me 
don’t have much say in what government does, 2) politics usually boils down to the 
struggle between the people and the powerful, 3) the system is stacked against people like 
me, and 4) politics is ultimately a struggle between good and evil. Exact question 
wording can be found in the chapter appendix. Again, the response options are seven-
172 
 
point scales ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The scale reliability 
coefficient of these four measures is 0.43. 
The dependent variable is vaccine misinformation endorsement, specifically, the 
belief that vaccines cause autism. This has been a significant and widespread piece of 
misinformation in health and science in recent years (Lewandowsky et al. 2012). 
Respondents were given the question, “Can vaccines administered to children at young 
ages cause them to become autistic?” The question had four possible response options: 
“they definitely cannot,” “they probably cannot,” “they probably can,” and “they 
definitely can.” Then, I recoded the responses into a binary variable, with zero meaning 
that vaccines definitely or probably do not cause autism, and with one indicating that 
vaccines definitely or probably cause autism.  
The analysis also includes demographic control measures that could account for 
factors driving the link between rural identification and anti-vaccine attitudes, and are 
based on what previous research has found to predict anti-vaccine misinformation 
endorsement. These include age (continuous variable), gender (binary with female = 1), 
race/ethnicity (a binary variable for Black and another for Hispanic), education level 
(seven-point scale), household income (24-point scale), party identity strength (7-point 
scale), and evangelical (binary with evangelical or born-again Christian = 1).  
To test the chapter argument, I employ OLS regressions to first show that anti-
intellectualism predicts rural identity strength, controlling for other factors. Next, I show 
that rural residency using an objective measure (RUCA codes) does not predict vaccine 
misinformation endorsement in a logit model. I then include a measure of rural identity 
strength, which should significantly and positively predict vaccine misinformation 
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endorsement. Finally, I add anti-intellectualism into the model. If anti-intellectualism 
mediates the relationship between rural identity and vaccine misinformation, both rural 
identity and anti-intellectualism should positively and significantly predict the outcome 
measure, but the coefficient for rural identity should be diminished. 
Table 6.1 below shows the relationship between anti-intellectualism and rural 
social identity strength for rural identifiers; this relationship is positive and statistically 
significant in both the bivariate model and in the model with control variables (Models 1 
and 2). The relationship between rural social identity strength and the populist anti-
elitism measure is not statistically significant; this is essentially an expanded model and 
analysis from that in Chapter 3. Furthermore, it is notable that Models 3 and 4 indicate 
that anti-intellectualism is not significantly predicted by objective rural residency.  
Table 6.1: Predicting rural social identity strength for rural respondents only, Lucid 
2019 non-experimental data. 
 
































0.20*** 0.17*** - - - - 0.19 - 





- - 0.02 -0.01 - - - - 




- - - - -0.05 -0.04 - 0.21 
     (0.05) (0.05)  (0.14) 
Educati
on 
- 0.01 - -0.05 - -0.14* - -
0.45* 
  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.07)  (0.19) 
Income - -0.00 - -0.02 - -0.04 - -0.21 
  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.14) 





  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.10) 
Age - -0.01 - -0.04 - -0.05 - -
0.33* 
  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.15) 
Gender - -0.01 - -0.01 - 0.00 - 0.02 
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.07) 
Black - 0.05 - 0.00 - -0.05 - -0.18 
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.11) 
Hispani
c 
- 0.01 - 0.02 - 0.04 - -0.05 
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.09) 
Evangel
ical 
- 0.05** - 0.09*** - 0.11*** - 0.20* 
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.09) 
Constan
t 




 (0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.15) 
r2 0.09 0.15 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.15 





OLS regression model results. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are * 
< 0.05, ** < 0.01, and *** < 0.001. Bolded items indicate statistical significance. All 
variables have been recoded to range from zero to one. Data weighted to population 
benchmarks.  
 
Rural social identity strength should also be positively associated with 
misinformation endorsement. Table 6.2 below shows that rural identity strength 
significantly and positively predicts a greater chance of endorsing vaccine 
misinformation (Model 1). This relationship is attenuated – i.e., the effect size is lowered 
– but still significant by the introduction of anti-intellectualism in the model, as would be 
expected (Model 2). Furthermore, being a current non-metro resident is not statistically 
significant in any model, including Model 3 with non-metro residency predicting vaccine 
misinformation endorsement.  
 
Table 6.2: Predicting vaccine misinformation endorsement using the non-experimental 
Lucid data. 
 (1) (2) (3) 






 Self-identified rural 
or grew up rural 
Self-identified rural 
or grew up rural 
All respondents 





0.88 0.93 1.00 
 (0.24) (0.26) (0.23) 
Rural ID 
Strength 
3.98*** 2.54** - 
 (1.78) (1.19)  
Anti-
Intellectualism 
- 13.56*** - 
  (9.31)  
Education 
Level 
1.27 1.30 1.10 
 (0.71) (0.75) (0.48) 
Income Level 0.57 0.53 0.41* 
 (0.27) (0.26) (0.15) 
Party ID 1.73* 1.42 1.96** 
 (0.55) (0.46) (0.48) 
Age 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
Gender 0.56** 0.56** 0.62** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) 
Black 2.45** 2.21** 1.37 
 (0.92) (0.85) (0.39) 
Hispanic 1.23 1.26 1.48 
 (0.39) (0.41) (0.34) 
Evangelical 1.56* 1.37 1.80** 
 (0.36) (0.33) (0.33) 
Political 
Interest 
0.81 0.88 1.16 
 (0.34) (0.37) (0.37) 
Constant 0.31 0.13*** 0.67 
 (0.19) (0.08) (0.28) 
Pseudo r2 0.12 0.15 0.09 
N 426.00 426.00 720.00 
Logit models, odds ratios shown. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are 
* < 0.05, ** < 0.01, and *** < 0.001. Bolded items indicate statistical significance. All 




ANES Data Analysis and Results 
I also use data from the 2019 ANES Pilot study (Study 7) to further build 
evidence for the chapter’s argument. Again, more information on this data set can be 
found in Chapter 2, as well as Table A6.4 in this chapter’s appendix.  
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Once again, rural residency in the ANES data is measured according to whether 
the respondent said that they grew up in a rural area or currently live in a rural area. Rural 
identity strength is measured according to how important the respondent feels being from 
a rural area is to them, and is measured using a three-part question (ANES wording based 
on Munis 2020). Respondents were first asked where they currently live, and then they 
were asked where they grew up. Respondents could select “rural area,” “small town,” 
“suburb,” or “city.” Based on this response, they were then asked how important being a 
person from this place is to their identity, with five possible responses ranging from “not 
at all important” to “extremely important”. The three-item anti-intellectualism measure in 
the ANES data set is the same as the one in the Lucid study above. The scale reliability 
coefficient of these three items is 0.71. 
The main dependent variable of this study is an anti-science misinformation 
endorsement scale. This variable is a count variable that ranges from zero (no 
misinformation endorsement) to three (endorses all three pieces of misinformation on 
GMOs, global warming, and vaccines). The first misinformation endorsement dimension 
is the same as the one from study one: whether or not the respondent indicates that 
vaccines cause autism. The measure used is a combination of two variations of question 
wordings; half of the respondents received the first question wording, while the other half 
received the second question wording. The first group was asked whether they thought 
vaccines cause autism or do not cause autism. The second group was asked whether they 
thought that scientific consensus shows that vaccines cause or do not cause autism.  
The second misinformation endorsement dimension is a binary of whether or not 
the respondent believes the global temperature has or has not increased over the past 100 
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years. Finally, the third misinformation endorsement dimension is measuring 
misinformation relating to GMOs. Like the vaccine-autism misinformation questions, the 
GMO misinformation measure used is a combination of two variations of question 
wordings; half of the respondents received the first question wording, while the other half 
received the second question wording. The first group was asked whether they thought 
GMOs are safe or not safe to eat. The second group was asked whether they thought that 
scientific consensus shows that GMOs are safe or not safe to eat.  
This dependent variable will be analyzed according to the combined count 
measure, as well as for each sub-measure (see chapter appendix, Tables A6.9 and A6.10). 
In the entire sample, 16% said they believe vaccines cause autism (14%), or that 
scientists believe that vaccines cause autism (17%). Of those asked, 50% said they 
believe GMOs are unsafe and, for those asked the alternative question, 43% said 
scientists believe GMOs are unsafe. For all respondents, 26% said global temperatures 
are not rising. I again include the same demographic control measures that could account 
for factors driving the link between rural identification and anti-science attitudes, though 
I also include binary variables for region with East = 0 and South, Midwest, and West = 1 
for each of their respective variables. 
Using OLS regressions I show that rural identity importance positively and 
significantly predicts anti-intellectualism, controlling for other factors. First, I predict 
anti-intellectualism using the place identity scale by rural, small town, suburb, and city in 
an interactive model (Table 6.3). The results find that social identity for rural residence, 
measured via importance of rurality to identity, is positively and significantly correlated 
with anti-intellectualism. Other place residencies do not have significant relationships 
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between identity and anti-intellectualism. Additionally, rural identity importance 
correlates with anti-intellectualism at 0.12 for rural self-identifiers only, while the place 
identity importance for all respondents is 0.05.  
 
Table 6.3: Predicting anti-intellectualism for rural identity importance, compared to 


























Live in city -0.02 
 (0.02) 
Live in suburb -0.01 
 (0.02) 






























OLS regression model results. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are * 
< 0.05, ** < 0.01, and *** < 0.001. Bolded items indicate statistical significance. All 
variables have been recoded to range from zero to one. Data weighted to population 
benchmarks. 
 
Next, Table 6.4 displays the results for how many of the three anti-science 
misinformation dimensions respondents endorsed, for subjective rural respondents only. 
Model 1 shows a positive and significant bivariate relationship between rural identity 
importance and the number of anti-science misinformation endorsements, as expected by 
H2a. Further, Model 2 shows that this relationship holds controlling for a variety of 
variables often cited as also predicting science and health misinformation. Finally, Model 
3 shows that rural identity importance is still positive and significant, even with anti-
intellectualism included. Notably, the coefficient of rural identity importance and anti-
science endorsement decreases between Models 2 and 3 when anti-intellectualism is 
added; this is to be expected if anti-intellectualism mediates the relationship (H2b). 
Further, similar analyses replacing the anti-science count dependent variable with each 
individual dimension (vaccines, GMOs, and global warming) are found in the chapter 
appendix, Tables A6.9 and A6.10. 
 
Table 6.4: Predicting anti-science endorsement count scale (vaccine, global warming, 
and GMOs), using weighted ANES data, for current or grew up rural residents only. 












0.41*** 0.27** 0.23** 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) 
Anti-
Intellectualism 
- - 1.08*** 
   (0.17) 
Education 
Level 
- 0.05 0.15 
  (0.14) (0.14) 
Income - -0.56*** -0.54*** 
  (0.20) (0.20) 
Party ID - 0.52*** 0.34*** 
  (0.10) (0.10) 
Age - 0.00 0.22 
  (0.18) (0.17) 
Female - 0.04 0.05 
  (0.07) (0.07) 
Black - 0.21* 0.22** 
  (0.12) (0.11) 
Hispanic - 0.13 0.05 
  (0.14) (0.15) 
Born Again 
Christian 
- 0.24*** 0.16** 
  (0.08) (0.07) 
Political 
Interest 
- -0.03 0.03 
  (0.12) (0.11) 
Midwest - -0.06 -0.06 
  (0.12) (0.12) 
South - -0.09 -0.11 
  (0.11) (0.11) 
West - -0.01 -0.02 
  (0.12) (0.12) 
Constant -0.22*** -0.41** -1.03*** 
 (0.06) (0.20) (0.21) 
N 889.00 738.00 738.00 
Poisson models used due to a count dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Significance levels are * < 0.05, ** < 0.01, and *** < 0.001. Bolded items indicate 
statistical significance. All variables have been recoded to range from zero to one. Data 
weighted to population benchmarks. 
 
 
Experimental Data and Results (Study 5) 
The above analyses and results provide correlational analysis in support of the 
hypotheses, but they do not evidence for implied causality. Existing studies have found 
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causal evidence that manipulating the level of anti-elitism in information provided to 
respondents affects opposition to areas of expert consensus (Merkley 2020). The theory 
discussed above by SIT suggests the in-group psychological attachment forms first and 
then out-group affect forms (Branscombe et al. 1999; Huddy 2003). To back up this 
theoretically assumed causal relationship, I manipulate rural salience for those who self-
identify as rural, with anti-intellectualism as the dependent variable.  
In early August 2020 (Study 5) and again in December 2020 (Study 6) as 
validation, I conducted survey experiments using Lucid. For the August 2020 study, 360 
individuals consented to take the survey. Information on the survey weight, as well as 
demographics of the respondents, can be found in Table A6.11 of the appendix. In the 
experiment all respondents were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: the control 
condition (“Control”) or the treatment condition (“Treatment”). Respondents in the 
treatment condition (N = 181) first received a message saying that they would read an 
excerpt from a local newspaper on the following screen. Then, respondents viewed a 
picture of a rural landscape, and were presented with a short 121-word paragraph 
highlighting the benefits of living in a rural area, and talking about how many younger 
people who grew up in rural areas are moving back. This treatment is meant to make 
rural social identification more salient, and to bolster positive in-group sentiment 
Respondents then answered the dependent variables. Respondents who were assigned to 
the control condition (N = 179) did not receive anything and only answered the 




The outcome variable is the anti-intellectualism scale by Oliver and Rahn (2016) 
measured in the same way the above analyses. The scale reliability coefficient of these 
three measures is 0.42, with an average interitem covariance of 0.02. Rural identification 
again includes those who either currently live in rural areas or who grew up in rural areas. 
Respondents were asked what best describes the community that they grew up in. Those 
who said “rural” were coded as rural. Then, respondents were asked what best describes 
the community they currently live in. Those who said “rural” here were also coded as 
rural. 
To analyze these results, I first compare the anti-intellectualism means for four 
groups: 1) self-identified rural residents in the control group, 2) self-identified rural 
residents in the treatment group, 3) self-identified non-rural residents in the control 
group, and 4) self-identified non-rural residents in the treatment group. I expect that the 
mean score in group 2 should be significantly higher (according to a t-test) than the mean 
score in group 1; this would provide support for rural identity driving anti-intellectualism. 
Furthermore, to control for other factors, I use OLS regressions predicting anti-
intellectualism with an interaction between rural identifier (binary) and experimental 
condition (treatment = 1, control = 0) that should have a positive and significant 
coefficient. The controls are the same as those found in the above Lucid analyses. 
Figure 6.1 below shows the mean anti-intellectualism scores for rural and non-
rural respondents for each condition. Rural respondents in the control group had an 
average anti-intellectualism score of 0.35 (95% CI = [0.29, 0.41]), while rural 
respondents in the treatment group had a mean score of 0.45 [95% CI = [0.37, 0.53]). 
Therefore, the average treatment effect is 0.10 points on the zero to one anti-
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intellectualism scale. Although there is slight overlap in the confidence level intervals, 
neither confidence level interval includes the mean score of the other group. Similar 
results can be found for the unweighted data; see Figure A6.4 in the chapter appendix for 
details. A t-test of the means between these two treatment groups for rural respondents 
rejects the null hypothesis that the means are the same with a probability of 0.04. This is 
a significant difference in means; exposure to the treatment for rural respondents yielded 
higher anti-intellectualism scores, on average, compared to those in the control. 
Figure 6.1: Average anti-intellectualism scores by experimental condition and rural self-
identification. 
 
Note: The difference in means is statistically significant at p < 0.001 for both the left- and right-hand 
graphs. Data is weighted; see Figure A6.4 in the chapter appendix for unweighted data. Results for non-
rural respondents can also be found in the appendix. 95% confidence intervals shown. 
 
For non-rural respondents, the mean anti-intellectualism score was 0.40 (95% CI 
= [0.37, 0.43]) for those in the control group and 0.36 (95% CI = [0.32, 0.39]) for those in 
the treatment group. This time, the means are just barely out of the confidence interval 
range of the other mean, although for the unweighted data, the confidence intervals 
overlap (see Figure A6.4 in the chapter appendix). However, a t-test of the means 
between these two treatment groups for non-rural respondents rejects the null hypothesis 



















treatment for non-rural respondents resulted in a very slight decrease in anti-
intellectualism, compared to the control. Furthermore, these differences remain 
statistically significant when controlling for a variety of demographic variables. Please 
see Tables A6.13 and A6.14 in the chapter appendix for more information.  
 
Experimental Data and Results: Replication (Study 6) 
As stated above, I replicate the above experimental analysis to verify the results. 
The Study 6 survey was conducted via Lucid in December 2020 (N = 495). The 
experiment is very similar to the one in the previous section. Half of the respondents (N = 
237) were assigned to the above-described treatment meant to increase rural salience. The 
remaining half of the respondents (N = 258) were assigned to the control condition and 
did not receive any text. All respondents were given the two sets of three questions each 
to measure anti-intellectualism – the outcome variable – as well as rural identity strength. 
The rural identity strength here serves as a manipulation check to verify whether the 
treatment increased rural identity strength. The scale order was randomly presented; 
question wordings and scale reliability information can be found in the chapter appendix. 
The rural social identity strength scale has a Chronbach’s alpha of 0.90. The anti-
intellectualism scale has a Chronbach’s alpha of 0.54. Since this is a fairly low value, I 
repeat all analyses using the two-question anti-intellectualism scale, which has a 
Chronbach’s alpha of 0.71. 
This time I also compare objective rural residency with subjective self-identified 
residency. For objective rural residency, I merge the experimental data with rural-urban 
commuting area (RUCA) codes based on respondent zip code. Then, I created a binary 
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variable of non-rural residents similar to that used above. For the second subjective 
measure, respondents are also asked whether they grew up or currently live a rural area or 
small town. If they said yes to either question, they are counted as self-identified rural 
residents.  
Using these measures, rural identity strength and anti-intellectualism are 
moderately and positively correlated for self-identified rural respondents in the control 
condition only (0.27 for the three-item measure of anti-intellectualism, 0.26 for the two-
item measure). Conversely, rural residency is not at all correlated with anti-
intellectualism for those in the control group: for the three-item measure of anti-
intellectualism, the correlation is -0.05 for the self-described rural residency measure and 
0.03 for the RUCA measure. Using the two-item measure of anti-intellectualism, the 
correlation is -0.10 and -0.01 for the RUCA and self-described measures, respectively. 
These findings echo findings from above sections and hold when controlling for other 
factors (see Table A6.20 in the chapter appendix for details). This is again in line with 
expectations from H1a. 
Figure 6.2: Mean Anti-Intellectualism Scores for Rural Respondents Only (self-
identified) According to Experimental Treatment Group. 
 
 
Note: The left-hand graph shows the mean anti-intellectualism scores using all three anti-intellectualism 
questions; the right-hand graph shows the mean anti-intellectualism scores using the first two anti-
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intellectualism questions due to the third question significantly lowering the scale’s Cronbach’s alpha 
score (see above for details). The difference in means is statistically significant at p < 0.001 for both the 
left- and right-hand graphs. Data is unweighted (see Franco et al. 2017). Results for non-rural respondents 
can be found in the chapter appendix. 95% confidence intervals shown. 
 
Next, Figure 6.2 above presents the mean anti-intellectualism scores by 
experimental condition for subjective rural respondents. For the full three-item scale of 
anti-intellectualism (left side of graph), participants in the treatment condition have a 
mean score of 0.40, while those in the control have a mean score of 0.33; this difference 
in means is statistically significant (p > 0.001). Using only the two-item anti-
intellectualism scale yields similar results (right side) (p > 0.001). The Figure 6.2 results 
suggest that increasing rural salience for rural respondents increases anti-intellectualism, 
which is associated with rural identity. The treatment effect, however, does not extend to 
objective rural residents. The mean three-item anti-intellectualism score for objective 
rural residents is 0.38 in the control group and 0.42 in the treatment group (0.39 and 0.44 
respectively for the two-item anti-intellectualism measure). T-test results show that the 
difference in means is not statistically significant (p > 0.31 for both).  
In addition, rural identity strength among the treatment group was higher on 
average (0.55) than rural identity strength among the control group (0.48). The difference 
is statistically significant according to a t-test (p < 0.01). This serves as a manipulation 
check to verify that the treatment does indeed manipulate rural identity strength, 
suggesting that the treatment effectively makes rural identity more salient.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The above results suggest support for the main argument: rural identity – 
particularly positive in-group salience - relates to anti-intellectualism, or a dislike and 
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distrust of experts and intellectuals as a group. This, in turn, has important consequences 
for political attitudes, science communication, and public health: anti-intellectualism is 
associated with health and science misinformation endorsement. Indeed, in the above 
analyses, rural social identity also predicts such misinformation endorsement. In other 
words, negative affect toward intellectuals and experts as a group constitutes an out-
group for rural identifiers, and this sentiment is particularly linked with rural social group 
identification rather than just objective rural measurement. Additionally, this dynamic is 
specific to stronger rural identification and not any place-based affiliation, as suggested 
by the ANES data.  
Unlike in previous chapters, such as in Chapters 3 and 5, this analysis does not 
explore in-depth the difference between white and non-white rural respondents. This is 
because theoretically there should not be a racial difference in this relationship, and in 
Chapter 3, anti-intellectualism is linked with rural social identity for both whites and non-
whites. That said, it is unclear whether certain subgroups within rural identifiers, such as 
racial minorities or regional differences, adopt similar or different values.   
The results of this study imply that subjective rural identification matters in 
certain ways more than objective rural-urban designations; this is because the subjective 
rural identification encompasses a value or worldview not necessarily tied to current 
location. We must thus be choosey about how we measure rural-urban distinctions. These 
findings also have implications for the study of misinformation attitudes and for public 
health, as understanding underlying values and psychology is an important step in 
gathering more support for science-backed evidence. In the next chapter, I sum up the 
188 
 
findings from Chapters 3-6 and reiterate the main argument and conclusions presented. I 




CHAPTER 7: Conclusion 
 
 I argue here that rural identity in politics is misunderstood. First, rural identity is 
not mainly anti-urban sentiment, as I repeatedly demonstrated in Chapter 3. Nor is it 
interchangeable or contingent on white working class membership or identity, a position I 
start to develop in Chapter 3 and fully flesh out in Chapter 4. Rather, it is based more on 
positive in-group affect and symbolic status of the group. Second, the political 
implications of rural identity mostly hinge on its intermediate status position in society; it 
sees both lower-status groups, such as immigrants, as well as elites and experts as out-
groups to some capacity; such groups are urban-affiliated but not urban per se and map 
onto right-wing populism. Chapter 5, and Chapter 3 to a lesser extent, explore the nature 
of rural identity in relation to feelings toward immigrants and immigration policy. Most 
notably, making rural respect salient to rural residents – meant to increase the salience of 
rural social identification – significantly changes attitudes toward immigrants, while 
economic or racial demographic changes do not. These results suggest an affective 
relationship with immigrants as well as an in-group status-based concern. Finally, in 
Chapter 6 I examine the role of anti-intellectualism being a significant predictor of rural 
social identity strength, which I argue helps explain health and science misinformation 
endorsement. Again, this is based on making in-group respect salient, implying that in-
group symbolic status is what matters. 
 
Implications of These Findings 
 One of the biggest takeaways from the findings here is that rural – particularly 
rural identity - does not mean the white working class. These terms are often used 
interchangeably or automatically go together. At one point in time, this strong link was 
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warranted, such as considerations of rural consciousness during the Gilded Age. Such a 
practice used today however ignores that there are class-based differences and racial 
differences within rural America. Further, it downplays the significant aspect of symbolic 
and group-based underpinnings to rural public opinion.   
 In addition, this study provides a better understanding of why rural areas support 
populism and outsider candidates by providing an explanation rooted in group-based 
psychology. In doing so, it covers an element underexplored in previous studies of rural 
identity (Cramer 2012; 2016), which is negative out-group affect toward immigrants or 
other lower status groups. This study also sheds light on the urban-rural divide over an 
important topic – health and science attitudes and misinformation endorsement. Anti-
intellectualism is affiliated with rural social identity, thus linking a rural out-group with 
science-backed policy attitudes, making rural residents more susceptible to science and 
health misinformation endorsement. The relevance of this has been made painfully clear 
in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and the disparity in COVID-19 vaccine uptake, 
among other relevant topics (such as climate change and environmental attitudes).  
 Finally, my work here also contributes to the literature on how to measure and 
understand the urban-rural spectrum in political science and beyond. Thinking about rural 
areas as a social identity, rather than simply living in a rural area, may be a more relevant 
measure for opinions and behavior than other measures. This is because social identities 
are strongly held and come with a set of norms, values, and attitudes toward other groups. 
Further, they are subjectively held, and what may ultimately matter in public opinion is 
what people think regardless of objective reality.  
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Limitations and Future Directions 
This dissertation has a number of limitations, as well as avenues for future 
research. Methodologically speaking, I include a number of studies but many of these are 
cross-sectional – though I do include some experimental evidence and panel data, but 
more would be helpful - and many studies have a relatively small sample size. The latter 
has been one of the larger constraints to improving the findings presented here, as I detail 
a little more below.  
One big limitation of this study is investigating the role of race. Although I 
touched upon it here at various points, limited sample sizes mean that investigating the 
role of rural identity for non-whites is difficult to do. Much of the analyses in Chapter 3 
found that respondent race made little difference in the associations found. This is 
somewhat contradictory with the findings in Chapter 5, where rural social identity 
strength was either uncorrelated or positively correlated with pro-immigrant sentiment for 
black rural respondents. Conversely, rural social identity strength for white rural 
respondents corresponds to harsher immigrant stances. However, even in these chapters, 
the non-white analysis either lumped all non-whites together, or only examined black and 
Hispanic rural respondents due to the small number of other racial groups (Native 
Americans, Asian Americans, etc.) This is not a sufficient examination of the intersection 
of race and rurality; an excellent continued course of study would be to examine non-
white rural identity further. Such an investigation would also help isolate the rural-
specific element to rural identity, rather than confounding elements of rural identity with 
those of whiteness. 
Another is the role of regional or state differences. In preliminary analyses of 
much of the work done here, regional differences in the rural identity or its relationships 
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did not seem to occur. However, I am again limited by the sample size of many of these 
studies. Ideally, state-level analyses of rural identity would be fruitful in understanding 
how well studies such as Cramer’s (2016) or Hochschild’s (2016) – which were confined 
to specific states – would apply cross-nationally. 
This study also does not compare a metro social identity to a rural social identity. 
In preliminary analyses of the present study, it was found that a metro identity does not 
significantly predict the same things that a rural identity does. I chose to hone in 
specifically on rural identity here because stronger theoretical expectations associated 
with it have already occurred. In addition, other scholars are working on studies that 
examine whether suburban identity exists and is politically relevant in the United States. 
Still another limitation – and direction for future research – is the role of 
partisanship and rural identity. Partisanship has less of a role in rural identity than 
expected when looking at regression analyses. However, it could still be the case that 
rural identity is different for Republicans versus Democrats. A little of this was seen in 
Chapter 5, which found that white rural Democrats behaved differently than others. 
Again, sample size had some role to play in this omission, as well as space. I have done 
some initial exploration into partisanship and rural identity using cross-lagged analysis 
and experimental data, but decided not to include it here because rural identity and 
partisanship have a relationship that is both conceptually and empirically messy and 
inconsistent. 
Another avenue for future study would be to investigate how rural identity matters 
politically outside the U.S.; many industrialized and non-industrialized countries have an 
urban-rural divide, and looking at rurality from a social identity perspective may shed 
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some light onto these political divisions. Rural identity, as it is conceptualized here and 
within existing literature in political science, may especially apply to other Western 
countries that have experienced right-wing populism in recent years (such as Canada, 
Europe, etc.).  
Finally, another area of continued study would be to examine how media maps 
rural social identity onto the political realm. As noted in Chapter 5, political news often 
use rural imagery to convey political opinions and policy stances. Such cues would 
appeal to the in-group as well as help shape what rural in-group political norms are.  
This dissertation is meant to further our understanding of rural politics, rural 
identity, and the urban-rural divide in American politics. As mentioned in the 
introduction, it has been my aim to present rural identity objectively without falling back 
on stereotypes of rural areas, whether they be positive (the morally correct victims), 
negative (backwards bigots), or mixed (the white working class). Though there are many 
aspects left unexplored, it is hopefully a useful stepping stone to scholars and the field in 
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CHAPTER 2 APPENDIX: The Urban-Rural Divide and Rural Identification as “the 
People  
 
Defining and Measuring “Rural” versus “Urban” 
It is first important to clarify what I mean by “rural” and “urban.” There are 
various ways to define and measure these terms, and decades of academic research by 
political scientists, sociologists, demographers, geographers, and other scholars have 
debated the best way to do so (Hart et al. 2005; Miller & Luloff 1981; Nemerever and 
Rogers 2021). Researchers often use definitions and quantitative scales created by 
government agencies based on objective criteria, such as population density, population 
size, and distance from metropolitan centers. For instance, the U.S. Census Bureau relies 
on population density to define various categories. The metropolitan categories include 
urban areas – areas of over 50,000 people - and urban clusters - areas between 2,500 and 
50,000 people. Anything not within these designations is rural (Ratcliffe et al. 2016) 
According to this measurement, around 19% of U.S. residents lived in rural areas in 
2010. 
Another way of quantitatively measuring the rural-urban continuum is by using 
county-level designations developed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Economic 
Research Services. Under this measurement, labor market areas are used to define larger 
and smaller urbanized centers, with rural areas being areas outside these centers 
(Cromartie & Parker 2019). This measurement recognizes urbanized counties as densely-
populated areas with 50,000 or more people, with another category - outlying counties – 
defined as commuting counties where at least 25% of the workers living in the county 
commute to the central urbanized counties. Non-metro counties are areas outside of these 
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two zones and are further divided into micropolitan areas – settlement clusters between 
10,000 and 49,999 people per county – with similar outlying counties. Anything outside 
of these designations is considered noncore or rural areas. Finally, the Office of 
Management and Budget also developed a quantitative measure of the rural-urban 
continuum called Core-Based Statistical Areas, which are based on these other two 
quantitative measures. Under this measure, central counties are those with at least one 
urbanized area (as defined by the Census Bureau’s coding), and with outlying counties 
where at least 25% of the workforce commutes to that central county. Anything not part 
of these urbanized areas are rural, and rural areas are further divided into two levels. 
Micropolitan areas of counties have 10,000 to 50,000 residents, while everywhere else is 
considered a non-core county (Mulvaney 2018). Although these different measures have 
much conceptual overlap between them (see Figure A2.1 for a visual comparison 
between the USDA and Census definitions), these different taxonomies produce a wide 
range of what percent of the population is rural. Using 2000 Census data, the U.S. 
population was anywhere between 10% and 28% of the national total using various 
definitions (Hart et al. 2005).  
In addition, some scholars simply use population density to measure the rural-
urban divide (Rodden 2019). Using population density, or the total population divided by 
the land area of a given geographic unit, it is not an entirely accurate quantitative measure 
however. For instance, an urban center in a large county could have the same county 
population density as a county with a handful of small towns in rural Wisconsin (Goodall 
et al. 1998; Hall et al. 2006).  
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Another way to look at what constitutes “rural” or “urban” is a subjective 
definition; these terms are whatever people believe they are, based on a set of individual-
level criteria. “Rural” often subjectively means isolation, low population density, or part 
of a small town, all of which are similar to the underpinnings of the quantitative measures 
listed above. Agriculture and large tracts of wilderness are also common associations 
with rural areas, as are certain stereotypes or sociocultural traits (Hart et al. 2005). For 
example, a rural culture could theoretically exist in an urban area.  
Figure A2.1: Side-by-side comparison of Census Bureau (left) and USDA (right) county 









Despite these differences in measuring rural and urban, they all have some 
commonalities. Rural is seen as encompassing places that are not urban or metropolitan, 
and urban or metropolitan is defined as either dense population centers, or as dense 
centers of labor and commerce. Therefore, “rural” constitutes lower population density 
and is associated with a certain type of isolation, either from economic centers or from 
large numbers of people. Furthermore, suburbs in these quantitative measures are seen as 
residential areas that are economically dependent on urban centers and are therefore more 
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associated with urban areas than rural areas. Politically speaking, suburbs have been 
increasingly voted more like urban areas than rural areas in the past couple decades 
(Parker et al. 2018). 
Given that the focus of much of my argument is based on individual self-
identification with rural or urban areas, subjective definitions of rurality matter in the 
context of this study. Therefore, I rely on subjective expressions of whether someone 
lives in a rural area or not for individual-level survey data responses relating to self-
identification. This has been recommended by other researchers in political science 
(Nemerever and Rogers 2021). However, I will also use the Rural-Urban Commuting 
Area (“RUCA”) codes developed by the USDA Economic Research Service and the 
University of Washington, which use Census tract levels (“fips” codes). This measure is 
useful in differentiating between rural areas that are or are not dependent economically 
on urban areas, which gives a better sense of not only economic isolation, but also 
cultural and social isolation. This measure is also very sensitive to demographic shifts, 
which is significant for determining the correlates of political outcomes. In addition, 
RUCA codes are easy to aggregate together given the multiple levels of rurality and are 
easy to convert to larger geographic levels of zip code or county, although this 
complexity can also be unwieldly at times (Hart et al. 2005). I anticipate that the 
combination of objective and subjective measures will provide a more rigorous 
determination of measuring rurality and metropolitan areas, especially since recent work 
in public health has found that rural self-identification is only moderately correlated with 
RUCA codes (Onega et al. 2019). 
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Finally, I at times use the terms “rural” and “urban”/ “metro” as if they were a 
binary distinction. This is primarily because subjectively, people see a difference between 
rural and metro as an in-group/out-group or “us versus them” dynamic. However, in 
practice and even among people subjectively, they will at other times see and measure 
these as endpoints of a continuum based on the designation of dense population clusters 
that denote large or small urban centers, with distance from dense population clusters 
determining the degree of ruralness. This comports with several prominent ways of 
measuring rural versus urban, as described above. Therefore, I use rural versus non-rural 
typically with language but note that there is more complexity to the designations. 
 
CHAPTER 3 APPENDIX: Correlates and Characteristics of Rural Identity  
 
Weights for Lucid data 
 

















Female 52% 52% 52% 51% 51% CPS 2017 
College 
Degree 
33% 35% 32% 34% 34% CPS 2017 




73% 66% 65% 62% 62% CPS 2017 
Hispanic 15% 14% 15% 15% 18% CPS 2017 
























 14% 16%  19% CPS 2017 
Democrat 45% 49% 39% 43% 49% ANES 
(Wgt.) 
Republican 43% 41% 36% 40% 39% ANES 
(Wgt.) 
Independent 12% 10% 26% 17% 8% ANES 
(Wgt.) 
N 940 531 825 492   
Note: Comparison of the study data to known population benchmarks. CPS = Current Population Survey 
(US Census, 2017). ANES = American National Election Study (2016). Although CPS is a better 
benchmark given its sample size and representativeness, I use weighted ANES data when CPS information 
is not available (CPS does not ask questions about Party ID). Weights in column two adjust for gender, 
education, race, age, and income. Party ID is not included in the weighting formula, and is shown only due 




Definitions of different RUCA code levels 
Primary RUCA Codes, 2010 
1    Metropolitan area core: primary flow within an urbanized area (UA) 
2    Metropolitan area high commuting: primary flow 30% or more to a UA 
3    Metropolitan area low commuting: primary flow 10% to 30% to a UA 
4    Micropolitan area core: primary flow within an Urban Cluster of 10,000 to 49,999 (large UC) 
5    Micropolitan high commuting: primary flow 30% or more to a large UC 
6    Micropolitan low commuting: primary flow 10% to 30% to a large UC 
7    Small town core: primary flow within an Urban Cluster of 2,500 to 9,999 (small UC) 
8    Small town high commuting: primary flow 30% or more to a small UC 
9    Small town low commuting: primary flow 10% to 30% to a small UC 
10  Rural areas: primary flow to a tract outside a UA or UC 
99  Not coded: Census tract has zero population and no rural-urban identifier information 
 
Rural and Metro Affective Measure Correlations 
 




















0.70 -     
Rural: 
Afraid 
0.69 0.65 -    
Rural: 
Proud 
0.16 0.21 0.15 -   
Rural: 
Happy 
0.03 0.12 0.07 0.73 -  
Rural: 
Hopeful 
0.04 0.09 0.11 0.65 0.77 - 
 















-      
Metro: 
Resentful 
0.68 -     
Metro: 
Afraid 
0.63 0.64 -    
Metro: 
Proud 
0.17 0.22 0.16 -   
Metro: 
Happy 
0.05 0.16 0.13 0.75 -  
Metro: 
Hopeful 
0.04 0.11 0.14 0.70 0.76 - 
 
Study 3 Distributions of Rural Identity Strength Measure  
 












N = 491, mean = 0.58, standard deviation = 0.27 
 
Figure A3.3: Rural social identity strength distributions for self-identified rural 
respondents (left) and self identified non-rural respondents (right). 
 
Left: N = 437, mean = 0.62, standard deviation = 0.27; Right: N = 144, mean = 0.47, 0.25. Means are 
statistically distinct according to a two-tailed t-test between group means where the null hypothesis is the 








Figure A3.4: Rural social identity strength distributions for rural respondents only 
(RUCA scores) versus non-rural respondents only (RUCA scores). 
Left: N = 116, mean = 0.62, standard deviation = 0.28; Right: N = 375, mean = 0.56, 0.27. Means are 
statistically distinct according to a two-tailed t-test between group means where the null hypothesis is the 




Figure A3.5: Rural social identity strength distributions for those who 1) grew up rural 
AND live in a rural area now (self-identified), 2) grew up rural only (self-identified), 3) 
did not grow up in a rural area but live in a rural area now (self-identified) 
  
 
1) N = 265 , mean = 0.62, standard deviation = 
0.28; 2): N = 144, mean = 0.47, standard deviation 








Correlations between Rural Identity Strength and Income/Education Level 
 
Table A3.4: Rural identity strength and income/education correlations, by rural 
















Income 0.08 -0.12 0.02 0.07 0.14 
Education 
Level 
0.00 -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 0.05 
Note: +Non-rural here means that the respondent said they do not live in a rural area and they did not grow 
up in a rural area. Sample sizes vary: 105 < N < 406.  
 
Respondent Distribution of Partisan Identity and Rurality  
 
















Democrat 76 22 98 210 177 
Pure 
Independent 
25 9 28 41 30 
Republican 113 53 120 178 144 
Note: +Non-rural here means that the respondent said they do not live in a rural area and they did not grow 




Race/ethnicity and Rurality Means and Distributions 
 
















White 177 74 187 303 245 
Black 15 2 22 55 44 
Hispanic 21 9 26 54 47 
Note: +Non-rural here means that the respondent said they do not live in a rural area and they did not grow 
up in a rural area. A table showing the number of respondents in each cell can be found in the appendix. 
 



















White 0.60 0.58 0.59 0.37 0.27 
Black 0.51 0.58 0.47 0.26 0.19 
Hispanic 0.63 0.49 0.64 0.43 0.35 
 
 
Question Wording Information (Questions Not Described in the Main Text Only) 
 
Racial Resentment 
The racial resentment scale is based on the four racial resentment items found in the 
American National Election Studies, the wording of which is as follows: 
1. Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked 
their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.  
2. It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only 
try harder they could be just as well off as whites. 
3. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.  (R) 
4. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it 
difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class. (R) 
Each item has a seven-point response option Likert scale ranging from “Strongly Agree” 
to “Strongly Disagree.” These items were averaged together to create a racial resentment 
score for each respondent, which was recoded to run from zero to one. The interitem 
covariance for these four items in the Study 3 data is 0.05, while the scale reliability 
coefficient is 0.77. 
 
White Identity 
The white identity scale is based on the three white identity questions used by Jardina 
(2019). These three questions are as follows: 
1. How strongly do you identify with white people? 
a. Not at all 
b. A little bit 
c. Somewhat 
d. A lot 
2. How important is being white to your identity? 
a. Not at all important 
b. Slightly important 
c. Moderately important 
d. Very important 
e. Extremely important 
3. How close do you feel to whites in terms of interests? 
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a. Not at all close 
b. A little close 
c. Moderately close 
d. Very close 
e. Extremely close 
These items were averaged together to create a white identity score for each respondent, 
which was recoded to run from zero to one. The interitem covariance for these three 
items in the Study 3 data is 3.25, while the scale reliability coefficient is 0.44. 
 
Ethnocentrism 
The ethnocentrism scale here was based on the one created by Kinder and Kam (2009). 
Respondents were asked to rate whites and blacks as groups using feeling thermometers 
that ranged from 0 (cold) to 100 (warm). Then, I subtracted feelings toward blacks from 
feelings toward whites to create the ethnocentrism scale for white respondents. This scale 
was then recoded to run from zero to one. The mean for white respondents is 0.52, with a 
standard deviation of 0.13. 
 
Social Dominance Orientation 
The Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) scale is based on several questions converted 
into an additive index. These questions were asked as followed: 
“Please indicate the extent to which you oppose or favor the following statements: 
A. An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom. 
B. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups. 
C. No one group should dominate in society. (Reverse coded) 
D. Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top. (Reverse coded) 
E. Group equality should not be our primary goal. 
F. It is unjust to try to make groups equal. 
G. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups. (Reverse 
coded) 
H. We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed. (Reverse coded)” 
Each statement had a six-point response scale, with responses including “strongly 





The authoritarianism measure is based on the childrearing index, and is formed by 
creating an additive scale of these four questions. The questions were phrased as followed 
(response options in italics): 
“Please read each pair of qualities that children might have, and indicate which of the two 
is the most desirable quality for a child to have: 




b. Respect for elders 
2. Obedience or self-reliance? 
a. Obedience 
b. Self-reliance 
3. Curiosity or good manners? 
a. Curiosity 
b. Good manners 
4. Being considerate or well-behaved? 
a. Considerate 
b. Well-behaved” 
Respondents received one point each for the following responses: 1.b., 2.a., 3.b., 4.b. 
 
Openness to Experience 
A. How well do the following traits describe you? 
a. Love art, music, literature 
b. Little interest in abstract ideas (reverse coded) 
c. Original; creative 
 
Need for Cognitive Closure 
A. Please state the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements. 
a. I don’t like situations that are uncertain. 
b. I feel uncomfortable when I don’t understand the reason why an event 
occurred in my life. 
c. I don’t like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from 
it. 
d. I don’t like to be with people who are capable of unexpected actions. 
e. I dislike it when a person’s statement could mean many different things. 
f. I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life. 
Response options included “Strongly agree,” “agree,” “somewhat agree,” “neither 
agree nor disagree,” “somewhat disagree,” “disagree,” “strongly disagree.” These 
questions were combined into an additive index. 
 
Income Level (Embedded data from Lucid) 
A. What is your current annual household income before taxes? 
[1] Less than $14,999 
[2] $15,000 to $19,999 
[3] $20,000 to $24,999 
[4] $25,000 to $29,999 
[5] $30,000 to $34,999 
[6] $35,000 to $39,999 
[7] $40,000 to $44,999 
[8] $45,000 to $49,999 
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[9] $50,000 to $54,999 
[10] $55,000 to $59,999 
[11] $60,000 to $64,999 
[12] $65,000 to $69,999 
[13] $70,000 to $74,999 
[14] $75,000 to $79,999 
[15] $80,000 to $84,999 
[16] $85,000 to $89,999 
[17] $90,000 to $94,999 
[18] $95,000 to $99,999 
[19] $100,000 to $124,999 
[20] $125,000 to $149,999 
[21] $150,000 to $174,999 
[22] $175,000 to $199,999 
[23] $200,000 to $249,999 
[24] $250,000 and above 
 
Education Level (Embedded data from Lucid) 
A. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
[1] 3rd Grade or less 
[2] Middle School – Grades 4 – 8 
[3] Completed some high school 
[4] High school graduate 
[5] Other post high school vocational training 
[6] Completed some college, but no degree 
[7] Associate Degree 
[8] College Degree (such as B.A., B.S.) 
[9] Completed some graduate, but no degree 
[10] Masters degree 
[11] Doctorate degree 
*[12] None of the Above 
 
*Note: Option 12 changed to missing  
 
Subjective Class, August 2019 data only 
A. Which socio-economic class do you consider yourself to be now? 
[1] Poor 
[2] Working Class 
[3] Middle Class 
[4] Upper Class 
[5] Rich 
 
Political Interest  
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A. How often do you pay attention to politics and elections? 
[1]  Always 
[2]  Most of the time 
[3]  About half the time 
[4]  Sometimes 
[5]  Never 
 
B. How interested are you in information about what’s going on in government and 
politics? 
[1]  Extremely interested 
[2]  Very interested 
[3]  Somewhat interested 
[4]  Slightly interested 




A. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a 
Democrat, and Independent, or what? 
[1]  Republican 
[2]  Democrat 
[3]  Independent 
[4]  Other party 
 
B. (Only if Answered [2]  to question A): Would you call yourself a strong Democrat 
or a not very strong Democrat? 
[1]  Strong Democrat 
[2]  Not very strong Democrat 
 
C. (Only if Answered [1]  to question A): Would you call yourself a strong 
Republican or a not very strong Republican? 
[1]  Strong Republican 
[2]  Not very strong Republican 
 
D. (Only if Answered [3]  or [4]  to question A): Do you think of yourself as closer 
to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party? 
[1]  Democratic 
[2]  Republican 






A. We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a seven-
point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from 
extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on 
this scale? 
 
[1] Extremely liberal 
[2] Somewhat liberal 
[3] Slightly liberal 
[4] Moderate 
[5] Slightly conservative 
[6] Somewhat conservative 





Respondents first answered the following question: 
A. What is your current employment status? 
a. Employed full time 
b. Employed part time 
c. Unemployed looking for work 
d. Unemployed not looking for work 
e. Retired 
f. Student  
g. Disabled/On Disability 
 
If respondents answered c or d, they were given a value of “1” for the unemployed 












A. How often do you attend religious services in a given year? 
a. Never 
b. Less than once a year 
c. Several times a year 
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d. Once a month 
e. 2-3 times a month 
f. About weekly 
g. Once a week 





A. How religious do you consider yourself? 
a. Very religious 
b. Pretty religious 
c. Moderately religious 
d. Slightly religious 
















Part 1: Political Anti-Elitism 
A. How much do you agree?:  People like me don't have much say in what 
government does. (Response options: 7-point scale from “strongly agree” to 
“strongly disagree”) 
B. How much do you agree?:  Politics usually boils down to a struggle between 
the people and the powerful. (Response options: 7-point scale from “strongly 
agree” to “strongly disagree”) 
C. How much do you agree?:  The system is stacked against people like me. 
(Response options: 7-point scale from “strongly agree” to “strongly 
disagree”) 
D. Fill in the blank. People at the top usually get there because they 
______________. (response options: “have talent and hard work” or “had 
some unfair advantage”) 
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E. How much do you agree?:  Politics is ultimately a struggle between good and 
evil. (response options: “have talent and hard work” or “had some unfair 
advantage”) 
 
Part 2: Anti-Intellectualism/Anti-Expert 
A. How much do you agree?:  I'd rather put my trust in the wisdom of ordinary 
people than in the opinions of experts and intellectuals. (Response options: 7-
point scale from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”) 
B. How much do you agree?:  When it comes to really important questions, scientific 
facts don't help very much. (Response options: 7-point scale from “strongly 
agree” to “strongly disagree”) 
C. How much do you agree?:  Ordinary people can really use the help of experts to 
understand complicated things like science. (Response options: 7-point scale from 
“strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”) (Reverse coded) 
Scales recoded so higher values indicate more populist opinions. 
 
Average Scores on Racial Attitude Measures by Population Density Measures 
 
Table A3.8: Racial attitudes or traits for white respondents, by rural residency (Study 3 
data). 



















0.55 0.59 0.61 0.57 0.53 0.59 
Ethnocentrism 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.53 0.52 




0.36 0.37 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.38 
Authoritarianism 0.52 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.51 0.56 
Note: +Non-rural here means that the respondent said they do not live in a rural area and they did not grow 
up in a rural area. Ethnocentrism and racial resentment correlation coefficient (for white respondents) = 
0.38. Information on the ethnocentrism, racial resentment, white identity, social dominance orientation, and 
authoritarianism scales can be found in the appendix.  
 
Table A3.9: Rural identity means, rural residency, and racial attitudes or traits for white 
respondents (Study 3 data). 



















0.19 0.14 0.06 0.21 0.21 0.17 
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Ethnocentrism 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.04 




0.27 0.23 0.28 0.30 0.27 0.26 
Authoritarianism 0.23 0.19 0.26 0.22 0.21 0.16 
Note: +Non-rural here means that the respondent said they do not live in a rural area and they did not grow 
up in a rural area. Ethnocentrism and racial resentment correlation coefficient (for white respondents) = 
0.38. Information on the ethnocentrism, racial resentment, white identity, social dominance orientation, and 
authoritarianism scales can be found in the appendix.  
 
Table A3.10: Trump support and rural identity strength bivariate logit regressions, 
Study 3 data, non-white rural respondents only. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Trump vote = 1 Party ID Symbolic Ideology 
 b/se b/se b/se 
    
Rural Identity 
Strength 
5.25* 0.27 0.39* 
 (2.09) (0.18) (0.17) 
Constant -4.86*** 0.19 0.20* 
 (1.21) (0.11) (0.08) 
r2  0.03 0.12 
N 51.00 49.00 51.00 
Standard errors in parentheses. All variables standardized from zero to one. Samples weighted to general population. 
Significance: * p > 0.05, ** p > 0.01, *** p > 0.001. 
 
 
Table A3.11: Predicting populism: anti-expert scale (anti-intellectualism), Survey 3 
data. 
 















Rural ID Str. 0.19*** 0.16** 0.34** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.11) 
Party Identity - - - 
    
Rural ID X 
Party ID 
- - - 
    
Constant 0.30*** 0.32*** 0.30*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) 
r2 0.08 0.05 0.20 
N 226.00 175.00 51.00 
Standard errors in parentheses. All variables standardized from zero to one. Samples weighted to general population. 






Table A3.12: Predicting populism: anti-political elites scale, Survey 3 data. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 






 Rural residents (self-
id) 
Rural residents (self-
id) and white 
Rural residents (self-
id) and non-white 
Rural Identity 
Strength 
0.14 0.10 0.36 
 (0.18) (0.20) (0.34) 
Constant 1.18*** 1.19*** 1.14*** 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.15) 
r2 0.00 0.00 0.02 
N 226.00 175.00 51.00 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. All variables standardized from zero to one. Samples weighted to general 







CHAPTER 4 APPENDIX: Rurality, Rural Identity, and Economic Indicators  
Weights for Lucid data 
 












Female 51% 52% 50% 52% 51% CPS 2017 
College 
Degree 
42% 34% 31% 33% 34% CPS 2017 
Black 11% 13% 12% 13% 12% CPS 2017 
White  73% 67% 79% 77% 69% CPS 2017 
Hispanic 12% 17% 16% 15% 18% CPS 2017 



























32% 34% 32% 33% 28% ANES 
(Wgt.) 
Independent 27% 25% 27% 26% 32% ANES 
(Wgt.) 
N 506 506 819 819   
Note: Comparison of the study data to known population benchmarks. CPS = Current Population Survey 
(US Census, 2017). ANES = American National Election Study (2016). Although CPS is a better 
benchmark given its sample size and representativeness, I use weighted ANES data when CPS information 
is not available (CPS does not ask questions about Party ID). Weights in column two adjust for gender, 
education, race, age, and income. Party ID is not included in the weighting formula, and is shown only due 
to the potential interests of those who might use or otherwise consume this data.  
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Definitions of different RUCA and RUCC code levels 
Primary RUCA Codes, 2010 
1    Metropolitan area core: primary flow within an urbanized area (UA) 
2    Metropolitan area high commuting: primary flow 30% or more to a UA 
3    Metropolitan area low commuting: primary flow 10% to 30% to a UA 
4    Micropolitan area core: primary flow within an Urban Cluster of 10,000 to 49,999 (large 
UC) 
5    Micropolitan high commuting: primary flow 30% or more to a large UC 
6    Micropolitan low commuting: primary flow 10% to 30% to a large UC 
7    Small town core: primary flow within an Urban Cluster of 2,500 to 9,999 (small UC) 
8    Small town high commuting: primary flow 30% or more to a small UC 
9    Small town low commuting: primary flow 10% to 30% to a small UC 




2013 Rural-urban Continuum Codes   
Metropolitan Counties* 
Code Description 
1 Counties in metro areas of 1 million population or more 
2 Counties in metro areas of 250,000 to 1 million population 
3 Counties in metro areas of fewer than 250,000 population   
Nonmetropolitan Counties 
Code Description 
4 Urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metro area 
5 Urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metro area 
6 Urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metro area 
7 Urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to a metro area 
8 
Completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metro 
area 
9 
Completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a 
metro area 




* Note: Metropolitan areas are based on the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
delineation as of February 2013. 
Note: The Rural-Urban Commuting Area (“RUCA”) codes developed by the USDA 
Economic Research Service and the University of Washington, which use Census tract 
levels (“fips” codes). This measure is useful in differentiating between rural areas that are 
or are not dependent economically on urban areas, which gives a better sense of not only 
economic isolation, but also cultural and social isolation. This measure is also very 
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sensitive to demographic shifts, which is significant for determining the correlates of 
political outcomes. In addition, RUCA codes are easy to aggregate together given the 
multiple levels of rurality and are easy to convert to larger geographic levels of zip code 
or county, although this complexity can also be unwieldly at times (Hart et al. 2005). 
 
Question wordings - Lucid 
 
Feeling Toward Trump (DV) 
A. Next, we’d like to get your feelings toward some people and groups in the news 
these days. More positive values (toward the right end) mean you see that person 
or group more warmly. More negative values (toward the left end) mean you see 
that person or group more coldly. Zero means you are neutral toward that group 
or person. Please note that you must move the slider in order to record a response. 
a. Donald Trump 
 
 
Vote for Trump (2016) (DV) 
 




B. If yes to A above:  Which presidential candidate did you support in the 2016 
election? 
a. Donald Trump 
b. Hillary Clinton 
c. Gary Johnson 
d. Jill Stein 
e. Other Candidate 
 
Trust in Trump (DV), May 2019 data only 
A. Please rate how much you approve or disapprove of the following individuals or 
groups as a whole. 
a. Donald Trump 
[1] Greatly disapprove 
[2] Moderately disapprove 
[3] Slightly disapprove 
[4] Neither approve nor disapprove 
[5] Slightly approve 
[6] Moderately approve 
[7] Greatly approve 
 
Rural Location (Subjective) Questions 
A. Did you grow up in a small town or rural area? 
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[1]  Yes 
[2]  No 
 
B. Do you currently live in a small town or rural area? 
[1]  Yes 
[2]  No 
 
Rural Identity Strength Questions 
 Respondents only answered these questions if they chose “yes” to either of the 
rural identification questions above.  
 Question order was randomly assigned. 
A. How much is being from a small town or rural area part of your identity? 
[1]  A great deal 
[2]  A lot 
[3]  A moderate amount 
[4]  A little 
[5]  None at all 
 
B. How important is being a small town or rural resident to you? 
[1]  Extremely important 
[2]  Very important 
[3]  Moderately important 
[4]  Slightly important 
[5]  Not at all important 
 
C. How well does the term “small town or rural resident” describe you? 
[1]  Extremely well 
[2]  Very well 
[3]  Moderately well 
[4]  Slightly well 
[5]  Not well at all 
 
D. When talking about small town or rural residents, how often do you use “we” 
instead of “they”? 
[1]  Always 
[2]  Most of the time 
[3]  About half the time 
[4]  Sometimes 
[5]  Never 
 
E. To what extent do you think of yourself as being a small town or rural resident? 
[1]  A great deal 
[2]  A lot 
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[3]  A moderate amount 
[4]  A little 
[5]  None at all 
 
Income Level Question (Embedded data from Lucid) 
B. What is your current annual household income before taxes? 
[1] Less than $14,999 
[2] $15,000 to $19,999 
[3] $20,000 to $24,999 
[4] $25,000 to $29,999 
[5] $30,000 to $34,999 
[6] $35,000 to $39,999 
[7] $40,000 to $44,999 
[8] $45,000 to $49,999 
[9] $50,000 to $54,999 
[10] $55,000 to $59,999 
[11] $60,000 to $64,999 
[12] $65,000 to $69,999 
[13] $70,000 to $74,999 
[14] $75,000 to $79,999 
[15] $80,000 to $84,999 
[16] $85,000 to $89,999 
[17] $90,000 to $94,999 
[18] $95,000 to $99,999 
[19] $100,000 to $124,999 
[20] $125,000 to $149,999 
[21] $150,000 to $174,999 
[22] $175,000 to $199,999 
[23] $200,000 to $249,999 
[24] $250,000 and above 
 
Education Level (Embedded data from Lucid) 
B. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
[1] 3rd Grade or less 
[2] Middle School – Grades 4 – 8 
[3] Completed some high school 
[4] High school graduate 
[5] Other post high school vocational training 
[6] Completed some college, but no degree 
[7] Associate Degree 
[8] College Degree (such as B.A., B.S.) 
[9] Completed some graduate, but no degree 
[10] Masters degree 
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[11] Doctorate degree 
*[12] None of the Above 
 
*Note: Option 12 changed to missing  
 
Subjective Class Question, August 2019 data only 
B. Which socio-economic class do you consider yourself to be now? 
[1] Poor 
[2] Working Class 
[3] Middle Class 
[4] Upper Class 
[5] Rich 
 
Political Interest Questions 
C. How often do you pay attention to politics and elections? 
[1]  Always 
[2]  Most of the time 
[3]  About half the time 
[4]  Sometimes 
[5]  Never 
 
D. How interested are you in information about what’s going on in government and 
politics? 
[1]  Extremely interested 
[2]  Very interested 
[3]  Somewhat interested 
[4]  Slightly interested 
[5]  Not at all interested 
 
Party Identity Question 
 
E. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a 
Democrat, and Independent, or what? 
[1]  Republican 
[2]  Democrat 
[3]  Independent 
[4]  Other party 
 
F. (Only if Answered [2]  to question A): Would you call yourself a strong Democrat 
or a not very strong Democrat? 
[1]  Strong Democrat 




G. (Only if Answered [1]  to question A): Would you call yourself a strong 
Republican or a not very strong Republican? 
[1]  Strong Republican 
[2]  Not very strong Republican 
 
H. (Only if Answered [3]  or [4]  to question A): Do you think of yourself as closer 
to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party? 
[1]  Democratic 
[2]  Republican 
[3]  Neither 
 
Racial Resentment Questions 
A. Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and 
worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.  
[1] Agree strongly 
[2] Agree slightly 
[3] Neither agree nor disagree 
[4] Disagree slightly 
[5] Disagree strongly 
 
B. It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would 
only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. 
[1] Agree strongly 
[2] Agree slightly 
[3] Neither agree nor disagree 
[4] Disagree slightly 
[5] Disagree strongly 
 
C. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve. (R) 
 
[1] Agree strongly 
[2] Agree slightly 
[3] Neither agree nor disagree 
[4] Disagree slightly 
[5] Disagree strongly 
 
D. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it 
difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class. (R) 
 
[1] Agree strongly 
[2] Agree slightly 
[3] Neither agree nor disagree 
[4] Disagree slightly 
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B. We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a seven-
point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from 
extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on 
this scale? 
 
[1] Extremely liberal 
[2] Somewhat liberal 
[3] Slightly liberal 
[4] Moderate 
[5] Slightly conservative 
[6] Somewhat conservative 








Question wordings – ANES 
 
Vote for Trump 
 
Each respondent was randomly assigned to either Q1, Q2, or Q3. 
 
Q1. In 2016, the major candidates for president were Donald Trump for the Republicans 
and Hillary Clinton for the Democrats. In that election, did you definitely vote, definitely 
not vote, or are you not completely sure whether you voted? 
[1] Definitely voted  
[2] Definitely did not vote  
[3] Not completely sure  
 
Q2. In every state, the government keeps a record of who votes in an election. In the 2016 
presidential election, would the record show that you voted or that you did not vote?  
 [1] Voted 
 [2] Did not vote 
 
Q3. We talk to many people who tell us they did not vote. And we talk to a few people 
who tell us they did vote, who really did not. We can tell they did not vote by checking 
with official government records. What about you? If we check the official government 
voter records, will they show that you voted in the 2016 presidential election, or that you 
did not vote in this election?  
 [1] Voted 
 [2] Did not vote 
 
Q4. [If Q1=1 or Q2=1 or Q3=1 only] In the 2016 presidential election, who did you vote 
for? Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, or someone else? 
[1] Donald Trump  
[2] Hillary Clinton  
[3] someone else 
 
 
Place and Place Identity Questions: 
 
Q1. Do you currently live in a rural area, small town, suburb, or a city?  
[1] I currently live in a rural area  
[2]  I currently live in a small town   
[3] I currently live in a suburb  
[4] I currently live in a city 
Q2. Growing up, did you mostly live in a rural area, small town, suburb, or a city?  
[1] I grew up in a rural area  
[2] I grew up in a small town  
[3] I grew up in a suburb  
[4] I grew up in a city  
Q3.  How important is being a ‘[fill]’ to your identity?  
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Fill = [IF Q1 or Q2 <=4] [if Q1=1 or Q2=1 fill=”city person”; if Q1=2 or Q2=2 
fill = “suburb person”; if Q1=3 or Q2=3 fill = “small town person”; if Q1=4 or 
Q2=4 fill = “country (or rural) person”]  
[1]  Not at all important  
[2] A little important  
[3] Moderately important  
[4] Very important  
[5] Extremely important 
 
Income Question 
Q1.The next question is about [the total income of all the members of your family 
living  
here / your total income] in 2018, before taxes. This figure should include 
income from all sources, including salaries, wages, pensions, Social Security, 
dividends, interest, and all other income. What was [the total income in 2018 
of all your family members living here / your total income in 2011]? 
[1] Less than $10,000  
            [2] $10,000 - $19,999  
            [3] $20,000 - $29,999  
            [4] $30,000 - $39,999  
            [5] $40,000 - $49,999  
            [6] $50,000 - $59,999  
            [7] $60,000 - $69,999  
            [8] $70,000 - $79,999  
            [9] $80,000 - $99,999  
            [10] $100,000 - $119,999  
          [11] $120,000 - $149,999  
          [12] $150,000 - $199,999  
          [13] $200,000 - $249,999  
          [14] $250,000 - $349,999  
          [15] $350,000 - $499,999  
          [16] $500,000 or more  
          *[17] Prefer not to say  
 
*Note: Option 17 changed to missing  
 
Education Level Question 
Q1. What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you 
have received? 
[1] No HS degree 
[2] HS graduate 
[3] Some college 
[4] Two-year degree 
[5] Four-year degree 
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[6] Post-graduate degree 
 
Political Interest Question: 
Q1. Some people seem to follow what’s going on in government and public affairs most 
of the time, whether there’s an election going on or not. Others aren’t that interested. 
Would you say you follow what’s going on in government and public affairs most of the 
time, some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all?  
[1] Most of the time  
[2] Some of the time  
[3] Only now and then  
[4] Hardly at all  
 
Party Identity Question 
 
Q1a. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, 
and Independent, or what? 
[1]  Republican 
[2]  Democrat 
[3]  Independent 
[4]  Other party 
 
Q1b. (Only if Answered [2]  to question Q1a): Would you call yourself a strong 
Democrat or a not very strong Democrat? 
[1]  Strong Democrat 
[2]  Not very strong Democrat 
 
Q1c. (Only if Answered [1]  to question Q1a): Would you call yourself a strong 
Republican or a not very strong Republican? 
[1]  Strong Republican 
[2]  Not very strong Republican 
 
Q1d. (Only if Answered [3]  or [4]  to question Q1a): Do you think of yourself as closer 
to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party? 
[1]  Democratic 
[2]  Republican 
[3]  Neither 
 
Racial Resentment Questions 
A. Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and 
worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.  
[1] Agree strongly 
[2] Agree slightly 
[3] Neither agree nor disagree 
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[4] Disagree slightly 
[5] Disagree strongly 
 
B. It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would 
only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. 
[1] Agree strongly 
[2] Agree slightly 
[3] Neither agree nor disagree 
[4] Disagree slightly 
[5] Disagree strongly 
 
C. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve. (R) 
 
[1] Agree strongly 
[2] Agree slightly 
[3] Neither agree nor disagree 
[4] Disagree slightly 
[5] Disagree strongly 
 
D. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it 
difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class. (R) 
 
[1] Agree strongly 
[2] Agree slightly 
[3] Neither agree nor disagree 
[4] Disagree slightly 




A. We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a seven-
point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from 
extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on 
this scale? 
 
[1] Extremely liberal 
[2] Somewhat liberal 
[3] Slightly liberal 
[4] Moderate 
[5] Slightly conservative 
[6] Somewhat conservative 







Question wordings – CCES 
 
Location 
A. How would you describe the place where you live? 
[1] City  
[2] Suburb 





A. In the election for U.S. president, who did you vote for? 
 [1] Donald Trump 
 [2] Hillary Clinton 
 [3] Someone else 
 [4] I did not cast a vote for president 
 [5] I do not recall 
 
Symbolic Ideology 
A. In general, how would you describe your own political viewpoint? 
 [1] Very liberal 
 [2] Liberal 
 [3] Moderate 
 [4] Conservative 
 [5] Very conservative 
 [6] Not sure 
 
Party Identity Question 
 
Q1a. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, 
and Independent, or what? 
[1]  Republican 
[2]  Democrat 
[3]  Independent 
[4]  Other party 
 
Q1b. (Only if Answered [2]  to question Q1a): Would you call yourself a strong 
Democrat or a not very strong Democrat? 
[1]  Strong Democrat 




Q1c. (Only if Answered [1]  to question Q1a): Would you call yourself a strong 
Republican or a not very strong Republican? 
[1]  Strong Republican 
[2]  Not very strong Republican 
 
Q1d. (Only if Answered [3]  or [4]  to question Q1a): Do you think of yourself as closer 
to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party? 
[1]  Democratic 
[2]  Republican 
[3]  Neither 
 
 
Racial Resentment Questions 
A. Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and 
worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.  
[1] Agree strongly 
[2] Agree slightly 
[3] Neither agree nor disagree 
[4] Disagree slightly 
[5] Disagree strongly 
 
B. It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would 
only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. 
[1] Agree strongly 
[2] Agree slightly 
[3] Neither agree nor disagree 
[4] Disagree slightly 
[5] Disagree strongly 
 
C. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve. (R) 
 
[1] Agree strongly 
[2] Agree slightly 
[3] Neither agree nor disagree 
[4] Disagree slightly 
[5] Disagree strongly 
 
D. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it 
difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class. (R) 
 
[1] Agree strongly 
[2] Agree slightly 
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[3] Neither agree nor disagree 
[4] Disagree slightly 
[5] Disagree strongly 
 
Family Income 
A. Thinking back over the last year, what was your family’s annual income? 
[1] Less than $10,000 
[2] $10,000 - $19,999 
[3] $20,000 - $29,999 
[4] $30,000 - $39,999 
[5] $40,000 - $49,999 
[6] $50,000 - $59,999 
[7] $60,000 - $69,999 
[8] $70,000 - $79,999 
[9] $80,000 - $99,999 
[10] $100,000 - $119,999 
[11] $120,000 - $149,999 
[12] $150,000 - $199,999 
[13] $200,000 - $249,999 
[14] $250,000 - $349,999 
[15] $350,000 - $499,999 
[16] $500,000 or more 
 
Education Level 
A. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
[1] No HS 
[2] High school graduate 























Additional Analyses – Part I 
 
Table A4.2: Predicting self-reported vote for Trump in 2016, for all and only white 
respondents, with interactions between rural and class variables (using objective rural 
residency). Replication of Table 4.1 but with RUCC instead of rural self-identified. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
























       
Rural Res. 
(RUCC) 
1.37 7.34 1.90 2.99 0.75 1.16 
 (2.45) (11.24) (1.83) (2.58) (0.97) (1.29) 
Education 
Level 
1.43 1.51 - - 1.43 1.09 
 (1.14) (1.41)   (0.94) (0.79) 
College 
Degree+ 
- - 1.95 2.26 - - 
   (0.94) (1.39)   
Household 
Income 
0.76 1.12 0.57 0.66 0.65 1.04 
 (0.52) (0.82) (0.40) (0.52) (0.53) (0.88) 
Party ID 130.45*** 138.34*** 142.88*** 133.74*** 138.44*** 149.17*** 
 (91.50) (125.65) (101.88) (117.57) (102.18) (141.00) 
Symbolic 
Ideology 
1.74 2.08 1.30 1.49 1.75 1.99 
 (1.61) (2.21) (1.21) (1.62) (1.63) (2.17) 
Racial 
Resentment 
8.66** 12.55** 9.89** 16.31** 8.31** 12.48** 
 (6.59) (11.90) (7.29) (15.20) (6.38) (11.86) 
Black 0.32 - 0.32 - 0.31 - 
 (0.23)  (0.23)  (0.23)  
Hispanic 1.43 0.43 1.36 0.45 1.45 0.47 
 (0.82) (0.24) (0.80) (0.23) (0.83) (0.25) 
Male 2.16* 2.20+ 2.35* 2.42* 2.16* 2.13+ 
 (0.82) (0.99) (0.86) (1.04) (0.81) (0.94) 
Age 3.45 0.53 3.43 0.61 3.43 0.52 




0.81 0.05 - - - - 




- - 0.18 0.08 - - 




Note: + = p < 0.10, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001, standard errors in parentheses. Results are 
of logit models; odds ratios shown. Results in bold show statistical significance at p < 0.05; results in italics 
show marginal statistical significance at 0.10 > p > 0.05. All variables (independent and dependent) have 




Table A4.3: Predicting party identity strength (seven-point), for all and only white 
respondents, with interactions between rural and class variables. Corresponds to Table 
4.1 but with a different dependent variable. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 















0.06 0.17+ 0.07 0.13* 0.11* 0.13* 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
Education 
Level 
0.01 0.20 - - 0.03 0.16+ 
 (0.10) (0.13)   (0.08) (0.09) 
College 
Degree+ 
- - 0.00 0.07 - - 
   (0.05) (0.06)   
Household 
Income 
0.11 0.01 0.13+ 0.08 0.14 0.01 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.12) 
Symbolic 
Ideology 
0.63*** 0.66*** 0.62*** 0.63*** 0.63*** 0.66*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
Black -0.18*** - -0.20*** - -0.19*** - 
 (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  
Hispanic -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.11 -0.07 -0.08 
 (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.10) 
Female 0.09* 0.11** 0.09* 0.11** 0.10* 0.11* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Age -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) 
Rural X 
Education 
0.05 -0.08 - - - - 
 (0.13) (0.16)     
Rural X 
College 
- - 0.08 -0.00 - - 
   (0.08) (0.10)   
Rural X 
Income 
- - - - -0.07 -0.01 
     (0.13) (0.14) 
r2 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.36 
N 463.00 346.00 471.00 352.00 463.00 346.00 
Rural Res. 
X Income 
- - - - 4.19 2.63 
     (13.51) (8.42) 
Pseudo r2 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.52 
N 463.00 346.00 471.00 352.00 463.00 346.00 
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Note: + = p < 0.10, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001, standard errors in parentheses. Results are 
of OLS models. Results in bold show statistical significance at p < 0.05; results in italics show marginal 
statistical significance at 0.10 > p > 0.05. All variables (independent and dependent) have been recoded 




Table A4.4: Predicting party identity strength (seven-point), for rural (subjective) and 
white respondents, with interactions between rural and class variables. Corresponds to 
Table 4.2 but with a different dependent variable. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Party ID Party ID Party ID 
 Rural and White 
Respondents 
Rural and White 
Respondents 




-0.00 0.13 0.10 
 (0.14) (0.10) (0.13) 
Education Level -0.16 - 0.05 
 (0.19)  (0.08) 
College Degree+ - -0.13 - 
  (0.14)  
Household 
Income 
-0.06 0.01 -0.11 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.22) 
Symbolic 
Ideology 
0.12*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Hispanic 0.04** 0.03* 0.04** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Female 0.13* 0.15* 0.14* 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Age -0.01 -0.06 -0.05 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) 
Rural Identity X 
Education 
0.34 - - 
 (0.29)   
Rural Identity X 
College 
- 0.21 - 
  (0.25)  
Rural Identity X 
Income 
- - 0.13 
   (0.33) 
Constant -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 
 (0.13) (0.10) (0.13) 
r2 0.45 0.41 0.44 
N 168.00 170.00 168.00 
Note: + = p < 0.10, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001, standard errors in parentheses. Results are 
of OLS models. Results in bold show statistical significance at p < 0.05; results in italics show marginal 
statistical significance at 0.10 > p > 0.05. All variables (independent and dependent) have been recoded 






Table A4.5: Predicting Trump vote in 2016 using ANES data by rural identity strength 
and class measures for white respondents.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
















3.85*** 1.85 2.49* 1.66 4.81*** 1.72 
 (1.17) (0.92) (1.22) (1.27) (2.66) (1.56) 
Degree 
(BA/BS) 
0.62* 0.62 - - - - 
 (0.17) (0.28)     
Income - 0.81 - 0.82 2.52 0.78 
  (0.64)  (0.64) (1.53) (0.83) 
Education 
Level 
- - 0.25*** 0.38 - 0.41* 
   (0.11) (0.26)  (0.19) 
Age - 0.45 - 0.44 - 0.44 
  (0.37)  (0.36)  (0.36) 
Female - 0.72 - 0.72 - 0.72 
  (0.21)  (0.21)  (0.21) 
Party ID - 226.45*** - 236.07*** - 236.53*** 
  (128.32)  (136.00)  (136.29) 
Racial 
Resentment 
- 0.02*** - 0.02*** - 0.02*** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Political 
Interest 
- 0.85 - 0.87 - 0.88 
  (0.47)  (0.48)  (0.48) 
Rural ID X 
Degree 
0.78 0.88 - - - - 
 (0.45) (0.95)     
Rural ID X 
Education 
- - 2.19 1.21 - - 
   (1.99) (1.88)   
Rural ID X 
Income 
- - - - 0.68 1.16 
     (0.93) (2.70) 
Pseudo r2 0.04 0.60 0.05 0.60 0.04 0.60 






Figure A4.3: Respondent frequency of Trump and non-Trump voters by rural residency 






Table A4.6: Predicting 7-point party identity by rural residency (or rural identity 
strength) and self-identified class membership, for white respondents only. August 2019 
Lucid data. 
 Full Model: Without 
Controls: 
Full Model: Without 
Controls: 
Full Model: Without 
Controls: 



















0.10 0.08 - - - - 
 (0.09) (0.09)     
Rural Res. 
(Obj.) 
- -   0.23+ 0.11 
     (0.12) (0.12) 
Rural Identity 
Strength 
- - -0.26 -0.16 - - 
   (0.32) (0.39)   
Income -0.04 - 0.01 - -0.04 - 
 (0.08)  (0.11)  (0.07)  
Education 
Level 
-0.14+ - -0.36*** - -0.14+ - 
 (0.08)  (0.10)  (0.08)  
Age -0.17** - -0.13 - -0.17* - 
 (0.07)  (0.11)  (0.07)  
Hispanic -0.06 - -0.11 
(0.08) 
 
- -0.05 - 
 (0.04)    (0.04)  
Evangelical -0.04 - -0.02 - -0.05 - 
















Non-Trump Vote Trump Vote Non-Trump Vote Trump Vote




Ideology 0.69*** - 0.80*** - 0.68*** - 
 (0.07)  (0.10)  (0.06)  
Racial 
Resentment 
0.23*** - 0.14 - 0.25*** - 
 (0.06)  (0.10)  (0.06)  
Political 
Engagement 
0.07 - 0.04 - 0.07 - 
 (0.06)  (0.10)  (0.06)  
Working Class -0.01 0.03 -0.08 -0.07 0.04 0.05 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.18) (0.23) (0.06) (0.06) 
Middle Class 0.07 0.06 -0.05 -0.08 0.09 0.07 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.18) (0.22) (0.06) (0.06) 
Upper Class 0.14 0.09 0.29 0.21 0.19* 0.10 
 (0.09) (0.13) (0.23) (0.48) (0.09) (0.11) 
Rich 0.03 0.18 0.72** 0.44+ 0.01 0.04 
 (0.21) (0.19) (0.27) (0.25) (0.17) (0.15) 
Working Class 
X Rural (subj.) 
0.04 0.11 - - - - 
 (0.11) (0.11)     
Middle Class X 
Rural (subj.) 
-0.04 0.06 - - - - 
 (0.10) (0.11)     
Upper Class X 
Rural (subj.) 
0.09 -0.01 - - - - 
 (0.18) (0.19)     
Rich X Rural 
(subj.) 
-0.14 -0.32 - - - - 
 (0.31) (0.27)     
Working Class 
X Rural (obj.) 
- - - - -0.12 0.15 
     (0.14) (0.13) 
Middle Class X 
Rural (obj.) 
- - - - -0.19 0.08 
     (0.12) (0.13) 
Upper Class X 
Rural (obj.) 
- - - - -0.46* -0.39 
     (0.19) (0.27) 
Rich X Rural - - - - 0.00 0.00 
     (.) (.) 
Working Class 
X Rural ID Str. 
- - 0.35 0.37 - - 
   (0.35) (0.44)   
Middle Class X 
Rural ID Str. 
- - 0.32 0.47 - - 
   (0.35) (0.44)   
Upper Class X 
Rural ID Str. 
- - -0.21 0.45 - - 
   (0.50) (0.98)   
Rich X Rural 
ID Str. 
- - -1.26** -0.75+ - - 
   (0.39) (0.42)   
Constant 0.14 0.41*** 0.16 0.50* 0.16 0.44*** 
 (0.12) (0.06) (0.11) (0.20) (0.11) (0.05) 
r2 0.47 0.04 0.57 0.08 0.46 0.04 
N 567.00 593.00 169.00 172.00 567.00 593.00 
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Note: + = p < 0.10, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001, standard errors in parentheses. Results are 
of OLS models. Results in bold show statistical significance at p < 0.05; results in italics show marginal 
statistical significance at 0.10 > p > 0.05. All variables (independent and dependent) have been recoded 
from zero to one. Data weighted to population benchmarks. Lucid (August 2019) data used. 
 
 









Additional Analyses – Part II 
 
Table A4.7: Predicted change in percent of vote share for the Republican presidential 
candidate between 2008 and 2016, by metro and non-metro counties and change in 
median county income, among high-white population counties. Interaction’s marginal 
effects shown in Figure 3.7. 
 (1) 



















Note: only for counties with percent of county white population 87% of total or higher. p < 0.10, * = p < 
0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001, standard errors in parentheses. Results from OLS regression models. 
Results in bold show statistical significance at p < 0.05; results in italics show marginal statistical 







Additional Analyses – Part III 
 
Table A4.8: Mixed effects multilevel model results with interaction between rural 
identity strength, local income change, and rural residency (self-identified in Model 1 
and RUCA in Model 2). Lucid data (April 2019). 
 (1) (2) 
 Trump Vote 2016 Trump Vote 2016 








 (6.48) (4.13) 
Income Change 
X Rural Id. Str. 
3.34 -10.00 
 (13.14) (8.30) 
Rural (subj) -6.84 - 
 (5.24)  
Rural (sub) X 
Income 
14.51 - 
 (10.75)  
Rural (sub) X 
Rural Id. Str. 
19.10* - 
 (9.24)  
Rural (sub) X 
Rural Id. Str. X 
Income 
-35.78+ - 
 (18.89)  
Rural (objective) - -18.51+ 




  (20.16) 
Rural (objective) 
X Rural Id. Str. 
- 33.99* 
  (15.38) 
Rural (objective) 
X Rural Id. Str. X 
Income 
- -68.74* 
  (32.31) 
Constant -1.61+ -2.73+ 
 (2.52) (2.46) 
Level 2   
var(_cons[zip]) 3.12*** 3.32*** 
 (1.01) (1.07) 
N 349.00 349.00 
Note: + = p < 0.10, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001, standard errors in parentheses. Logit 
models. Results in bold show statistical significance at p < 0.05, results in italic show statistical 
significance at 0.10 > p > 0.05, results in regular font show statistically insignificant results. Models do not 





Figure A4.6: Interaction between rural identity strength, local income change, and 




Figure A4.7: Interaction between rural identity strength and local income change from 
















Table A4.9:  Mixed effects models predicting party identity strength and symbolic 
ideology, with weighted data, May 2019 Lucid data. 
 (1) (2) 
 Party Identity Symbolic Ideology 
   
Rural Soc. ID -0.35 6.77*** 
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 (0.62) (1.94) 
Zip code income 
change 
0.49 5.71** 
 (0.49) (1.93) 
Rural identity X Zip 
code inc. change 
-1.91* -12.74** 
 (0.83) (3.92) 
Constant -0.12 0.89 
 (0.22) (0.95) 
lns1_1_1   
_cons -1.79 -11.70 
 (1.37) (12.04) 
lns1_1_2   
_cons -1.69*** 0.15 
 (0.36) (0.10) 
lnsig_e   
_cons -1.16*** 0.16 
 (0.07) (0.09) 
N 464.00 485.00 
Note: + = p < 0.10, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001, standard errors in parentheses. Models 1 
and 2 show the results of mixed effects models. Results in bold show statistical significance at p < 0.05, 
results in italic show statistical significance at 0.10 > p > 0.05, results in regular font show statistically 
insignificant results. Models do not include control variables. All variables (independent and dependent) 
have been recoded from zero to one. Data weighted to population benchmarks.  
 
 
Figure A4.8: Interaction between rural identity strength and local income change from 














Figure A4.10: Interaction between rural identity strength and local income change from 


















Table A4.10: Mixed effects models predicting party identity strength, with an additional 
interaction term. Weights used; May 2019 Lucid data. 
 (1) (2) 
 Party ID Party ID 
 Weighted Unweighted 
   
Rural Soc. ID -0.35 -0.14 
 (0.62) (0.66) 
Zip code income change 0.49 0.35 
 (0.49) (0.48) 
Rural ID X Zip income change 0.89 0.42 
 (1.27) (1.32) 
Live in rural area -0.49 -0.39 
 (0.52) (0.52) 
Rural area X Rural ID 2.07* 1.72+ 
 (0.91) (0.94) 
Rural area X Zip income change 1.04 0.86 
 (1.10) (1.06) 
Rural area X Rural ID X Zip income 
change 
-3.98* -3.18+ 
 (1.91) (1.91) 
Constant 0.13 0.20 
 (0.24) (0.24) 
lns1_1_1   
_cons -1.68 -25.75 
 (1.46) (.) 
lns1_1_2   
_cons -1.81*** -26.52 
 (0.52) (.) 
lnsig_e   
_cons -1.16*** -1.00 
 (0.07) (.) 
N 464.00 464.00 
Note: + = p < 0.10, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001, standard errors in parentheses. Models 1 
and 2 show the results of mixed effects models. Results in bold show statistical significance at p < 0.05, 
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results in italic show statistical significance at 0.10 > p > 0.05, results in regular font show statistically 
insignificant results. Models do not include control variables. All variables (independent and dependent) 
have been recoded from zero to one. Data in model 1 weighted to population benchmarks. 
 
Figure A4.11: Interaction between rural identity strength and local income change for 







CHAPTER 5 APPENDIX: Immigrants as a Rural Identity Out-Group  
 
Weighted and Non-Weighted Sample Demographics 
 







   
Age (Avg) 51 yrs 49 yrs 
Female (%) 54 51 




Black  (%) 30 14 
Hispanic (%) 9 14 
White (%) 60 71 
Republican 29 47 
Democrat 55 37 
Independent/Other 16 6 
Weights created using “svywgt” function in Stata. 
 
Question Wordings: Wave 1 
 
Seven-Point Party Identity Strength: 
 Response Options:   N: 
1) Strong Democrat   811
  
2) Not very strong Democrat 294 
3) Lean Democrat   247 
4) Independent   423 
5) Lean Republican   184 
6) Not very strong Republican 158 
7) Strong Republican  414 
8) Not sure    84 
9) Don’t know   0 
 
Small Town or Rural Identity – Importance: 
 How important is being a small town or rural resident to you? 
 Response Options:   N: 
1) Extremely important  325 
2) Very important   467 
3) Moderately important  549 
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4) Slightly important   272 
5) Not at all important  1002 
 
Small Town or Rural Identity – Self View 
To what extent do you think of yourself as being a small town or rural resident? 
 Response Options:   N: 
1) A great deal   370 
2) Quite a bit    367 
3) Somewhat    530 
4) Very little    368 
5) Not at all    980 
 
Black Identity – Importance (if self-described respondent race is black): 
 How important is being black to you? 
 Response Options:   N: 
1) Extremely important  281 
2) Very important   81 
3) Moderately important  34 
4) Slightly important   21 
5) Not at all important  24 
 
Black Identity – Self View (if self-described respondent race is black): 
To what extent do you think of yourself as being black?: 
 Response Options:   N: 
1) A great deal   309 
2) Quite a bit    60 
3) Somewhat    37 
4) Very little    20 
5) Not at all    15 
 
Hispanic/Latino Identity – Importance (if self-described respondent race is 
Hispanic/Latino): 
 How important is being Hispanic/Latino to you? 
 Response Options:   N: 
1) Extremely important  47 
2) Very important   35 
3) Moderately important  19 
4) Slightly important   6 
5) Not at all important  13 
 
Hispanic/Latino – Self View (if self-described respondent race is Hispanic/Latino): 
To what extent do you think of yourself as being Hispanic/Latino?: 
 Response Options:   N: 
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1) A great deal   57 
2) Quite a bit    35 
3) Somewhat    16 
4) Very little    7 
5) Not at all    5 
White Identity – Importance (if self-described respondent race is white): 
 How important is being white to you? 
 Response Options:   N: 
1) Extremely important  135 
2) Very important   111 
3) Moderately important  186 
4) Slightly important   121 
5) Not at all important  334 
 
White Identity – Self View (if self-described respondent race is white): 
To what extent do you think of yourself as being white?: 
 Response Options:   N: 
1) A great deal   237 
2) Quite a bit    160 
3) Somewhat    206 
4) Very little    145 
5) Not at all    139 
 
Location Question – Small town or rural upbringing 
 
Did you grow up in a small town or rural area? 
 
 Response Options:   N: 
1) Yes     1226 
2) No     1389 
 
 
Location Question – Current small town or rural resident 
 
Do you currently live in a small town or rural area? 
 
 Response Options:   N: 
1) Yes     1150 
2) No     1465 
 
Immigration Attitude Question 
Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are allowed to come 
to the United States to live should be increased, decreased, or kept the same as it is now? 
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 Response Options:   N: 
1) Increased a lot   164 
2) Increased a moderate amount 210 
3) Increased a little   162 
4) Kept the same as it is now 540 
5) Decreased a little   136  
6) Decreased a moderate amount 97 




Question Wordings: Wave 3 
 
Seven-Point Party Identity Strength: 
 Response Options:   N: 
1) Strong Democrat   474 
2) Not very strong Democrat 170 
3) Lean Democrat   141 
4) Independent   240 
5) Lean Republican   97 
6) Not very strong Republican 83 
7) Strong Republican  230 
8) Not sure    36 
 
Small Town or Rural Identity – Importance: 
 How important is being a small town or rural resident to you? 
 Response Options:   N: 
1) Extremely important  174 
2) Very important   220 
3) Moderately important  347 
4) Slightly important   146 
5) Not at all important  584 
 
Small Town or Rural Identity – Self View 
To what extent do you think of yourself as being a small town or rural resident? 
 Response Options:   N: 
1) A great deal   191 
2) Quite a bit    200 
3) Somewhat    306 
4) Very little    223 




Location Question – Small town or rural upbringing 
 
Did you grow up in a small town or rural area? 
 
 Response Options:   N: 
1) Yes     684 
2) No     787 
 
 
Location Question – Current small town or rural resident 
 
Do you currently live in a small town or rural area? 
 
 Response Options:   N: 
1) Yes     641 
2) No     830 
 
Black Identity – Importance (if self-described respondent race is black): 
 How important is being black to you? 
 Response Options:   N: 
1) Extremely important  276 
2) Very important   77 
3) Moderately important  48 
4) Slightly important   11 
5) Not at all important  29 
 
Black Identity – Self View (if self-described respondent race is black): 
To what extent do you think of yourself as being black?: 
 Response Options:   N: 
1) A great deal   297 
2) Quite a bit    61 
3) Somewhat    50 
4) Very little    18 
5) Not at all    15 
 
Hispanic/Latino Identity – Importance (if self-described respondent race is 
Hispanic/Latino): 
 How important is being Hispanic/Latino to you? 
 Response Options:   N: 
1) Extremely important  53 
2) Very important   28 
3) Moderately important  19 
4) Slightly important   11 
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5) Not at all important  9 
 
Hispanic/Latino – Self View (if self-described respondent race is Hispanic/Latino): 
To what extent do you think of yourself as being Hispanic/Latino?: 
 Response Options:   N: 
1) A great deal   54 
2) Quite a bit    31 
3) Somewhat    18 
4) Very little    8 
5) Not at all    9 
White Identity – Importance (if self-described respondent race is white): 
 How important is being white to you? 
 Response Options:   N: 
1) Extremely important  132 
2) Very important   127 
3) Moderately important  226 
4) Slightly important   128 
5) Not at all important  274 
 
White Identity – Self View (if self-described respondent race is white): 
To what extent do you think of yourself as being white?: 
 Response Options:   N: 
1) A great deal   207 
2) Quite a bit    174 
3) Somewhat    226 
4) Very little    144 
5) Not at all    136 
 
Immigration Attitude Question 
Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are allowed to come 
to the United States to live should be increased, decreased, or kept the same as it is now? 
 Response Options:   N: 
1) Increased a lot   162 
2) Increased a moderate amount 206 
3) Increased a little   169 
4) Kept the same as it is now 558 
5) Decreased a little   108  
6) Decreased a moderate amount 91 








Table A5.4: Cross-lagged OLS regression models predicting rural identity (T2) and 




Note: * = p < 0.10, ** = p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01, standard errors in parentheses. Results in bold show 
statistical significance. All variables (independent and dependent) have been recoded from zero to one. 
Data weighted to T2 population benchmarks.  
 
Experimental Treatments and Variables 
 
Respondents were randomly assigned to one of four conditions for the experiment: the 
control condition, the economic condition, the respect condition, or the majority-minority 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Rural ID (T2) White-Hisp 
Ethnocentrism (T2) 
Rural ID (T2) Black-Hisp 
Ethnocentrism (T2) 
 Whites Whites Blacks Blacks 
Rural ID (T1) 0.74*** 0.01 0.67*** -0.03* 




0.09 0.58*** - - 




- - -0.01 0.61*** 
   (0.11) (0.06) 
Party ID 0.05 0.01 0.04 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) 
Symbolic 
Ideology 
0.00 0.05*** 0.10* -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) 
Hispanic 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.12 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.13) (0.17) 
Income -0.03 0.04* -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03) 
Education 
Level 
-0.07** -0.02 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
Age -0.06* -0.02 -0.17*** -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) 
Female 0.04** 0.00 0.02 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 
Constant 0.07* 0.18*** 0.17** 0.27*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.05) 
r2 0.67 0.49 0.51 0.38 
N 767.00 767.00 384.00 383.00 
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condition. Before being shown the statements for their respective conditions, respondents 
read a preamble worded as follows: 
On the next screen, you will read an excerpt of an article from a local newspaper. 
After you read the excerpt, please answer the questions. 
The following are the wordings for each experimental condition: 
 
Control Condition: 
New U.S. Census Bureau data suggest that the rate of geographical mobility, or 
the number of individuals who have moved within the past year, is increasing. 
The national mover rate increased from 11.9 percent in 2018 (the lowest rate since 
the U.S. Census Bureau began tracking the data) to 12.5 percent in 2019. 
According to the new data, 37.1 million people changed residences in the U.S. 
within the past year. 84.5 percent of all movers stayed within the same state. 
Renters were more than five times more likely to move than homeowners.  
 
Economic Condition: 
The nation is currently going through an economic downturn. However, the 
negative economic effects will be strongly felt in rural areas of the United States 
in particular. This is because rural areas have lagged behind non-rural areas in 
various economic indicators, such as wage growth, even during the 2010s when 
the rest of the country was doing well economically. In other words, many rural 
areas were never able to fully recover from the Great Recession in the late 2000s. 
The recent spike in unemployment and drop in retail spending is going to pile on 
to the economic issues rural areas already face. 
 
Respect Condition: 
Rural Americans are proud of their tight-knit communities, their hard work, their 
common sense, and their general way of life. However, many non-rural 
Americans look down on rural residents as being culturally uneducated and 
backwards, rather than appreciating or respecting their values and strengths. 
Popular depictions of hardworking small town residents are increasingly and 
unfairly being replaced by ignorant and racist country bumpkins. Recent polls 
suggest that a majority of rural residents in the U.S. feel disrespected and 
negatively stereotyped by society at large. Such a lack of respect and 
understanding of rural life comes at a detriment to our society. 
 
Majority-Minority Condition: 
New U.S. Census Bureau data suggest that America will become a “majority-
minority” nation much faster than once predicted – especially in rural areas, 
where racial and ethnic minority population growth is higher than average. The 
nation’s racial minority population is steadily rising, advancing an unmistakable 
trend that could make minorities the new American majority by midcentury. The 
data show a declining number of White adults and growing under-18 populations 
of Hispanics, Asians, and other minorities. Demographers calculate that by 2042, 
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Americans who identify themselves as Hispanic, Black, Asian, American Indian, 
Native Hawaiian, or Pacific Islander will together outnumber non-Hispanic 
Whites. The main reasons for the accelerating change are rapid immigration 
growth and significantly higher birthrates among racial and ethnic minorities. 
 
 
Attention Check Questions 
 If respondents received the control condition: 
True or false? According to the article you just read, Americans have been 
moving much less in the past couple years. 
 If respondents received the economic condition: 
True or false?: According to the article excerpt you just read, in the past 
decade rural areas on average have not completely recovered from the 
recession, in contrast to non-rural areas. 
 If respondents received the respect condition: 
True or false?: According to the article excerpt you just read, many rural 
residents feel as if they are disrespected by the rest of society. 
 If respondents received the majority-minority condition: 
True or false? According to the article excerpt you just read, minority 
population growth is higher in rural areas. 
 
Dependent Variable Questions (randomized order) 
Where would you rate the following people or groups, where 0 means that you 
feel extremely cold toward that group or person, and 100 means that you feel 
extremely warm toward that group or person? A score of 50 means you feel 




D. Undocumented Immigrants 
 
Other Experimental Results 
 
Figure A5.1: Experimental results (CSPP) for all (left) or white (right) respondents, with 




Figure A5.2: Experimental results (CSPP 2020) for all respondents who passed the 
attention check, with rurality determined by RUCA codes. 
 
 
Note: only includes respondents who passed the attention check. 
 
Table A5.4: Feelings toward undocumented immigrants by experimental treatment 
condition, for rural residents only (RUCA codes), by race and/or partisanship. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 






















0.05 0.14 -0.02 -0.12 
 (0.07) (0.16) (0.10) (0.13) 
Respect 
Condition 
0.12+ 0.04 0.09 0.13 




0.02 -0.09 -0.05 0.07 
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 (0.07) (0.16) (0.09) (0.11) 
Respondent 
Race White = 
1 
- -0.14 - - 
  (0.13)   
Economic X 
White 
- -0.15 - - 
  (0.18)   
Respect X 
White 
- 0.09 - - 
  (0.17)   
MM X White - 0.14 - - 
  (0.18)   
Independent - - -0.30** -0.29* 
   (0.11) (0.12) 
Republican - - -0.41*** -0.38*** 
   (0.09) (0.10) 
Economic X 
Independent 
- - 0.08 0.21 
   (0.18) (0.22) 
Economic X 
Republican 
- - 0.10 0.20 
   (0.13) (0.16) 
Respect X 
Independent 
- - 0.02 -0.05 
   (0.14) (0.17) 
Respect X 
Republican 
- - -0.06 -0.09 
   (0.13) (0.14) 
MM X 
Independent 
- - 0.08 -0.05 
   (0.15) (0.17) 
Respect X 
Republican 
- - 0.04 -0.09 
   (0.13) (0.14) 
Constant 0.34*** 0.47*** 0.59*** 0.57*** 
 (0.05) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) 
r2 0.02 0.07 0.35 0.37 
N 167.00 167.00 167.00 130.00 
Note: Passed attention check only. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 




CHAPTER 6 APPENDIX: Rural Identity and Anti-Intellectualism  
 
Section A Appendix: Non-Experimental Study 3 Lucid Data 
Sample characteristics and weighting information for Study 3 Lucid data 
 

















Note. Comparison of the study’s Lucid data to known population benchmarks. CPS = Current 
Population Survey (US Census, 2017). ANES = American National Election Study (2016). 
Although CPS is a better benchmark given its sample size and representativeness, I use weighted 
ANES data when CPS information is not available (CPS does not ask questions about Party ID). 
Weights in column two adjust for gender, education, race, age, and income. Party ID is not 
included in the weighting formula, and is shown only due to the potential interests of those who 
might use or otherwise consume this data. N = 825. 
 
 
Definitions of different RUCA code levels 
Primary RUCA Codes, 2010 
1    Metropolitan area core: primary flow within an urbanized area (UA) 
2    Metropolitan area high commuting: primary flow 30% or more to a UA 
3    Metropolitan area low commuting: primary flow 10% to 30% to a UA 
4    Micropolitan area core: primary flow within an Urban Cluster of 10,000 to 49,999 (large UC) 
5    Micropolitan high commuting: primary flow 30% or more to a large UC 
6    Micropolitan low commuting: primary flow 10% to 30% to a large UC 
7    Small town core: primary flow within an Urban Cluster of 2,500 to 9,999 (small UC) 
8    Small town high commuting: primary flow 30% or more to a small UC 
9    Small town low commuting: primary flow 10% to 30% to a small UC 






Female 51% 52% 52% CPS 2017 
College 
Degree 
31% 32% 30% CPS 2017 
Black 13% 13% 12% CPS 2017 
White 66% 65% 65% CPS 2017 
Hispanic 16% 15% 15% CPS 2017 
Democrat 39% 39% 34% ANES (Wgt.) 
Republican 35% 36% 28% ANES (Wgt.) 
Independent 26% 26% 32% ANES (Wgt.) 
Mean Age 47 47 47 ANES (Wgt.) 
Median 
Income 
$55-59,999 $60-64,999 $ 55-59,999 ANES (Wgt.) 
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10  Rural areas: primary flow to a tract outside a UA or UC 
99  Not coded: Census tract has zero population and no rural-urban identifier information 
 
Note: The Rural-Urban Commuting Area (“RUCA”) codes developed by the USDA Economic 
Research Service and the University of Washington, which use Census tract levels (“fips” codes). 
This measure is useful in differentiating between rural areas that are or are not dependent 
economically on urban areas, which gives a better sense of not only economic isolation, but also 
cultural and social isolation. This measure is also very sensitive to demographic shifts, which is 
significant for determining the correlates of political outcomes. In addition, RUCA codes are easy 
to aggregate together given the multiple levels of rurality and are easy to convert to larger 
geographic levels of zip code or county, although this complexity can also be unwieldly at times 
(Hart et al. 2005). 
 
 
Question wordings  
 
Vaccines Cause Autism:  
Can vaccines administered to children at young ages cause them to become autistic? 
[1]  They definitely can 
[2]  They probably can 
[3]  They probably cannot 
[4]  They definitely cannot 
 
Anti-Intellectualism Scale (Oliver and Rahn 2016): 
A. How much do you agree? I’d rather put my trust in the wisdom of ordinary people than in 
the opinions of experts and intellectuals. 
[1]  Strongly disagree 
[2]  Disagree 
[3]  Slightly disagree 
[4]  Neither agree nor disagree 
[5]  Slightly agree 
[6]  Agree 
[7]  Strongly agree 
 
B. How much do you agree? When it comes to really important questions, scientific facts 
don’t help much. 
[1]  Strongly disagree 
[2]  Disagree 
[3]  Slightly disagree 
[4]  Neither agree nor disagree 
[5]  Slightly agree 
[6]  Agree 




C. (reversed) How much do you agree? Ordinary people can really use the help of experts 
to understand complicated things like science. 
[1]  Strongly disagree 
[2]  Disagree 
[3]  Slightly disagree 
[4]  Neither agree nor disagree 
[5]  Slightly agree 
[6]  Agree 
[7]  Strongly agree 
 
Anti-Political Elite Scale (Oliver and Rahn 2016): 
A. How much do you agree? People like me don’t have much say in what government does. 
[1]  Strongly disagree 
[2]  Disagree 
[3]  Slightly disagree 
[4]  Neither agree nor disagree 
[5]  Slightly agree 
[6]  Agree 
[7]  Strongly agree 
 
B. How much do you agree? Politics usually boils down to a struggle between the people 
and the powerful. 
[1]  Strongly disagree 
[2]  Disagree 
[3]  Slightly disagree 
[4]  Neither agree nor disagree 
[5]  Slightly agree 
[6]  Agree 
[7]  Strongly agree 
 
C. How much do you agree? The system is stacked against people like me. 
[1]  Strongly disagree 
[2]  Disagree 
[3]  Slightly disagree 
[4]  Neither agree nor disagree 
[5]  Slightly agree 
[6]  Agree 
[7]  Strongly agree 
 
D. How much do you agree? Politics is ultimately a struggle between good and evil. 
[1]  Strongly disagree 
[2]  Disagree 
[3]  Slightly disagree 
[4]  Neither agree nor disagree 
[5]  Slightly agree 
[6]  Agree 
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[7]  Strongly agree 
Rural Identification Questions: 
A. Did you grow up in a small town or rural area? 
[1]  Yes 
[2]  No 
 
B. Do you currently live in a small town or rural area? 
[1]  Yes 
[2]  No 
 
Rural Identity Strength Questions: 
 Respondents only answered these questions if they chose “yes” to either of the rural 
identification questions above. Otherwise, they answered the five Metro Identity Strength 
questions listed below. 
 Question order was randomly assigned. 
A. How much is being from a small town or rural area part of your identity? 
[1]  A great deal 
[2]  A lot 
[3]  A moderate amount 
[4]  A little 
[5]  None at all 
 
B. How important is being a small town or rural resident to you? 
[1]  Extremely important 
[2]  Very important 
[3]  Moderately important 
[4]  Slightly important 
[5]  Not at all important 
 
C. How well does the term “small town or rural resident” describe you? 
[1]  Extremely well 
[2]  Very well 
[3]  Moderately well 
[4]  Slightly well 
[5]  Not well at all 
 
D. When talking about small town or rural residents, how often do you use “we” instead of 
“they”? 
[1]  Always 
[2]  Most of the time 
[3]  About half the time 
[4]  Sometimes 
[5]  Never 
 
E. To what extent do you think of yourself as being a small town or rural resident? 
[1]  A great deal 
[2]  A lot 
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[3]  A moderate amount 
[4]  A little 
[5]  None at all 
 
 
Metro Identity Strength Questions 
 Respondents only answered these questions if they did not say “yes” to either of the two 
rural identification questions listed above. 
 Question order was randomly assigned. 
A. How much is being from a metro area (suburbs/large cities) part of your identity? 
[1]  A great deal 
[2]  A lot 
[3]  A moderate amount 
[4]  A little 
[5]  None at all 
 
B. How important is being a resident of a metro area to you? 
[1]  Extremely important 
[2]  Very important 
[3]  Moderately important 
[4]  Slightly important 
[5]  Not at all important 
 
C. How well does the term “metro resident” describe you? 
[1]  Extremely well 
[2]  Very well 
[3]  Moderately well 
[4]  Slightly well 
[5]  Not well at all 
 
D. When talking about metro residents, how often do you use the term “we” instead of 
“they”? 
[1]  Always 
[2]  Most of the time 
[3]  About half the time 
[4]  Sometimes 
[5]  Never 
 
E. To what extent do you think of yourself as being a metro resident? 
[1]  A great deal 
[2]  A lot 
[3]  A moderate amount 
[4]  A little 
[5]  None at all 
 
Political Interest Questions 
A. How often do you pay attention to politics and elections? 
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[1]  Always 
[2]  Most of the time 
[3]  About half the time 
[4]  Sometimes 
[5]  Never 
 
B. How interested are you in information about what’s going on in government and politics? 
[1]  Extremely interested 
[2]  Very interested 
[3]  Somewhat interested 
[4]  Slightly interested 
[5]  Not at all interested 
 
Evangelical Question: 
Do you consider yourself an evangelical and/or born again Christian? 
 [1]  Yes 
 [2]  No 
 
Party Identity Question 
 
A. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, and 
Independent, or what? 
[1]  Republican 
[2]  Democrat 
[3]  Independent 
[4]  Other party 
 
B. (Only if Answered [2]  to question A): Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a 
not very strong Democrat? 
[1]  Strong Democrat 
[2]  Not very strong Democrat 
 
C. (Only if Answered [1]  to question A): Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a 
not very strong Republican? 
[1]  Strong Republican 
[2]  Not very strong Republican 
 
D. (Only if Answered [3]  or [4]  to question A): Do you think of yourself as closer to the 
Republican Party or the Democratic Party? 
[1]  Democratic 
[2]  Republican 










Rural Binary Subjective Identification and Vaccine Misinformation Endorsement 
 
Table A6.2 below displays how many respondents endorsed the outcome variable according to 
binary rural versus non-rural identifiers. For non-rural residents in the sample, 127/472, or 27% 
reported that vaccines definitely or probably cause autism. However, for rural residents, 134/339 
– 37% - reported that vaccines definitely or probably cause autism. Furthermore, a t-test of the 
mean score for vaccine-autism endorsement between rural and non-rural resident groups is 




Table A6.2: Number of Respondents from Lucid data who endorse vaccine misinformation, by 
rural versus non-rural. 
 Vaccines Definitely 
Do Not or Probably 
Do Not Cause Autism 






345 127 472 
Rural (Subjective) 205 134 339 
 650 263  
Note: weighted data. 
 
 
Additional Rural Identity Strength Distribution (Lucid data) 
 
Figure A6.1: Rural identity strength distributions for current and grew up rural residents versus 





Additional Regression Tables (Lucid data) 
 
Table A6.3: Predicting vaccine misinformation endorsement using Lucid data, with self-


































Note: Logit models, odds ratios shown. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are * 
< 0.05, ** < 0.01, and *** < 0.001. Bolded items indicate statistical significance. All variables 




 (1) (2) 




 (Current Rural 
Residents and Grew 
Up in Rural Areas 
only) 
(Current Rural 
Residents and Grew 
Up in Rural Areas 
only) 
   
Current Rural Resident 1.21 1.15 
 (0.33) (0.32) 
Rural ID Strength 3.60** 2.31 
 (1.85) (1.20) 
Anti-Intellectualism - 17.19*** 
  (13.02) 
Education Level 2.28 2.11 
 (1.39) (1.31) 
Income Level 0.34** 0.32** 




Party ID 2.34** 2.02** 
 (0.79) (0.70) 
Age 0.13*** 0.13*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) 
Gender 0.59** 0.63* 
 (0.15) (0.17) 
Black 2.64** 2.39** 
 (1.02) (0.94) 
Hispanic 1.52 1.50 
 (0.50) (0.51) 
Evangelical 1.43 1.24 
 (0.38) (0.34) 
Political Interest 1.15 1.32 
 (0.55) (0.63) 
Pseudo r2 0.14 0.17 
N 426.00 426.00 
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Section B Appendix: ANES Pilot Data 
 
Sample characteristics and weighting information for ANES (ANES) data 
 
Table A6.4: Sample characteristics and weighting for ANES (ANES pilot) data. 
 
Variable Raw ANES data Weighted ANES data 
Female 52% 52% 
College Degree 44% 41% 
Black 11% 12% 
Whtie 70% 68% 
Hispanic/Latino 11% 12% 
Democrat 32% 33% 
Independent 38% 26% 
Republican 27% 26% 
Mean Age 52 50 
Median Income $50,000 - $59,000 $50,000 - $59,000 
 






Question wordings – ANES 
 
Place and Place Identity Questions: 
 
Q1. Do you currently live in a rural area, small town, suburb, or a city?  
[1] I currently live in a rural area  
[2]  I currently live in a small town   
[3] I currently live in a suburb  
[4] I currently live in a city 
 
Q2. Growing up, did you mostly live in a rural area, small town, suburb, or a city?  
[1] I grew up in a rural area  
[2] I grew up in a small town  
[3] I grew up in a suburb  
[4] I grew up in a city  
 
Q3.  How important is being a ‘[fill]’ to your identity?  
Fill = [IF Q1 or Q2 <=4] [if Q1=1 or Q2=1 fill=”city person”; if Q1=2 or Q2=2 fill = 
“suburb person”; if Q1=3 or Q2=3 fill = “small town person”; if Q1=4 or Q2=4 fill = 
“country (or rural) person”]  
[1]  Not at all important  
[2] A little important  
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[3] Moderately important  
[4] Very important  
[5] Extremely important 
 
Anti-Intellectualism: 
Q1. When it comes to public policy decisions, whom do you tend to trust more, ordinary people 
or experts? 
[1] Trust ordinary people much more  
[2] Trust ordinary people somewhat more  
[3] Trust both the same  
[4] Trust experts somewhat more  
[5] Trust experts much more  
 
Q2. In general, how important should science be for making government decisions?  
[1] Not at all important  
[2] A little important  
[3] Moderately important  
[4] Very important 
[5] Extremely important  
 
Q3. How much do ordinary people need the help of experts to understand complicated things like 
science and health?  
[1] Not at all  
[2] A little 
[3] A moderate amount  
[4] A lot  
[5] A great deal 
 
 
Anti-Science/Health Misinformation DVs: 
 
Vaccine Misinformation. 
Note: Half of respondents received Q1a, while the other half received Q1b. 
 
Q1a. Which of these two statements do you think is most likely to be true?  
[1] Childhood vaccines cause autism  
[2] Childhood vaccines do not cause autism  
 
Q1b. Which of these two statements do you think is most likely to be true? 
[1] Most scientific evidence shows childhood vaccines cause autism  




Note: All respondents received Q2 below. 
 
Q2. Which of these two statements do you think is most likely to be true?  
[1] World temperatures have risen on average over the last 100 years 
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Note: Half of respondents received Q3a, while the other half received Q3b. 
 
Q1a. Which of these two statements do you think is most likely to be true?  
[1] Genetically modified foods are safe to eat  
[2] Genetically modified foods are not safe to eat 
 
Q1b. Which of these two statements do you think is most likely to be true? 
[1] Most scientific evidence shows genetically modified foods are safe to eat 
[2] Most scientific evidence shows genetically modified foods are not safe to eat 
 
Political Interest Question: 
Q1. Some people seem to follow what’s going on in government and public affairs most of the 
time, whether there’s an election going on or not. Others aren’t that interested. Would you say 
you follow what’s going on in government and public affairs most of the time, some of the time, 
only now and then, or hardly at all?  
[1] Most of the time  
[2] Some of the time  
[3] Only now and then  
[4] Hardly at all  
 
Evangelical Question: 
Do you consider yourself an evangelical and/or born again Christian? 
 [1]  Yes 
 [2]  No 
 
Party Identity Question 
 
Q1a. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, and 
Independent, or what? 
[1]  Republican 
[2]  Democrat 
[3]  Independent 
[4]  Other party 
 
Q1b. (Only if Answered [2]  to question Q1a): Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a 
not very strong Democrat? 
[1]  Strong Democrat 
[2]  Not very strong Democrat 
 
Q1c. (Only if Answered [1]  to question Q1a): Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a 
not very strong Republican? 
[1]  Strong Republican 




Q1d. (Only if Answered [3]  or [4]  to question Q1a): Do you think of yourself as closer to the 
Republican Party or the Democratic Party? 
[1]  Democratic 
[2]  Republican 
[3]  Neither 
 
Distribution of Rural Identity Importance  
 
Figure A6.2: The distribution of rural identity importance for current rural residents or for those 






Rural Binary Subjective Identification and Misinformation Endorsement Scale – ANES 
 
Table A6.5 below shows the distribution of rural versus non-rural respondents and the 
number of science/health misinformation endorsement items they support. For rural residents, the 
mean score on this scale is 0.97, while for non-rural residents, it is 0.83; this is a 4.5 percentage 
point difference. The results of a t-test comparing the mean score for the anti-science 



























308 341 182 48 958 
 1257 1153 583 145  
Note: weighted data. 
 
Table A6.6 below shows that, for non-rural residents in the sample, 314/2102, or 15% 
reported that vaccines cause autism. However, for rural residents, 148/884 – 18% - reported that 
vaccines cause autism. Furthermore, a t-test of the mean score for vaccine-autism endorsement 
between rural and non-rural resident groups is marginally significant (probability of rejecting the 
null hypothesis that the two means are equal is 0.08). Although the urban-rural difference is less 
pronounced, the effect is similar to that found in the Lucid data.  
 
Table A6.6: Number of respondents from ANES who endorse vaccine misinformation, by rural 
versus non-rural. 





Non-Rural Resident 1788 314 2102 
Current or Grew Up 
Rural Resident 
736 148 884 
 2524 462  
Note: weighted data. 
 
Table A6.7: Number of respondents from ANES who reject global warming, by rural versus non-
rural. 





Non-Rural Resident 1612 495 2106 
Current or Grew Up 
Rural Resident 
621 267 889 
 2233 762  




Table A6.8: Number of respondents from ANES for each GMO response, by rural versus non-
rural. 
 GMOs safe GMOs unsafe  
Non-Rural Resident 1155 947 2102 
Current or Grew Up 
Rural Resident 
439 446 885 
 1594 1393  
Note: weighted data. 
 
 As mentioned above, the ANES data set also includes measures of global warming 
skepticism. Table A6.7 above shows global warming endorsement by rural versus non-rural. 
495/2106, or 24%, of non-rural residents are global warming skeptics, compared to 267/889, or 
30%, of rural residents. A t-test of the mean difference between rural versus non-rural residents is 
statistically significant at a probability of less than 0.0001.  
 Finally, Table A6.8 above shows evaluations of GMO safety by non-rural versus rural 
respondents. 947/2102, or 45%, of non-rural residents believe GMOs are unsafe for consumption. 
Conversely, 446/886, or 50%, of rural residents believe the same. A t-test of the mean difference 




Additional Regression Tables for ANES Data 
 
The table below displays the results for the three science/health misinformation 
dependent variables. Models 1, 4, and 7 show bivariate regressions indicating that rural identity 
importance does significantly and positively predict misinformation acceptance for all three 
dependent variables. Also in line with expectations, rural identity importance becomes 
insignificant when anti-intellectualism is added into the model; theoretically, if anti-
intellectualism mediates the relationship between rural identity and the outcome variables, then 
the effect of rural identity and the outcome variables should weaken and/or become insignificant. 
However, for models without anti-intellectualism but with control variables (Models 2, 5, and 8), 
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once control variables are added rural identity importance is statistically significant only for 
global warming (Model 5) and not for GMOs or vaccine misinformation endorsement. 
 
Table A6.9: Predicting vaccine misinformation endorsement, global warming skepticism, and 
GMOs being unsafe, using weighted ANES data, for current or grew up rural residents only. 

































          
Rural ID 
Importance 
2.24*** 1.63 1.55 2.54**
* 
1.65* 1.57 1.50* 1.49 1.43 






- - 10.87*** - - 20.06*
** 
- - 2.35** 
   (5.83)   (10.71)   (0.93) 
Education 
Level 
- 0.74 0.95 - 0.96 1.27 - 1.43 1.56 
  (0.31) (0.38)  (0.35) (0.47)  (0.44) (0.48) 




  (0.55) (0.56)  (0.28) (0.29)  (0.09) (0.09) 




- 1.09 0.92 
  (0.79) (0.59)  (1.98) (1.45)  (0.27) (0.24) 
Age - 2.70** 4.61*** - 0.70 1.33 - 0.78 0.93 
  (1.30) (2.39)  (0.31) (0.63)  (0.31) (0.38) 
Female - 1.04 1.06 - 0.83 0.84 - 1.39** 1.39** 
  (0.24) (0.25)  (0.15) (0.16)  (0.23) (0.23) 
Black - 2.61** 2.74*** - 1.10 1.17 - 1.20 1.18 
  (0.99) (1.03)  (0.45) (0.47)  (0.39) (0.38) 
Hispanic - 1.25 1.04 - 1.33 1.06 - 1.12 1.05 
  (0.46) (0.40)  (0.49) (0.43)  (0.37) (0.36) 
Born Again 
Christian 
- 2.01*** 1.75** - 1.85**
* 
1.56** - 1.11 1.04 
  (0.48) (0.41)  (0.37) (0.32)  (0.20) (0.19) 
Political 
Interest 
- 1.28 1.42 - 1.12 1.28 - 0.74 0.79 
  (0.49) (0.55)  (0.39) (0.45)  (0.20) (0.21) 
Midwest - 0.35** 0.35** - 1.12 1.17 - 1.11 1.11 
  (0.15) (0.15)  (0.35) (0.38)  (0.30) (0.31) 
South  - 0.69 0.67 - 0.94 0.93 - 0.90 0.90 
  (0.21) (0.21)  (0.26) (0.27)  (0.21) (0.21) 
West - 1.16 1.11 - 1.14 1.12 - 0.81 0.80 
  (0.39) (0.37)  (0.36) (0.36)  (0.22) (0.21) 
r2          
N 894.00 740.00 740.00 898.00 745.00 745.00 893.0
0 
741.00 741.00 
Logit model, odds ratios shown. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are * < 0.05, 
** < 0.01, and *** < 0.001. Bolded items indicate statistical significance. All variables have 




 The results in Models 2 and 8 therefore run counter to the expectations laid out for the 
argument. To further investigate this dynamic, recall that the vaccine-autism dependent variable 
and the GMO safety variable are comprised of two separate questions: whether the individual 
personally believes the misinformation, or, whether the individual believes scientific consensus 
endorses the misinformation. I therefore replicate Models 1, 3, 7, and 9 in the above table, but for 
these two separate measures. The results can be found in Table A6.10 below. From these results, 
a pattern emerges: rural identity importance significantly and positively predicts the perception 
that scientific consensus endorses misinformation, i.e., that GMOs are unsafe and that vaccines 
cause autism. This is apparent in Models 3 and 7. Furthermore, the effect of rural identity 
importance is attenuated when anti-intellectualism is added into the models (Models 4 and 8). 
Conversely, rural identity importance does not predict personal misinformation endorsement 
(Models 1-2 and 5-6). 
 
Table A6.10: Predicting personal belief versus perception of scientific consensus for vaccine 
misinformation endorsement and GMOs being unsafe, using weighted ANES data, for current or 
grew up rural residents only. 













































         
Rural ID 
Importance 
1.55 1.23 3.77*** 2.90* 0.97 0.97 2.38*** 2.22** 




- 6.86** - 20.83*** - 3.14* - 1.58 
  (5.89)  (14.57)  (1.99)  (0.79) 
Education 
Level 
- 1.54 - 0.65 - 1.84 - 1.40 
  (0.92)  (0.36)  (0.85)  (0.58) 
Income - 0.49 - 2.39 - 0.18*** - 0.25** 
  (0.43)  (2.39)  (0.12)  (0.14) 
Party ID - 1.98 - 1.55 - 0.61 - 1.55 
  (0.93)  (0.76)  (0.23)  (0.57) 
Age - 2.21 - 14.42*** - 0.75 - 1.04 
  (1.50)  (13.15)  (0.45)  (0.54) 
Female - 1.26 - 0.81 - 1.10 - 1.66** 
  (0.43)  (0.29)  (0.27)  (0.38) 
Black - 3.26** - 2.23 - 1.12 - 1.44 
  (1.76)  (1.26)  (0.59)  (0.59) 
Hispanic - 1.36 - 0.61 - 0.73 - 1.63 
  (0.68)  (0.41)  (0.35)  (0.71) 
Born Again 
Christian 
- 1.75* - 1.66 - 1.43 - 0.76 
  (0.55)  (0.63)  (0.39)  (0.20) 
Political 
Interest 
- 1.50 - 1.11 - 0.87 - 0.65 
  (0.84)  (0.64)  (0.36)  (0.23) 
Midwest - 0.32** - 0.43 - 1.51 - 0.81 
  (0.18)  (0.28)  (0.63)  (0.31) 
South - 0.56 - 0.81 - 0.96 - 0.84 
  (0.24)  (0.39)  (0.34)  (0.27) 
West - 0.80 - 1.39 - 0.89 - 0.69 
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  (0.37)  (0.74)  (0.34)  (0.26) 
pr2         
N 418.00 344.00 476.00 396.00 420.00 346.00 473.00 395.00 
         
Logit model, odds ratios shown. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are * < 0.05, 
** < 0.01, and *** < 0.001. Bolded items indicate statistical significance. All variables have 










































Section C Appendix: Experimental Pilot Data (Study 5) 
 
Sample Characteristics and Weighting Information for Experimental Data 
 




















Note. Comparison of the study’s Lucid (Experimental data) data to known population 
benchmarks. CPS = Current Population Survey (US Census, 2017). ANES = American National 
Election Study (2016). Although CPS is a better benchmark given its sample size and 
representativeness, I use weighted ANES data when CPS information is not available (CPS does 
not ask questions about Party ID). Weights in column two adjust for gender, education, race, age, 
and income. Party ID is not included in the weighting formula, and is shown only due to the 




Experiment Treatments and Question Wordings – Experimental data 
 
Experiment 
Respondents began the survey either as being in the control group or in the treatment group 
(random assignment). Those in the control group did not receive any experimental prompt and 
proceeded immediately to the dependent variable (whether vaccines cause autism). Those in the 
treatment group first saw a screen displaying the following: 






Female 51% 51% 52% CPS 2017 
College 
Degree 
41% 26% 30% CPS 2017 
Black 13% 13% 12% CPS 2017 
White 68% 65% 65% CPS 2017 
Hispanic 13% 16% 15% CPS 2017 
Democrat 36% 36% 34% ANES (Wgt.) 
Republican 38% 39% 28% ANES (Wgt.) 
Independent 26% 25% 32% ANES (Wgt.) 
Mean Age 44 46 47 ANES (Wgt.) 
Median 
Income 









Then, after selecting the blue button with the right-facing arrow, respondents saw a new screen 
with the experimental dependent variable (vaccines cause autism).  
All respondents were debriefed at the end of the survey. In this debrief, respondents were told that 
the excerpt was not actually from a local newspaper, and that they were told this deception to 





Vaccines Cause Autism (Experimental DV):  
Can vaccines administered to children at young ages cause them to become autistic? 
[1]  They definitely can 
[2]  They probably can 
[3]  They probably cannot 
[4]  They definitely cannot 
 
Anti-Intellectualism Scale: 
A. How much do you agree? I’d rather put my trust in the wisdom of ordinary people than in 
the opinions of experts and intellectuals. 
[1]  Strongly disagree 
[2]  Disagree 
[3]  Slightly disagree 
[4]  Neither agree nor disagree 
[5]  Slightly agree 
[6]  Agree 
[7]  Strongly agree 
 
B. How much do you agree? When it comes to really important questions, scientific facts 
don’t help much. 
[1]  Strongly disagree 
[2]  Disagree 
[3]  Slightly disagree 
[4]  Neither agree nor disagree 
[5]  Slightly agree 
[6]  Agree 
[7]  Strongly agree 
 
C. (reversed) How much do you agree? Ordinary people can really use the help of experts 
to understand complicated things like science. 
[1]  Strongly disagree 
[2]  Disagree 
[3]  Slightly disagree 
[4]  Neither agree nor disagree 
[5]  Slightly agree 
[6]  Agree 
[7]  Strongly agree 
 
Rural Identification Questions 
A. What best describes the community where you grew up? 
[1]  City 
[2]  Suburb 
[3] Small Town 
[4] Rural 
 
B. Which best describes the community where you live now? 
[1]  City 
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[2]  Suburb 
[3] Small Town 
[4] Rural 
 
Political Interest Question 
How interested are you in politics? 
 [1] Very interested 
 [2] Moderately interested 
 [3] Slightly interested 
 [4] Not at all interested 
 
Evangelical Question: 
Do you consider yourself an evangelical and/or born again Christian? 
 [1]  Yes 
 [2]  No 
 
Party Identity Questions 
 
A. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, and 
Independent, or what? 
[1]  Republican 
[2]  Democrat 
[3]  Independent 
[4]  Other party 
 
B. (Only if Answered [2]  to question A): Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a 
not very strong Democrat? 
[1]  Strong Democrat 
[2]  Not very strong Democrat 
 
C. (Only if Answered [1]  to question A): Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a 
not very strong Republican? 
[1]  Strong Republican 
[2]  Not very strong Republican 
 
D. (Only if Answered [3]  or [4]  to question A): Do you think of yourself as closer to the 
Republican Party or the Democratic Party? 
[1]  Democratic 
[2]  Republican 
[3]  Neither 
 
 





Table A6.12: Distribution of rural residency versus rural/small town residency, experimental 
conditions, and anti-intellectualism (Experimental data). 
Control Cond.   
  # of respondents if anti-
intellectualism is less 
than the mean (0.42) 
 Non-rural 72 
 Rural 36 
Treatment Cond.   
 Non-rural 98 
 Rural 20 
Unweighted data. 
The above table (A12) suggests that many of the calculations done for rural residency 
only (as opposed to rural/small town residency) are problematic due to there being very few 
individuals in some of these groups. For this reason, I perform all analyses looking at rural 
residents versus non-rural residents, as well as looking at rural/small town residents versus non-
rural/small town residents. Furthermore, histograms of key variables, including anti-
intellectualism, show that higher levels of anti-intellectualism are fairly uncommon across the 
board (Figure A3). This uneven distribution is further evidence that certain analyses could be 
prone to high levels of variance if only rural resident/non-rural resident is used. 
 
 
















Experimental data Means, unweighted data 
 
Figure A6.4 below shows the mean anti-intellectualism scores for rural and non-rural respondents 
for each condition. Rural respondents in the control group had an average anti-intellectualism 
score of 0.33 (95% CI = [0.26, 0.40]), while rural respondents in the treatment group had a mean 
score of 0.44 [95% CI = [0.38, 0.44]). Although there is slight overlap in the confidence level 
intervals, neither confidence level interval includes the mean score of the other group. A t-test of 
the means between these two treatment groups for rural respondents rejects the null hypothesis 
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that the means are the same with a probability of 0.04. This suggests a distinct and significant 
difference in means; exposure to the treatment group for rural respondents yielded higher anti-
intellectualism scores, on average, compared to those in the control. 
Figure A6.4: Replicates Figure 3 but with unweighted data. Average anti-intellectualism scores 
by experimental condition and rural identification. 
 
 
For non-rural respondents, the mean anti-intellectualism score was 0.41 (95% CI = [0.35, 0.53]) 
for those in the control group and 0.36 (95% CI = [0.33, 0.39]) for those in the treatment group. 
This time, the means are in the confidence interval range of the other mean. However, a t-test of 
the means between these two treatment groups for non-rural respondents rejects the null 
hypothesis that the means are the same with a probability of 0.02. Therefore, exposure to the 





Additional Analyses for Experimental data 
 
As expected, the interaction between the experimental conditions and rural residency remains 
positive and significant, controlling for other variables.  
 
Table A6.13: Predicting anti-intellectualism with the interaction between treatment group and 


































Treatment = 1 -0.05 
 (0.03) 
Treatment X 







Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are * < 0.05, ** < 0.01, and *** < 0.001. 
Bolded items indicate statistical significance. All variables have been recoded to range from zero 
to one. Data weighted to population benchmarks. 
 
 
Table A6.14: Replication of Table A3.3 analyses using bivariate, and then unweighted models.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Anti-Intellectualism Anti-Intellectualism Anti-Intellectualism 
Rural Res. Only -0.05 -0.08** -0.08** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Income - - 0.03 
   (0.04) 
Party ID - - 0.14*** 
   (0.03) 
Age - - -0.15*** 
   (0.05) 
Female - - -0.01 
   (0.02) 
Black - - 0.04 
   (0.04) 
Hispanic - - 0.04 
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   (0.03) 
Political 
Interest 
- - -0.01 
   (0.03) 
Education level   -0.01 
   (0.01) 
Born Again 
Christian 
- - 0.09*** 
   (0.02) 
Treatment = 1 -0.04 -0.05** -0.05** 




0.14** 0.16** 0.13** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Constant 0.40*** 0.41*** 0.40*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) 
Adj. r2 0.02 0.01 0.19 
N 359.00 359.00 336.00 
Above table predicts anti-intellectualism with the interaction between treatment group and rural 
respondent as the primary independent variable. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance 
levels are * < 0.05, ** < 0.01, and *** < 0.001. Bolded items indicate statistical significance. All 
variables have been recoded to range from zero to one. Model 1 data weighted to population 





























Section D Appendix: Study 6 Experimental Replication Data 
 
Sample Characteristics  
 





















*Note: Rural here is defined as respondent specifying whether they lived or grew up in a small 
town or in a rural area. 
**Note: N = 495. Respondents were asked the attention check question; of 504 respondents, 9 
failed. These respondents were removed. 
 
 
Number of Respondents Per Experimental Condition 
 
Table A6.16: Number of respondents per experimental condition, by rural/nonrural. 
 Control Group Treatment Group 
All respondents 264 240 
Rural/Small Town only (RUCA 7-
10) 
23 13 
Non-Rural/Small Town only 
(RUCA 7-10) 
241 227 
Rural only (self-identified – current 
or grew up rural or small town) 
113 107 
Variable December 2020 Lucid data  
Female 52%  
College Degree 40%  
Black 11%  
White 78%  
Hispanic 15%  
Democrat 43%  
Republican 25%  
Independent 25%  
Mean Age 46  
Median Income $50-54,999  
Rural (RUCA 7 - 10) 7%  
Rural (Self-Identified) * 44%  
N 495**  
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Non-rural only (self-identified – 





Cross-Tabulation of Objective, Subjective, and Identity Measures 
 
For ease of interpretation, rural social identity has been divided into thirds. 
Table A6.17. Number of objective and subjective respondents with a rural social identity 





Rural (Subjective) 0 27 
Non-Rural (Subjective) 0 116 
Note: N = 143 
 
Table A6.18. Number of objective and subjective respondents with a rural social identity 









Note: N = 190 
 
Table A6.19. Number of objective and subjective respondents with a rural social identity 





Rural (Subjective) 23 79 
Non-Rural (Subjective) 0 60 
Note: N = 162 
 
The objective and subjective measures of rural residency are correlated at 0.26. The subjective 
rurality measure is correlated with rural social identity strength at 0.37, while the objective 
rurality measure (binary) is correlated with rural social identity strength at 0.27 (also 0.27 with 
the continuous objective measure of rurality). 
 
 
Anti-Intellectualism OLS Regressions 
 
This section verifies the correlations found in the experimental replication section by controlling 
for other factors using OLS regression models with anti-intellectualism as the dependent variable. 
The results are below. 
Table A6.20. Predicting Anti-Intellectualism using Rural Designations and Control Variables. 
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 Anti-Intellectualism  Anti-Intellectualism  
 (3-question) (2-question) 












 (0.04) (0.05) 
Female -0.02 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Age -0.08 -0.12* 
 (0.04) (0.06) 
Black 0.04 0.06 
 (0.03) (0.04) 
Hispanic 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.04) 
Income -0.05 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.04) 
Education 0.01 0.00 
 (0.05) (0.06) 
Republican 0.05* 0.08* 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Democrat -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
Liberal -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
Conservative 0.02 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
Constant 0.35*** 0.39*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) 
r2 0.18 0.21 
N 463.00 463.00 
Standard errors in parentheses, values re-coded from zero to one.  
Bolded items statistically significant; significance levels at  
* p < 0.05, ** p <0.01, and ***p < 0.001. All respondents included. 
Measures for control variables from Lucid demographic data,  
except for liberal and conservative; 
respondents were asked which of the following ideological labels 
they identify with, and if respondents picked ‘conservative’ or ‘liberal’ 








Experimental Results for Non-Rural Respondents 
 
 
Figure A6.5. Mean Anti-Intellectualism Scores for Non-Rural Respondents Only (self-identified) 





























Note: left-hand graph shows the three-question anti-intellectualism scale means with control 
condition mean = 0.34 and treatment condition mean = 0.43. This difference in means is 
statistically significant according to a t-test (0.002). The right-hand graph shows the two-
question anti-intellectualism scale means with the control condition = 0.38 and the treatment 
condition = 0.51. This difference in means is also statistically significant according to a t-test (< 
0.0001). 
 
 
 
